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Economics 'A significant amount of research has tended to highlight the adverse effects of keeping rents below market levels' Note: this was written in late February before WHO declared COVID-ig a pandemic, which has prompted lockdowns around the globe. The evidence is not all one-way, though, with research rightly identifying the benefits of rent capping for hard-pressed tenants, particularly those at risk of displacement as rents move upwards. [...]a 2019 paper published in the American Economic Review, entitled The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco', is an exhaustive study finding that good intentions in this area are likely to prove counterproductive.

The high-frequency trading arms race is a symptom of flawed market design. Instead of the continuous limit order book market design that is currently predominant, we argue that financial exchanges should use frequent batch auctions: uniform price double auctions conducted, for example, every tenth of a second. That is, time should be treated as discrete instead of continuous, and orders should be processed in a batch auction instead of serially. Our argument has three parts. First, we use millisecond-level direct-feed data from exchanges to document a series of stylized facts about how the continuous market works at high-frequency time horizons: (i) correlations completely break down; which (ii) leads to obvious mechanical arbitrage opportunities; and (iii) competition has not affected the size or frequency of the arbitrage opportunities, it has only raised the bar for how fast one has to be to capture them. Second, we introduce a simple theory model which is motivated by and helps explain the empirical facts. The key insight is that obvious mechanical arbitrage opportunities, like those observed in the data, are built into the market design—continuous-time serial-processing implies that even symmetrically observed public information creates arbitrage rents. These rents harm liquidity provision and induce a never-ending socially wasteful arms race for speed. Last, we show that frequent batch auctions directly address the flaws of the continuous limit order book. Discrete time reduces the value of tiny speed advantages, and the auction transforms competition on speed into competition on price. Consequently, frequent batch auctions eliminate the mechanical arbitrage rents, enhance liquidity for investors, and stop the high-frequency trading arms race.

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal income taxes that do not condition on how much of an individual's income is earned in each of the two activities. These optimal taxes feature an externality-corrective term, the magnitude of which depends both on the Pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent-seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted and on the relative impact of rent-seeking externalities on the private returns to traditional and to rent-seeking activities. If rent-seeking externalities primarily affect other rent-seekers, for example, the optimal correction lies strictly below the Pigouvian correction. A calibrated model indicates that the gap between the Pigouvian and optimal correction can be quantitatively important. Our results thus point to a hefty informational requirement for correcting rent-seeking externalities through the income tax code.

In light of the advent of Airbnb, rent gap theory can be helpful for understanding how tourist rentals affect residential rental housing. It is argued that on those properties currently rented to residents, rental payments are not only ‘actual ground rent’, but also ‘potential ground rent’. The shift from a residential to a touristic use of rental housing thereby creates a potential ground rent. Taking as a case study the Palma Old Quarter in Mallorca, Spain, this paper analyses the evolution of the stock, prices, and revenues of residential rentals vis-à-vis tourist rentals and finds that, because it is more profitable to rent to tourists than to residents, the number of houses listed on Airbnb has increased, housing affordability for residents has shrunk, and the threat of displacement has increased. 随着爱彼迎的出现，租金差距理论有助于了解旅游租赁如何影响居住租赁。有人认为，对于目前租给居民的房产，租金不仅是“实际地租”，还包括“潜在地租”。从居住到旅游租赁的转变从而创造了潜在地租。以西班牙马略卡岛帕尔马老城区为例，本文分析了居住租赁的存量房、价格和收入相对于旅游租赁的演变，并发现，由于旅游租赁比居住租赁更有利可图，挂在爱彼迎上的房屋数量增加，居民住房负担能力下降，流离失所的威胁增加了。

We present the approach to comparative economic development of Why Nations Fail. Economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions—those which create broad based incentives and opportunities in society. Extractive economic institutions, which lack these properties, create poverty. Variation in economic institutions is created by differences in political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the result of political choices which arise under inclusive political institutions: a strong state and a broad distribution of power in society. When either of these conditions fails one has extractive political institutions that lead to extractive economic institutions. We relate our analysis to Tullock’s notion of ‘rent seeking’.

Research in strategy has identified and tried to explain four types of rents: monopolistic rents, efficiency rents, quasi rents, and Schumpeterian rents. Building on previous work on political and institutional strategies, we add a fifth type of rent: influence rents. Influence rents are the extra profits earned by a firm because the rules of the game (laws, regulations, and informal rules) are designed or changed to suit it. To aid the analysis of the relationship between institutional context and firm performance and to provide a structure to guide research, we develop a framework with five key components: (a) an identification of the five fundamental problems of a market economy, (b) a typology that describes the five different types of institutions that emerge to solve these problems, (c) the market-ordering mechanisms used by institutions to solve these problems, (d) the common causes of weak institutional performance, and (e) generic strategies used by firms to exploit these weaknesses of an institutional context to enhance firm performance. We highlight potential applications of the framework as well as an illustrative research agenda that can advance the development of theory to explain the emergence and persistence of influence rents.

Ideas are strangely absent from modern models of political economy. In most prevailing theories of policy choice, the dominant role is instead played by “vested interests”—elites, lobbies, and rent-seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public. Any model of political economy in which organized interests do not figure prominently is likely to remain vacuous and incomplete. But it does not follow from this that interests are the ultimate determinant of political outcomes. Here I will challenge the notion that there is a well-defined mapping from “interests” to outcomes. This mapping depends on many unstated assumptions about the ideas that political agents have about: 1) what they are maximizing, 2) how the world works, and 3) the set of tools they have at their disposal to further their interests. Importantly, these ideas are subject to both manipulation and innovation, making them part of the political game. There is, in fact, a direct parallel, as I will show, between inventive activity in technology, which economists now routinely make endogenous in their models, and investment in persuasion and policy innovation in the political arena. I focus specifically on models professing to explain economic inefficiency and argue that outcomes in such models are determined as much by the ideas that elites are presumed to have on feasible strategies as by vested interests themselves. A corollary is that new ideas about policy—or policy entrepreneurship—can exert an independent effect on equilibrium outcomes even in the absence of changes in the configuration of political power. I conclude by discussing the sources of new ideas.