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This study will prove useful in expanding our understanding of the United Nations as the body with capacity, suitability, and competence to assume the role of governing and carrying out a global design of the Global Tax Governance architecture, as well as s well as to establish the bases, principles and areas of international tax cooperation. Public International Law rules and general “Principles and Purposes” of the Global Legal Order have been extrapolated to international tax law to achieve this conclusion. Furthermore, we propose the creation of an international organization on International Fiscal Cooperation and Global Fiscal Governance within the UN family itself. International tax cooperation is a crucial instrument to enhance domestic public resources and to avoid international tax fraud fighting against the flow of illicit capital, as stated in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the 2030 Agenda of United Nations, Monterrey Consensus and Doha Declaration. Nowadays, after the covid-19 pandemic, it is an unquestionable necessity.

This paper examines the efficiency of destination-and origin-based consumption taxes, in the presence of consumption generated perfect cross-border pollution spillovers, when tax revenue either finances public pollution abatement or it is lump-sum distributed. When consumption tax revenue finances the provision of public pollution abatement and regions have identical and quasi-linear preferences then, the non-cooperative equilibrium origin-based consumption taxes are efficient, while the destination-based consumption taxes are inefficiently low. When, however, consumption tax revenue is lump-sum distributed, then, the destination-based tax principle leads to inefficiently low taxes, while the origin-based tax principle leads either to inefficiently high or low taxes.

The Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of Indonesia in the Paris Agreement targeted emission reductions of 29% on its own and 41% with international cooperation in 2030, followed by Net Zero Emissions (NZE) in 2060. To achieve NZE, Indonesia enacted a carbon tax policy on April 1, 2022. The 2022–2024 carbon tax is limited to Steam Power Plants and will be imposed on other sectors by 2030. This research examines the ratio legis of carbon cost policies in Indonesia and compares the core of carbon tax policies in Indonesia with Sweden and Finland. Indonesia is starting to implement a Carbon Pricing policy under the ‘Cap-and-Tax’ scheme. The Cap scheme will be a means to force changes in the business culture in Indonesia, so the companies will pay attention to and reduce the carbon emission produced to avoid paying penalties for carbon exceeding the limits. Meanwhile, the Carbon Tax will provide economic resources to Indonesia to develop environmentally friendly technologies, fund research on renewable energy, and provide incentives for environmentally friendly businesses during the transition process to a carbon culture in Indonesia. Referring to the results of the comparison of carbon pricing policies in Finland and Sweden, Indonesia can gradually increase the cost of carbon taxes starting from Rp30,000/US$2 per ton CO2 equivalent to US$10 per ton CO2 equivalent. Meanwhile, for the imposition of high carbon tax rates, such as in Finland (US$73.02 per ton CO2 equivalent) and Sweden (US$137 per ton CO2 equivalent), Indonesia must carry out tax reforms, so the applied carbon tax is able to reduce carbon emissions without causing adverse impacts for the Indonesian economy.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate and provide pathways for leveraging the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD’s) Ten Global Principles (TGPs) for countering tax crimes in the EU. Design/methodology/approach The study is guided by the combination of traditional and innovative research methods drawn from criminal law and justice, public regulatory theory and tax law, based on socio-legal and comparative methodologies. Findings The research shows that EU has achieved considerable amount of progress when it comes to meeting the TGPs. However, law and practice in EU Member States indicate that there are different legal, human and organisational approaches to fighting tax crimes. The TGPs could be strategically applied to complementing the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) and other initiatives on Administrative Cooperation. Research limitations/implications Although the TGPs appear encompassing, there are opportunities to harness the potency of these principles and to provide more tailored principles that can help engineer sustainable remedies for countering tax crimes in the EU. Practical implications The paper critically analyses, through a multidisciplinary approach, the main legal, human and organisational factors influencing the prosecution of tax crimes in the EU Member States. Social implications Realignment and harmonisation of tax enforcement paractices in the EU Member States thus help in the reduction of tax gap resulting from tax offences. Originality/value The paper provides novel approaches and findings based on empirical info obtained from face-to-face focus groups with end users and law enforcement agencies in tax enforcement eco-system in ten different EU Member States.

Value-added tax, the most common form of consumption tax in the world, operates on a destination principle to ensure it is levied only in the place of final consumption in cases of cross-border transactions. The international trade in services and intangibles through digital means poses two challenges: finding the place of consumption and collecting the tax when services supplied by businesses in one jurisdiction are instantaneously consumed by customers in another. This article examines these challenges and considers how unilateral action and soft international responses have so far failed to achieve consistent destination basis taxation. An alternative option would be to adopt a hard multilateral response that would overcome the limitations of unilateralism and soft-law approaches and achieve consistent destination basis taxation in the digitalised economy.

The article is devoted to the study of tax residency of an individual in the context of globalization and modern conditions of international cooperation.

In the national and supranational legal area, the need to address the ne bis in idem principle is justified by the growing interest aroused by the most recent pronouncements of the European Courts. The principle prohibits anyone who has already been acquitted or convicted in a previous trial from being tried again. Moreover, it has become a fundamental right enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The interest in the issue also derives from the need to understand whether the approach of the Italian legal system – or any other similar national order – can be considered compliant with European tax law and case law, based on the definitions of criminal and tax offences. Thus, talking about a European legal space means rethinking the idea of punitive power in a dimension that tends to be ‘solidarity-based’. The State can consider itself impervious to repressive demands from outside but is instead called to cooperate actively to safeguard its own guarantees. The traditional self-referential conception of criminal repression effectively summarised in the expression ‘punitive sovereignty’ gives way to an idea of jurisdiction that draws directly from the principle of mutual recognition. In this scenario, the profile of the protection of the individual from the risk of a duplication of the exercise of punitive power for the same fact in different states assumes the role of the first magnitude. Hence, there is a need to act on two levels at the same time: to seek solutions aimed at resolving possible conflicts of jurisdiction (prohibition of competing prosecutions for the same fact), and to attribute, within each Member State, preclusive effects to the previously judged foreigner (ne bis in idem).

Neutrality plays a central role in the literature on international taxation. In its most prevalent form, the concept of neutrality posits that in order to maximize aggregate global welfare, capital needs to flow to where it would produce the highest pretax return. The thesis of this Article is that neutrality is ordinarily inapplicable in the field of international taxation. When considering neutrality in the international arena, the problem that one encounters is that the term \"international taxation\" is commonly used to describe a number of very different types of tax regimes (what the Article refers to as \"intranational taxation,\" \"supranational taxation,\" and \"interjurisdictional taxation\"). Although the literature tends not to distinguish among them, the different types of international tax regimes are conceptually distinct and require radically dissimilar guiding principles. The Article argues that neutrality is an appropriate principle with regard to only one type of international taxation: a hypothetical non-Pigouvian supranational tax. With regard to intranational taxation, neutrality has no role to play, as a rational country will exploit its tax system to promote the welfare of its own constituents without regard to which investments it would have attracted in a no-tax world. With regard to a hypothetical Pigouvian supranational tax and in particular with regard to the much-scrutinized field of inter-jurisdictional taxation, neutrality is irrelevant, as here it is the after-tax return and not the pretax return that is determinative of allocative efficiency. Promoting neutrality would undermine the very goals that the principle of neutrality purports to serve. The Article concludes by noting that the current discourse with regard to international taxation is fraught with conceptual confusion. First, there is a tendency to rely upon concepts that were developed within the context of domestic taxation without a thorough examination of their applicability to the international arena. Second, there is a tendency to lump together a number of very distinct types of tax regimes under the overbroad category of international taxation, and to ignore the fact that due to the fundamental dissimilarities among them, the principles of tax theory relevant to each will also be different.

A prominent theme in the discourse of international taxation is that taxing rights should follow wealth production. Examples of current attempts to implement such a proposition include the OECD’s BEPS project and the frequently heard calls to adopt some form of international formulary apportionment. In considering the validity of this proposition, the Article will rely on the familiar dichotomy in moral philosophy between the right and the good. In the context of international taxation, the right involves a host country’s deontological claim to receive a portion of the income produced within its borders. The good involves the claim that host countries need revenue from multinational enterprises (MNEs) to fund public goods. Although the literature often conflates these two claims, they are distinct and require separate analysis. Within the realm of the right, we must make a further distinction between two different types of right-based claims. On the one hand, a host country may assert that MNEs who choose to operate in its territory take upon themselves an implicit contractual obligation to pay tax as delineated in the host country’s laws. When the host country imposes an income tax, MNEs are in effect contractually obligated to pay the host country a percentage of the income generated by their economic activity in the host country. Alternatively, the host country may assert a neo-Lockean claim to a commensurate share of the wealth that its social capital—in the broadest possible sense of the term—helped to create. Regarding the contractual claim, I argue that the terms of the contract are in almost all cases delineated by the host country’s tax legislation. In effect the host country offers a standard-form contract to foreign entities, which then signify their assent by investing or otherwise operating in the host country’s territory. Consequently, if the terms of the agreement are difficult to enforce, the most obvious response would be to adopt terms that are more easily enforceable. I posit that the reason host countries do not do so is because a stricter tax regime would make it difficult to compete for international investments against countries whose tax systems are easier to manipulate. In other words, the so-called “loopholes” are actually part and parcel of the implicit contractual arrangement between the host country and the MNE. The neo-Lockean argument is that creation of wealth within a country’s borders is effectively a joint project involving the exploitation of the MNE’s resources along with the social capital—in the broadest sense of the term—of the host country. Under neo-Lockean theory, the host country is entitled to a share of the income commensurate with its contribution to the production of that wealth, and income tax is the means by which it asserts that right. Profit shifting by MNEs understates the wealth actually created within the host country’s territory and prevents the host country from claiming its fair share of that income. I contend that this argument too does not succeed. First, from the mere fact that an MNE derives wealth from its operations in the territory of a certain country, it does not necessarily follow that the host country’s social capital contributes in any meaningful way to the production of that wealth. Second, even when there is reliance upon the social capital of the host country, the MNE will in most cases pay for its exploitation of the host country’s social capital via factor prices (particularly salaries and rent). Third, to the extent that the positive contribution of its social capital is not reflected in factor prices, the host country should be able effectively to impose tax on foreign entities. Its desire for more MNE tax revenue than it is capable of collecting in a competitive atmosphere constitutes at least prima facia evidence that it wants more than its actual contribution to the creation of wealth. Moving from the right to the good, it is often asserted that budgetary exigencies of host countries require that they collect taxes from MNEs and that without such revenue their ability to supply essential public good would be seriously curtailed. However, this utilitarian claim does nothing to support the proposition that taxing rights should follow the production of wealth. In allocating taxing rights under the umbrella of the good, it is needs and the capacity to meet those needs that should dictate taxing power. To which of any number countries the international tax regime should grant the power to tax a particular MNE’s income in the name of the good would be a function of the extent to which granting the taxing power to any particular country would promote total human happiness. The location of wealth production is irrelevant from this perspective. The Article concludes by considering why the principle that taxing rights should follow value creation has gained such prominence in the discourse on international taxation. I speculate that what actually motivates countries is a parochial concept of the good in which the welfare of their constituents takes precedence over the welfare of others. However, as it is difficult to seek international cooperation to implement such a principle, they instead attempt to justify their position in terms of an objective principle, even if that principle ultimately lacks a normative justification.

This paper addresses the issue of the regulations contained in the Fiscal Procedure Code regarding the general principles that must govern the conduct of the parties throughout the fiscal procedure. The enunciation and regulation of these principles produce particularly important effects, and we have referred to some of them in the content of this paper. Therefore, the paper includes the presentation, critical analysis, observations and conclusions regarding the principle of legality of the fiscal procedure applied by the fiscal bodies of the state and of the administrative-territorial units, the unitary application of the fiscal legislation on the entire national territory, the exercise of the fiscal body's right of discretion in assessing and interpreting evidence and information that may be considered relevant for the correct determination of the taxpayer's fiscal situation, the active role recognized to the fiscal body by the legislator and under which it is entitled to examine the facts, obtain and use the information and the documents it deems useful for determining the taxpayer's fiscal situation, the official language in the fiscal administration and how documents and information presented in other languages can be used, the taxpayer's right to be heard in the fiscal administration procedure and its limits according to the practice of the fiscal bodies of the Romanian state, but also in the vision of the judges of the Court of Justice of the European Union called to censor these practices, the obligation of cooperation established by the legislator exclusively in the taxpayer's charge, the maintenance of fiscal secrecy as a general obligation of the fiscal body significantly diluted by numerous exceptions, and, last but not least, good faith in the relations between the taxpayer and the fiscal body for the correct application of the legal provisions.