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Recent developments in global politics and international relations theory have raised questions about the strength of international norms. Critical constructivists identify instances of norm change, contestation, and even regress, arguing that norms may be less deeply internalized and more fragile than often assumed. This study builds on contemporary constructivist scholarship to advance a model of elite-driven norm change with stages of redefinition and substitution through contestation. It conducts a plausibility probe of the model by analyzing the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the US-led program that appeared designed to change normative principles from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation and from freedom of navigation on the high seas to maritime interdiction of suspect weapons and technology shipments. The model lends valuable insights on the evolution of norms to accommodate new realities over the last decade, and it suggests the need for more contingent and multi-linear theories of international cooperation.

As a US-led coalition operation designed to obstruct weapons proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is especially applicable to North Korea. Though practical measures have been developed to implement the interdiction of seaborne weapons shipments in particular, the PSI has yet to be rendered consistent with the international legal regime supporting free navigation of the high seas. Nor has it attracted specific United Nations support. A review of the 1962 'quarantine' of Cuba demonstrates that in the absence of a more restrictive approach towards Pyongyang and conclusive evidence that North Korean weapons capability poses a current threat to the United States, the appellation 'Cuba Lite' is not inappropriate. Furthermore, in the context of multilateral diplomacy intended to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for security guarantees, the PSI may be interpreted as pressuring Pyongyang and thus may not be perceived – even by PSI coalition partners – as consistent with that diplomacy.

The recent North Korean crisis is the latest phase in a lengthy U.S.-North Korean deterrence relationship. That relationship, particularly its problems and limitations, is reviewed and the effectiveness of each side's contemporary deterrence posture is assessed. It is noted that deterrence and compellence have not prevented the emergence of the North's nuclear proliferation efforts, nor has it brought North Korea a large improvement in security. The recent crisis is also examined to assess the mistakes in U.S. efforts to further pursue deterrence and compellence to end the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Lessons of the crisis for the use of deterrence for system security management are briefly discussed.

Since 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative has been an important element in the battle against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States, Japan and Australia were prominent in its development, and they have now been joined by more than 80 other states, including New Zealand. The dangers of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists was a key motivator, as was recognition that existing arms control treaties and arrangements contained loopholes that could be exploited by non-state actors or terrorists. A major focus has been the interception of shipments of weapons or components by sea, but the PSI also aims to prevent their movement by land or air.

During the summer of 2005, the United States concluded two additional reciprocal ship-boarding agreements. These agreements, an element of the Proliferation Security Initiative, establish procedures for expedited notification and flag-state authorization for boarding and inspection of vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern.

Reports on debate within South Korea about whether to support U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative against North Korea.

Reports on South Korean likely decision to join Proliferation Security Initiative following North Korean announcement of missile test and notes South Korean public's concerns about issue.

Forwards proposed South Korean statement supporting Proliferation Security Initiative.