Journal Article

The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations and Government Contracts in Brazil

Hidalgo, F. Daniel, Boas, Taylor C., Richardson, Neal P.

2014

Overview

When firms give money to candidates for public office, what return can they expect on their investment? Prior studies have been inconclusive, due to both methodological challenges and unique features of the U.S. political context on which they have focused. Using data from Brazil, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the effect of an electoral victory on government contracts for a candidate’s corporate donors. Firms specializing in public-works projects can expect a substantial boost in contracts—at least 14 times the value of their contributions—when they donate to a federal-deputy candidate from the ruling Workers’ Party (PT) and that candidate wins office. We find no effects among allied parties, indicating that the PT prioritizes this form of state spending for party strengthening rather than coalition management.

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press,University of Chicago Press
• Subject: Brazil / Business structures / Candidates / Coalitions / Contracts / Discontinuity / Donation / Donations / Donors / Elections / Electoral behaviour / Electoral campaign financing / Electoral College / Expenditures / Federal budgets / Government / Government Contracts / Government spending / Investment / Legislators / Methodological problems / Money / Political Campaigns / Political candidates / Political culture / Political factors / Political finance / Political norms / Political Parties / Spoils system / Voting