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Background This study explores the facilitating and inhibiting factors in the design/development, implementation, and applicability/evaluation of value-based payment models of integrated care. The Delphi technique was used to reach consensus among a panel of (inter)national experts on these factors. Methods An expert panel of 15 members participated in a three-round Delphi study. Factors from experts and literature were used to compile a list of 40 facilitators and 40 inhibitors. Afterwards, experts were asked to rate the importance of these factors using a 5-point Likert scale. Results Eight facilitating (e.g., transparency, communication, and trust among involved stakeholders) and seven inhibiting factors (e.g., lack of motivation and engagement among involved stakeholders) achieved full consensus. Timely availability of data and an integrated information technology system for data registration (a facilitator) were the only factors achieving full consensus through a very high agreement. Conclusions Adequate outcome measures, targets, benchmarks, and incentives are important in value-based payment models. The less quantifiable items, such as strong leadership, transparency, communication and trust, and motivation and engagement of the involved stakeholders, are also important for successful adoption of these models and promote high-quality care at lower or equal costs. Highlights – Delphi study identifies key facilitating and inhibiting factors for effective value-based payment models. – Success of these models relies on measurable factors such as outcome measures, and intangibles like trust and leadership. – \"Hard-to-measure\" contextual factors play an important role in value-based payment model success across healthcare organizations. – Prioritize teamwork and clear goals before tailoring these models for optimal value, benefiting patients globally.

Policy Points Six states received $250 million under the federal State Innovation Models (SIM) Initiative Round 1 to increase the proportion of care delivered under value‐based payment (VBP) models aligned across multiple payers. Multipayer alignment around a common VBP model occurred within the context of state regulatory and purchasing policies and in states with few commercial payers, not through engaging many stakeholders to act voluntarily. States that made targeted infrastructure investments in performance data and electronic hospital event notifications, and offered grants and technical assistance to providers, produced delivery system changes to enhance care coordination even where VBP models were not multipayer. Context In 2013, six states (Arkansas, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Vermont) received $250 million in Round 1 State Innovation Models (SIM) awards to test how regulatory, policy, purchasing, and other levers available to state governments could transform their health care system by implementing value‐based payment (VBP) models that shift away from fee‐for‐service toward payment based on quality and cost. Methods We gathered and analyzed qualitative data on states’ implementation of their SIM Initiatives between 2014 and 2018, including interviews with state officials and other stakeholders; consumer and provider focus groups; and review of relevant state‐produced documents. Findings State policymakers leveraged existing state law, new policy development, and federal SIM Initiative funds to implement new VBP models in Medicaid. States’ investments promoted electronic health information going from hospitals to primary care providers and collaboration across care team members within practices to enhance care coordination. Multipayer alignment occurred where there were few commercial insurers in a state, or where a state law or state contracting compelled commercial insurer participation. Challenges to health system change included commercial payer reluctance to coordinate on VBP models, cost and policy barriers to establishing bidirectional data exchange among all providers, preexisting quality measurement requirements across payers that impede total alignment of measures, providers’ perception of their limited ability to influence patients’ behavior that puts them at financial risk, and consumer concerns with changes in care delivery. Conclusions The SIM Initiative's test of the power of state governments to shape health care policy demonstrated that strong state regulatory and purchasing policy levers make a difference in multipayer alignment around VBP models. In contrast, targeted financial investments in health information technology, data analytics, technical assistance, and workforce development are more effective than policy alone in encouraging care delivery change beyond that which VBP model participation might manifest.

Introduction Outcome-based payment models (OBPMs) might solve the shortcomings of fee-for-service or diagnostic-related group (DRG) models using financial incentives based on outcome indicators of the provided care. This review provides an analysis of the characteristics and effectiveness of OBPMs, to determine which models lead to favourable effects. Methods We first developed a definition for OBPMs. Next, we searched four data sources to identify the models: (1) scientific literature databases; (2) websites of relevant governmental and scientific agencies; (3) the reference lists of included articles; (4) experts in the field. We only selected studies that examined the impact of the payment model on quality and/or costs. A narrative evidence synthesis was used to link specific design features to effects on quality of care or healthcare costs. Results We included 88 articles, describing 12 OBPMs. We identified two groups of models based on differences in design features: narrow OBPMs (financial incentives based on quality indicators) and broad OBPMs (combination of global budgets, risk sharing, and financial incentives based on quality indicators). Most (5 out of 9) of the narrow OBPMs showed positive effects on quality; the others had mixed (2) or negative (2) effects. The effects of narrow OBPMs on healthcare utilization or costs, however, were unfavourable (3) or unknown (6). All broad OBPMs (3) showed positive effects on quality of care, while reducing healthcare cost growth. Discussion Although strong empirical evidence on the effects of OBPMs on healthcare quality, utilization, and costs is limited, our findings suggest that broad OBPMs may be preferred over narrow OBPMs.

Healthcare reimbursements in the United States have been traditionally based on a fee-for-service (FFS) scheme, providing incentives for high volume of care, rather than efficient care. The new healthcare legislation tests new payment models that remove such incentives, such as the bundled payment (BP) system. We consider a population of patients (beneficiaries). The provider may reject patients based on the patient’s cost profile and selects the treatment intensity based on a risk-averse utility function. Treatment may result in success or failure, where failure means that unforeseen complications require further care. Our interest is in analyzing the effect of different payment schemes on outcomes such as the presence and extent of patient selection, the treatment intensity, the provider’s utility and financial risk, and the total system payoff. Our results confirm that FFS provides incentives for excessive treatment intensity and results in suboptimal system payoff. We show that BP could lead to suboptimal patient selection and treatment levels that may be lower or higher than desirable for the system, with a high level of financial risk for the provider. We also find that the performance of BP is extremely sensitive to the bundled payment value and to the provider’s risk aversion. The performance of both BP and FFS degrades when the provider becomes more risk averse. We design two payment systems, hybrid payment and stop-loss mechanisms, that alleviate the shortcomings of FFS and BP and may induce system optimum decisions in a complementary manner. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management .

To combat adverse selection, governments increasingly base payments to health plans and providers on enrollees' scores from risk-adjustment formulae. In 2004, Medicare began to risk-adjust capitation payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to reduce selection-driven overpayments. But because the variance of medical costs increases with the predicted mean, incentivizing enrollment of individuals with higher scores can increase the scope for enrolling \"overpriced\" individuals with costs significantly below the formula's prediction. Indeed, after risk adjustment, MA plans enrolled individuals with higher scores but lower costs conditional on their score. We find no evidence that overpayments were on net reduced.

Context: There is a widespread belief that the US health care system needs to move \"from volume to value.\" This transformation to value (eg, quality divided by cost) is conceptualized as a two-fold movement: (1) from fee-for-service to alternative payment models; and (2) from solo practice and freestanding hospitals to medical homes, accountable care organizations, large hospital systems, and organized clinics like Kaiser Permanente. Methods: We evaluate whether this transformation is happening quickly, shifting risk to providers, lowering costs, and improving quality. We draw on recent evidence on provider payment and organization and their effects on cost and quality. Findings: Data suggest a low prevalence of provider risk payment models and slow movement toward new payment and organizational models. Evidence suggests the impact of both on cost and quality is weak. Conclusions: We need to be patient in expecting system improvements from ongoing changes in provider payment and organization. We also may need to look for improvements in other areas of the economy or to accept and accommodate prospects of modest improvements over time.

We examine changes in firms' dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Agency theories predict a decrease in dividend payments to the extent that improved public information lowers managers' need to convey their commitment to avoid overinvestment via costly dividend payouts. Conversely, dividends could increase if minority investors are in a better position to extract cash dividends. We test these predictions by analyzing the dividend payment behavior of a global sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws. Both events serve as proxies for a general improvement of the information environment and, hence, the corporate governance structure in the economy. We find that, following the two events, firms are less likely to pay (increase) dividends, but more likely to cut (stop) such payments. The changes occur around the time of the informational shock, and only in countries and for firms subject to the regulatory change. They are more pronounced when the inherent agency issues or the informational shocks are stronger. We further find that the information content of dividends decreases after the events. The results highlight the importance of the agency costs of free cash flows (and changes therein) for shaping firms' payout policies.

OBJECTIVE:To examine changes in more and less discretionary condition-specific postacute care use (skilled nursing, inpatient rehabilitation, home health) associated with Medicare accountable care organization (ACO) implementation. DATA SOURCES:2009–2014 Medicare fee-for-service claims. STUDY DESIGN:Difference-in-difference methodology comparing postacute outcomes after hospitalization for hip fracture and stroke (where rehabilitation is fundamental to the episode of care) to pneumonia, (where it is more discretionary) for beneficiaries attributed to ACO and non-ACO providers. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:Across all 3 cohorts, in the baseline period ACO patients were more likely to receive Medicare-paid postacute care and had higher episode spending. In hip fracture patients where rehabilitation is standard of care, ACO implementation was associated with 6%–8% increases in probability of admission to a skilled nursing facility or inpatient rehabilitation (compared with home without care), and a slight reduction in readmissions. In a clinical condition where rehabilitation is more discretionary, pneumonia, ACO implementation was not associated with changes in postacute location, but episodic spending decreased 2%–3%. Spending decreases were concentrated in the least complex patients. Across all cohorts, the length of stay in skilled nursing facilities decreased with ACO implementation. CONCLUSIONS:ACOs decreased spending on postacute care by decreasing use of discretionary services. ACO implementation was associated with reduced length of stay in skilled nursing facilities, while hip fracture patients used institutional postacute settings at higher rates. Among pneumonia patients, we observed decreases in spending, readmission days, and mortality associated with ACO implementation.

Context: During the 1980s and 1990s, innovations in the organization, funding, and delivery of primary health care in Canada were at the periphery of the system rather than at its core. In the early 2000s, a new policy environment emerged. Methods: This policy analysis examines primary health care reform efforts in Canada during the last decade, drawing on descriptive information from published and gray literature and from a series of semistructured interviews with informed observers of primary health care in Canada. Findings: Primary health care in Canada has entered a period of potentially transformative change. Key initiatives include support for interprofessional primary health care teams, group practices and networks, patient enrollment with a primary care provider, financial incentives and blended-payment schemes, development of primary health care governance mechanisms, expansion of the primary health care provider pool, implementation of electronic medical records, and quality improvement training and support. Conclusions: Canada's experience suggests that primary health care transformation can be achieved voluntarily in a pluralistic system of private health care delivery, given strong government and professional leadership working in concert.

Policy Points The predominantly fee‐for‐service reimbursement architecture of the US health care system contributes to waste and excess spending. While the past decade of payment reforms has galvanized the adoption of alternative payment models and generated moderate savings, uptake of truly population‐based payment systems continues to lag, and interventions to date have had limited impact on care quality, outcomes, and health equity. To realize the promise of payment reforms as instruments for delivery system transformation, future policies for health care financing must focus on accelerating the diffusion of value‐based payment, leveraging payments to redress inequities, and incentivizing partnerships with cross‐sector entities to invest in the upstream drivers of health.