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With a new Introduction by the author An elegant and sane little book. - The New Statesman Myths, as Mary Midgley argues in this powerful book, are everywhere. In political thought they sit at the heart of theories of human nature and the social contract; in economics in the pursuit of self interest; and in science the idea of human beings as machines, which originates in the seventeenth century, is a today a potent force. Far from being the opposite of science, however, Midgley argues that myth is a central part of it. Myths are neither lies nor mere stories but a network of powerful symbols for interpreting the world. Tackling a dazzling array of subjects such as philosophy, evolutionary psychology, animals, consciousness and the environment in her customary razor-sharp prose, The Myths We Live By reminds us of the powerful role of symbolism and the need to take our imaginative life seriously. Mary Midgley is a moral philosopher and the author of many books including Wickedness, Evolution as a Religion, Beast and Man and Science and Poetry. All are published in Routledge Classics.

Discussing with generative artificial intelligence (GAI) has been recognized as a method for obtaining information. Researchers have noticed that students' ability to search, select, and evaluate information (e.g., their online information-searching strategies) may affect the quality of their learning and discussion with GAI. In this study, we conducted an experiment in an online science course to explore the role of online information-searching strategies (OISS) in the process of students discussing with GAI. A total of 46 high school students participated in the study. In the course, students wrote question prompts to the GAI, accessed information provided by the GAI, and composed their science reports. We collected the students' OISS tendency questionnaire, science reports, and the question prompt content they wrote to GAI. According to the results, students with higher OISS outperformed those with lower OISS in terms of content accuracy and logical descriptions in their science reports. The ordered network analysis (ONA) results showed a significant difference in the prompting sequences of the two groups of students. Students with higher OISS gradually developed their knowledge models of scientific concepts by organizing information and finding connections or inconsistencies among different types of knowledge. Students with lower OISS strategies focused more on content extension and consolidation of independent expertise. We labeled the higher OISS students as holism learners, while the lower OISS students were labeled as atomism learners. Lastly, the study findings underscore the importance of guiding students to comprehensively structure and synthesize their knowledge within GAI-based learning environments.

Purpose This study aims to correct errors in, and comment on the claims made in the comment papers of Rigdon (2022) and Henseler and Schuberth (2022), and to tidy up any substantive oversights made in Cadogan and Lee (2022). Design/methodology/approach The study discusses and clarifies the gap between Rigdon’s notion of scientific realism and the metaphysical, semantic and epistemological commitments that are broadly agreed to be key principles of scientific realism. The study also examines the ontological status of the variables that Henseler and Schuberth claim are emergent using emergence logic grounded in the notion that variables are only truly emergent if they demonstrate a failure of generative atomism. Findings In scientific realism, hypothetical causal contact between the unobserved and the observed is a key foundational stance, and as such, Rigdon’s concept proxy framework (CPF) is inherently anti-realist in nature. Furthermore, Henseler and Schuberth’s suggestion that composite-creating statistical packages [such as partial least squares (PLS)] can model emergent variables should be treated with skepticism by realists. Research limitations/implications Claims made by Rigdon regarding the realism of CPF are unfounded, and claims by Henseler and Schuberth regarding the universal suitability of partial least squares (PLS) as a tool for use by researchers of all ontological stripes (see their Table 5) do not appear to be well-grounded. Practical implications Those aspiring to do science according to the precepts of scientific realism need to be careful in assessing claims in the literature. For instance, despite Rigdon’s assertion that CPF is a realist framework, we show that it is not. Consequently, some of Rigdon’s core criticisms of the common factor logic make no sense for the realist. Likewise, if the variables resulting from composite creating statistical packages (like PLS) are not really emergent (contrary to Henseler and Schuberth) and so are not real, their utility as tools for scientific realist inquiry are called into question. Originality/value This study assesses PLS using the Eleatic Principle and examines H&S’s version of emergent variables from an ontological perspective.

Noting that the doctrine of the general resurrection attracted renewed attention after the Reformation, and after the atomist revival led to the displacement of traditional hylomorphism by alternative matter theories, this article surveys the ways in which the resurrection was discussed by leading natural philosophers in seventeenth‐century England. These include discussion of how bodily resurrection might be possible, what resurrected bodies will be like; as well as the nature of living conditions after the resurrection. It is indicated that the resurrection seems to have played a much less prominent place in the writings of natural philosophers than the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and other issues of natural theology. Reasons for this lack of prominence are tentatively offered, chiefly focusing on its unsuitability for combatting the perceived atheism of the time. It is hoped that this preliminary survey might inspire others to extend the survey, especially to cover Continental philosophers.

The Standard Picture holds that the contribution to the law made by an authoritative legal pronouncement is directly explained by the linguistic content of that pronouncement. This essay defends the Standard Picture from Mark Greenberg’s purported counterexamples drawn from patterns of statutory interpretation in U.S. criminal law. Once relevant features of the U.S. rule of recognition are admitted into the analysis—namely, that it arranges sources of law hierarchically, and that judicial decisions are sources of valid law—Greenberg’s counterexamples are revealed as only apparent, not genuine. The legal norms that result from the patterns of interpretation he identifies can be directly explained in terms of the linguistic contents of authoritative pronouncements: judicial decisions. Furthermore, those norms can be understood as modifications of the valid norms contained in their originating statutes because judicial decisions are permitted ‘explanatory intermediaries’ of statutes by the rule of recognition.

This academic paper provides a historical reflection on the problem of the origin of science in order to determine the reasons for differences in determining the date and content of the first scientific achievements. The application of historical-genetic research methods in the disciplinary aspect contributes to the distinction of particular scientific programs in the science body frame with a different relationship between the object and subject of cognition, the internal logic of ideas and worldviews. As a result, the existing research concerned with the conditions of knowledge function in different types of society or with the relations between the structure of knowledge and its purpose, was supplemented by an explication of forms of the continuity of program components – ontological, epistemological and axiological basis of specific scientific cognition/knowledge. In particular, it is established that the ancient world atomistic and peripatetic programs follow the structural pattern of the scientific explanation of the Pythagorean one (scientific and philosophical at the same time), contributing a new subject content in it.

In modern science and human activity, we increasingly refer to creative thinking that does not belong to the strict definition of art. Art studies and art theory should answer the questions that emerge in the complex interaction among diverse creative fields. Art experience may be considered as one of many different manifestations of creative thinking (general creativity). When we develop ideas involving heterogeneous nuclei, our thoughts aim to encompass or reflect upon the area in between their fusion. This paper proposes a method of implementing an introspective analysis that brings the artist to a new position—the position of an explorer of their own cognitive space.

The debate on the a fortiori and the universal that took place between April 1914 and April 1919 in the journal Mind has a double interest for argumentation theorists. First, the discussion is an example of a philosophical polylogue that exhibits the characteristics of a quasi-engaged dialogue (Blair Blair, J. A. (2012 [1998]). “The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument”. Argumentation 12, pp. 325–339. Reprinted in J.A. Blair, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation, pp. 231–244. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.), confirming Blair’s hypothesis that journal papers and scholarly monographs can be analyzed as turns in non-engaged or quasi-engaged dialogues. It could be said that philosophical argumentation is dialectical but not dialogical. Second, the debate is a discussion in argumentation theory. Generalism in the theory of argument claims that the very possibility of arguing depends on a suitable supply of general rules that specify what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from what kinds of data, while particularism denies this. Although the terminology may be alien, I will also show that the debate on the a fortiori and the universal was a debate on generalism and particularism.

The first half of the 17th century was a time of intellectual ferment when wars of natural philosophy were echoes of religious wars, as we illustrate by a case study of an apparently innocuous mathematical technique called adequality pioneered by the honorable judge Pierre de Fermat, its relation to indivisibles, as well as to other hocus-pocus. André Weil noted that simple applications of adequality involving polynomials can be treated purely algebraically but more general problems like the cycloid curve cannot be so treated and involve additional tools–leading the mathematician Fermat potentially into troubled waters. Breger attacks Tannery for tampering with Fermat’s manuscript but it is Breger who tampers with Fermat’s procedure by moving all terms to the left-hand side so as to accord better with Breger’s own interpretation emphasizing the double root idea. We provide modern proxies for Fermat’s procedures in terms of relations of infinite proximity as well as the standard part function.

This paper describes how hopes can be, and have been, placed in nanotechnology. Focusing on two recent UK government reports into the future of nanotechnology, by the DTI/OST and MoD, the paper describes how the disclosure of the nanoscale as a place subject to intervention, the act that is taken to define nanotechnology, can be understood in the context of anticipatory knowledge practices that create futures. Because the object of such practices are virtualities, such as opportunities and threats, the paper argues that affect is transversal to both nano-technoscience and anticipatory governance. In conclusion, I open up a set of questions about anticipatory knowledges and argue that the ground that enables hope to be placed in nanotechnology is the event that defines nano -to simultaneously reduce ' life' to matter and to multiply ' life' into a limitless set of materialities.