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"Reasoning. Problem solving"
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White matter abnormalities are associated with the declined ability of reasoning and problem‐solving in major depressive disorder
Objectives Executive function in people with depression is linked to the integrity of white matter fibers in the brain. We hypothesized that the maze tests in neuropsychological tests assessed reasoning and problem‐solving abilities dependent on the integrity of brain white matter fibers, and assessed this relationship using diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) in depressed patients and healthy controls. Methods Participants aged from 18 to 50 years were recruited from Zhumadian Second People's Hospital from July 2018 to August 2019. The sample included 33 clinically diagnosed individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) and 24 healthy volunteers (HVs). All subjects underwent Neuropsychological assessment battery (NAB) maze tests and DTI. Tract‐based spatial statistics technology in FSL software was used to process DTI data, and threshold‐free cluster enhancement (TFCE) was used to perform multiple comparison corrections. The fractional anisotropy (FA) of white matter fibers in the MDD group and HVs group were compared and extracted. Pearson correlation was used to analyze the relationship between FA and NAB scores and HAMD scores. Results The mean NAB maze test score for the MDD group was lower than the HVs group, and the difference was statistically significant (F = 11.265, p = .037). The FA value of the body of corpus callosum and cerebral peduncle right in the depression group was lower than that in the healthy control group, and the difference was statistically significant (p < .05). FA value of the body of corpus callosum was positively correlated with NAB score (r = 0.400, p = .036), but not with the HAMD score (r = 0.065, p = .723). Conclusions The decreased ability of reasoning and problem‐solving in MDD may be due to the decreased integrity of the white matter fibers of the body of the corpus callosum. The NAB maze test score of MDD patients was lower than that of HVs group, The FA value of body of corpus callosum and cerebral peduncle right in depression group was lower than that in healthy control group. FA value of body of corpus callosum was positively correlated with NAB score, but not with HAMD score. The decreased ability of reasoning and problem‐solving in MDD may be due to the decreased integrity of white matter fibers of the body of the corpus callosum.
Journal Article
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
Journal Article
Simulation as an engine of physical scene understanding
In a glance, we can perceive whether a stack of dishes will topple, a branch will support a child’s weight, a grocery bag is poorly packed and liable to tear or crush its contents, or a tool is firmly attached to a table or free to be lifted. Such rapid physical inferences are central to how people interact with the world and with each other, yet their computational underpinnings are poorly understood. We propose a model based on an “intuitive physics engine,” a cognitive mechanism similar to computer engines that simulate rich physics in video games and graphics, but that uses approximate, probabilistic simulations to make robust and fast inferences in complex natural scenes where crucial information is unobserved. This single model fits data from five distinct psychophysical tasks, captures several illusions and biases, and explains core aspects of human mental models and common-sense reasoning that are instrumental to how humans understand their everyday world.
Journal Article
Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence
Myside bias occurs when people evaluate evidence, generate evidence, and test hypotheses in a manner biased toward their own prior opinions and attitudes. Research across a wide variety of myside bias paradigms has revealed a somewhat surprising finding regarding individual differences. The magnitude of the myside bias shows very little relation to intelligence. Avoiding myside bias is thus one rational thinking skill that is not assessed by intelligence tests or even indirectly indexed through its correlation with cognitive ability measures.
Journal Article
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.
Journal Article
The role of individual differences in cognitive training and transfer
Working memory (WM) training has recently become a topic of intense interest and controversy. Although several recent studies have reported near- and far-transfer effects as a result of training WM-related skills, others have failed to show far transfer, suggesting that generalization effects are elusive. Also, many of the earlier intervention attempts have been criticized on methodological grounds. The present study resolves some of the methodological limitations of previous studies and also considers individual differences as potential explanations for the differing transfer effects across studies. We recruited intrinsically motivated participants and assessed their need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42:116–131,
1982
) and their implicit theories of intelligence (Dweck,
1999
) prior to training. We assessed the efficacy of two WM interventions by comparing participants’ improvements on a battery of fluid intelligence tests against those of an active control group. We observed that transfer to a composite measure of fluid reasoning resulted from both WM interventions. In addition, we uncovered factors that contributed to training success, including motivation, need for cognition, preexisting ability, and implicit theories about intelligence.
Journal Article
Identification of the Social and Cognitive Processes Underlying Human Cumulative Culture
The remarkable ecological and demographic success of humanity is largely attributed to our capacity for cumulative culture, with knowledge and technology accumulating over time, yet the social and cognitive capabilities that have enabled cumulative culture remain unclear. In a comparative study of sequential problem solving, we provided groups of capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and children with an experimental puzzlebox that could be solved in three stages to retrieve rewards of increasing desirability. The success of the children, but not of the chimpanzees or capuchins, in reaching higher-level solutions was strongly associated with a package of sociocognitive processes—including teaching through verbal instruction, imitation, and prosociality—that were observed only in the children and covaried with performance.
Journal Article
Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions
Human reasoning has been characterized as often biased, heuristic, and illogical. In this article, I consider recent findings establishing that, despite the widespread bias and logical errors, people at least implicitly detect that their heuristic response conflicts with traditional normative considerations. I propose that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical and probabilistic knowledge that is intuitive and that is activated automatically when people engage in a reasoning task. I sketch the basic characteristics of these intuitions and point to implications for ongoing debates in the field.
Journal Article