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As one of the commonly used folk psychological concepts, self‐deception has been intensively discussed yet is short of solid ground from cognitive neuroscience. Self‐deception is a biased cognitive process of information to obtain or maintain a false belief that could be both self‐enhancing or self‐diminishing. Study 1 (N = 152) captured self‐deception by adopting a modified numerical discrimination task that provided cheating opportunities, quantifying errors in predicting future performance (via item‐response theory model), and measuring the belief of how good they are at solving the task (i.e., self‐efficacy belief). By examining whether self‐efficacy belief is based upon actual ability (true belief) or prediction errors (false belief), Study 1 showed that self‐deception occurred in the effortless (easier access to answer cues) rather than effortful (harder access to answer cues) cheating opportunity conditions, suggesting high ambiguity in attributions facilitates self‐deception. Studies 2 and 3 probed the neural source of self‐deception, linking self‐deception with the metacognitive process. Both studies replicated behavioral results from Study 1. Study 2 (ERP study; N = 55) found that the amplitude of frontal slow wave significantly differed between participants with positive/self‐enhancing and negative/self‐diminishing self‐deceiving tendencies in incorrect predictions while remaining similar in correct predictions. Study 3 (functional magnetic resonance imaging study; N = 33) identified self‐deceiving associated activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and showed that effortless cheating context increased cheating behaviors that further facilitated self‐deception. Our findings suggest self‐deception is a false belief associated with a distorted metacognitive mental process that requires ambiguity in attributions of behaviors. Self‐deception occurs in the effortless cheating opportunity context. The amplitude of the frontal slow wave reflects self‐deceiving tendencies. Self‐deception displays alterations in the amPFC activity patterns.

In this paper, we provide a perspective into the main ideas and findings emerging from the growing literature on motivated beliefs and reasoning. This perspective emphasizes that beliefs often fulfill important psychological and functional needs of the individual. Economically relevant examples include confidence in ones' abilities, moral self-esteem, hope and anxiety reduction, social identity, political ideology, and religious faith. People thus hold certain beliefs in part because they attach value to them, as a result of some (usually implicit) tradeoff between accuracy and desirability. In a sense, we propose to treat beliefs as regular economic goods and assets—which people consume, invest in, reap returns from, and produce, using the informational inputs they receive or have access to. Such beliefs will be resistant to many forms of evidence, with individuals displaying non-Bayesian behaviors such as not wanting to know, wishful thinking, and reality denial.

Investigations of women’s same-sex relationships present a paradoxical pattern, with women generally disliking competition, yet also exhibiting signs of intrasexual rivalry. The current article leverages the historical challenges faced by female ancestors to understand modern women’s same-sex relationships. Across history, women were largely denied independent access to resources, often depending on male partners’ provisioning to support themselves and their children. Same-sex peers thus became women’s primary romantic rivals in competing to attract and retain relationships with the limited partners able and willing to invest. Modern women show signs of this competition, disliking and aggressing against those who threaten their romantic prospects, targeting especially physically attractive and sexually uninhibited peers. However, women also rely on one another for aid, information, and support. As most social groups were patrilocal across history, upon marriage, women left their families to reside with their husbands. Female ancestors likely used reciprocal altruism or mutualism to facilitate cooperative relationships with nearby unrelated women. To sustain these mutually beneficial cooperative exchange relationships, women may avoid competitive and status-striving peers, instead preferring kind, humble, and loyal allies. Ancestral women who managed to simultaneously compete for romantic partners while forming cooperative female friendships would have been especially successful. Women may therefore have developed strategies to achieve both competitive and cooperative goals, such as guising their intrasexual competition as prosociality or vulnerability. These historical challenges make sense of the seemingly paradoxical pattern of female aversion to competition, relational aggression, and valuation of loyal friends, offering insight into possible opportunities for intervention.

We present results from a \"corruption game\" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism.

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.

Based on ethical faded theory, this paper examines the relationship between emotional neglect and unethical behavior via self-deception under the influence of employee Machiavellianism. A two-phased survey involving 253 managerial employees of various private sector service organizations was conducted in the Punjab province of Pakistan. Data showed sufficient reliability and validity of existing measures used in this study. The conditional process analysis revealed that employees emotionally neglected at work indulged in unethical behavior and that self-deception by such employees explained this mechanism. Employee Machiavellianism moderated the relationship between self-deception and unethical behavior, indicating that the indirect effect of emotional neglect on unethical behavior would be more robust for employees with high levels of Machiavellianism in their personalities. Findings help understand the antecedents and conditions that promote unethical behavior at work and warrant the need for effective managerial strategies to prevent it. Implications of these findings have been discussed.

Self-deception has long been the subject of speculation and controversy in psychology, evolutionary biology and philosophy. According to an influential 'deflationary' view, the concept is an over-interpretation of what is in reality an instance of motivationally biased judgement. The opposite view takes the interpersonal deception analogy seriously, and holds that some part of the self actively manipulates information so as to mislead the other part. Building on an earlier self-signalling model of Bodner and Prelec, we present a game-theoretic model of self-deception. We propose that two distinct mechanisms collaborate to produce overt expressions of belief: a mechanism responsible for action selection (including verbal statements) and an interpretive mechanism that draws inferences from actions and generates emotional responses consistent with the inferences. The model distinguishes between two modes of self-deception, depending on whether the self-deceived individual regards his own statements as fully credible. The paper concludes with a new experimental study showing that self-deceptive judgements can be reliably and repeatedly elicited with financial incentives in a categorization task, and that the degree of self-deception varies with incentives. The study also finds evidence of the two forms of self-deception. The psychological benefits of self-deception, as measured by confidence, peak at moderate levels.

We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying. The results allow us to reject a type-based model. People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either “economic types” (who care only about consequences) or “ethical types” (who care only about process). Instead, we find that preferences for truthfulness are heterogeneous among individuals. Moreover, when examining possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying and their interplay with economic costs of truthfulness, we find that preferences for truthfulness are also heterogeneous within individuals.

Self-deception, a motivated process of maintaining false beliefs despite contrary evidence, is often depicted using anecdotes and philosophical hypotheses, with emerging yet scarce empirical data. This study aimed to examine the prevalence and frequency of self-deception in the general population, gather real-life examples, and explore essential elements and characteristics of self-deception (e.g., intentionality, awareness, motivations, contradictory evidence, strategies used to maintain self-deception). Participants (N= 228 university students, Mage = 21.7, SDage = 2.46, 71.9% women; the total number of respondents varied per question) received a mixed-methods survey with open-ended and multiple-choice questions on experiences of self-deception. Dispositional self-deception was also measured using the Self-Deceptive Enhancement Scale of the Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS; Paulhus, 1998). Findings revealed a high prevalence of self-deception (91.3%, n = 200) with high reported frequency (50.5%, n = 122). Participants reported denying and exaggerating information, due primarily to intrapersonal motivations (e.g., increased well-being and self-confidence). Self-deception was maintained by largely ignoring or avoiding contradictory evidence, and new evidence and social feedback led to its retraction. Notably, while dispositional self-deception was lower in our sample than in normative populations, it was negatively associated with the reported frequency of (situational) self-deception. The study discusses the importance of understanding essential elements and characteristics of self-deception in everyday situations and its relevance for legal settings.

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.