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When firms give money to candidates for public office, what return can they expect on their investment? Prior studies have been inconclusive, due to both methodological challenges and unique features of the U.S. political context on which they have focused. Using data from Brazil, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the effect of an electoral victory on government contracts for a candidate’s corporate donors. Firms specializing in public-works projects can expect a substantial boost in contracts—at least 14 times the value of their contributions—when they donate to a federal-deputy candidate from the ruling Workers’ Party (PT) and that candidate wins office. We find no effects among allied parties, indicating that the PT prioritizes this form of state spending for party strengthening rather than coalition management.

Oleksandra Keudel proposes a novel explanation for why some local governments in hybrid regimes enable citizen participation while others restrict it.She argues that mechanisms for citizen participation are by-products of political dynamics of informal business-political (patronal) networks that seek domination over local governments.

As revolutions swept across Central and South America in the 1820s and 1830s, Andrew Jackson’s administration undertook a landmark reform that transformed the US foreign policy apparatus into the nation’s first global bureaucracy. With the introduction of Edward Livingston’s 1833 consular reform bill to Congress, the nation embarked on a long path toward the modernization of its consular service in line with the powers of Europe and the new American republics. Despite the popularity of Livingston’s plan to turn a dated US consular service comprised of mercantile elites into a salaried professional bureaucracy, the Jacksonian consular reform dragged on for more than two decades before the passing of a consular bill in 1856. Contrary to Weberian models positing a straightforward path toward bureaucratization, the trajectory of Jacksonian consular reform demonstrates the power of mercantile elites to resist central government regulation just as much as it highlights how petty partisans—the protégé consuls appointed via the Jacksonian “spoils system”—powerfully shaped government policy to achieve personal advantages. In the constant tug-of-war between merchant-consuls and Jacksonian protégés, both groups mobilized competing visions of the “national character” in their correspondence with the Department of State and in the national press. Ultimately, the Jacksonian reform vision of an egalitarian and loyal consular officialdom prevailed over the old mercantile model of consulship as a promoter of national prestige and commercial expertise, but only after protégé consuls successfully exploited merchant-consuls’ perceived inability to compete with the salaried European officials across the sister-republics of the southwestern hemisphere.

This book addresses an important issue and debate in public administration: the politicization of civil service systems and personnel. Using a comparative framework the authors address issues such as compensation, appointments made from outside the civil service system, anonymity, partisanship and systems used to handle appointees of prior administrations in the US, Canada, Germany, France, Britain, New Zealand, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Greece.

Varosha (Famagusta) was one of the richest districts, and best known holiday destination of the region during the 1970's. However, due to the war in 1974, half of Varosha was closed to residents and the other half became a bordered city. The demographic structure, in addition to the physical and cultural structures of the city was therefore completely altered. Postwar displacement and re-settlement in Varosha is the focus of this paper. The main aim is to discuss the lifestyle in Varosha from a cultural perspective using memories from former and current inhabitants. To achieve this, a set of semi-structured interviews were conducted in which two main questions were posed during the interviews: 1) What was the lifestyle in Varosha before 1974? and 2) What was the lifestyle in Varosha after 1974? these questions were intended to shed some light on the post-war landscape of Varosha. For this purpose, researchers followed a chronological order: life before 1974; interview group a, six Greek Cypriots who were former inhabitants of Varosha. Life after 1974: interview group B, six turkish Cypriots who were displaced and settled in Varosha; and interview group C, six immigrant/settlers turks from turkey, who volunteered to move to Cyprus and settle in Varosha. The snowball method has been used to identify former and current residents of Varosha. The findings are based on interviews with the former, displaced and re-settled Varoshian residents. The interviews revealed how displacement affected the city and the former and current inhabitants. Analysis of the findings were categorized under three headings: 1) displacement from/to Varosha; 2) belonging and identity; 3) life style and culture of each group. The categorization is used to describe how displacement affected the city and its citizens. In other words, this research targets to describe pre- and post-war life (styles) in Varosha.

Nigeria earns millions of dollars yearly from crude oil; has vast resources and huge market potentials considering its large population. Thus, Nigeria has opportunities to be among the rich nations of the world enjoying economic prosperity, development, and well-being. Contrarily, Nigeria ranks lower in all global indices for measuring development and good life, mainly due to politico-administrative elite corruption which this study investigates. Data was collected through secondary sources, and content analyzed. Spoil system and political game theories were used in the analysis of how politico-administrative elite corruption engenders underdevelopment. It was found that the elite engages in anti-people activities like nepotism in appointment and recruitment, electoral fraud, looting, and deprivation of social justice to enrich themselves and have more power and wealth, thereby robbing the state of necessary resources and institutional capacity needed to derive development. Politico-administrative elite corruption and non-politico-administrative elite corruption were juxtaposed, and it was discovered that the politico-administrative elite corruption is responsible for Nigeria's underdevelopment and plights. The practice of open and e-government that leverages ICT to deploy modern technologies that detect, pre-empt, and consequently prevent corruption are recommended - not relying on our law enforcement agents hunting and prosecuting corrupt politicians after looting and hiding the loots abroad.

The notion that groups form and act in ways that respond to objective, external costs and benefits has long been the key to accounting for social change processes driven by collective action. Yet this same notion seems to fall apart when we try to explain how collectivities emerge out of the choices of individuals. This book overcomes that dilemma by offering an analysis of collective action that, while rooted in individual decision making, also brings out the way in which objective costs and benefits can impede or foster social coordination. The resulting approach enables us to address the causes and consequences of collective action with the help of the tools of modern economic theory. To illustrate this, the book applies the tools it develops to the study of specific collective action problems such as clientelism, focusing on its connections with economic development and political redistribution; and wage bargaining, showing its economic determinants and its relevance for the political economy of the welfare state.

The issue of patronage-clientelism has long been of interest in the social sciences. Based on long-term ethnographic research in southern Italy, this book examines the concept and practice of raccomandazione: the omnipresent social institution of using connections to get things done. Viewing the practice both from an indigenous perspective - as a morally ambivalent social fact - and considering it in light of the power relations that position southern Italy within the nesting relations of global Norths and Souths, it builds on and extends past scholarship to consider the nature of patronage in a contemporary society and its relationship to corruption.

This book asks why some countries devote the lion's share of their social policy resources to the elderly, while others have a more balanced repertoire of social spending. Far from being the outcome of demands for welfare spending by powerful age-based groups in society, the 'age' of welfare is an unintended consequence of the way that social programs are set up. The way that politicians use welfare state spending to compete for votes, along either programmatic or particularistic lines, locks these early institutional choices into place. So while society is changing - aging, divorcing, moving in and out of the labor force over the life course in new ways - social policies do not evolve to catch up. The result, in occupational welfare states like Italy, the United States, and Japan, is social spending that favors the elderly and leaves working-aged adults and children largely to fend for themselves.

This wide-ranging volume goes to the heart of the revisionist debate about the crisis of government that led to the English Civil War. The author tackles questions about the patronage that structured early modern society, arguing that the increase in royal bounty in the early seventeenth century redefined the corrupt practices that characterized early modern administration.