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Using a field experiment in a 401(k) plan, we measure the effect of disseminating information about peer behavior on savings. Low-saving employees received simplified plan enrollment or contribution increase forms. A randomized subset of forms stated the fraction of age-matched coworkers participating in the plan or age-matched participants contributing at least 6% of pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: the presence of peer information decreased the savings of nonparticipants who were ineligible for 401(k) automatic enrollment, and higher observed peer savings rates also decreased savings. Discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to drive this reaction.

Defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make explicit choices for themselves. We study such \"active decisions\" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take thirty months to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment (i.e., default enrollment), standard enrollment (i.e., default nonenrollment), or active decisions (i.e., no default and compulsory choice). Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous. Financial illiteracy, however, favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.

Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While results are theory-specific, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or—contrary to common wisdom—at zero.

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of employer-provided health insurance, Medicare, and Social Security on retirement behavior. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Our results suggest that Medicare is important for understanding retirement behavior, and that uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply responses to Medicare. Half the value placed by a typical worker on his employer-provided health insurance is the value of reduced medical expense risk. Raising the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 leads individuals to work an additional 0.074 years over ages 60-69. In comparison, eliminating 2 years worth of Social Security benefits increases years of work by 0.076 years.

This study used data from the 2018 National Financial Capability Study to investigate the association between financial hardship and retirement planning behaviors. Results from logistic regressions showed that respondents with high difficulty making ends meet were more likely to calculate retirement needs and more likely to own a non-employer sponsored retirement plan. The perceived over-indebtedness was positively associated with owning an employer-sponsored account while negatively associated with owning a non-employer-sponsored account. Financial fragility was associated with a lower likelihood of calculating retirement needs and having a retirement account. The results of additional generational analyses revealed that the difficulty making ends meet and the perceived over-indebtedness showed different patterns with retirement planning behavior across three generations. In contrast, financial fragility showed consistent and negative associations with the retirement planning behaviors across generations.

We identify employees at seven companies whose 401(k) investment choices are dominated because they are contributing less than the employer matching contribution threshold despite being vested in their match and being able to make penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for any reason because they are older than 59½. At the average firm, 36% of match-eligible employees over age 59½ forgo arbitrage profits that average 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. A survey educating employees about the free lunch they are forgoing raised contribution rates by a statistically insignificant 0.67% of income among those completing the survey.

As firms switch from defined‐benefit plans to defined‐contribution plans, employees bear more responsibility for making decisions about how much to save. The employees who fail to join the plan or who participate at a very low level appear to be saving at less than the predicted life cycle savings rates. Behavioral explanations for this behavior stress bounded rationality and self‐control and suggest that at least some of the low‐saving households are making a mistake and would welcome aid in making decisions about their saving. In this paper, we propose such a prescriptive savings program, called Save More Tomorrow™ (hereafter, the SMarT program). The essence of the program is straightforward: people commit in advance to allocating a portion of their future salary increases toward retirement savings. We report evidence on the first three implementations of the SMarT program. Our key findings, from the first implementation, which has been in place for four annual raises, are as follows: (1) a high proportion (78 percent) of those offered the plan joined, (2) the vast majority of those enrolled in the SMarT plan (80 percent) remained in it through the fourth pay raise, and (3) the average saving rates for SMarT program participants increased from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent over the course of 40 months. The results suggest that behavioral economics can be used to design effective prescriptive programs for important economic decisions.

Target-date funds in corporate retirement plans grew from $5 billion in 2000 to $734 billion in 2018, partly because federal regulation sanctioned these as default investments in automatic enrollment plans. We show that adopters delegated pension investment decisions to fund managers selected by plan sponsors. Inclusion of these funds in retirement saving menus raised equity shares, boosted bond exposures, curtailed cash/company stock holdings, and reduced idiosyncratic risk. The adoption of low-cost target-date funds may enhance retirement wealth by as much as 50% over a 30-year horizon.

The issue of pensions has become increasingly topical. This paper presents the ordered weighted averaging real average pension (OWARAP) operator. The OWARAP operator is based on the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator and calculates the future average retirement benefit taking into account price changes. Moreover, this work extends the OWARAP operator by using order-inducing variables, generalized means, and probabilities. This paper ends by analyzing the applicability of the OWARAP operator and its extensions in forecasting the real average Social Security benefits for retired workers in each state of the United States (U.S.). The results demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach in retirement decision making. First published online 30 April 2024

People who engage with their retirement savings are more likely to opt out of unsuitable defaults. We use cluster analysis of matched survey and administrative data to identify groups of pension plan members that are alike in their attitudes toward retirement saving. We find that engaged and disengaged members segregate into groups based on their interest and trust. Group membership in turn helps predict plan engagement, as proxied by nondefault choices. Specifically, engagement is stronger among interested groups. Trust, however, has a more complex relationship with engagement, particularly as it interacts with interest. While members with low interest and high trust are less likely to engage (e.g., by not checking plan performance), less trusting members engage more (e.g., by actively choosing asset allocations). As interest and trust successfully determine group membership, and ultimately engagement, pension plan providers should address members’ diverse needs and circumstances with personalized approaches.