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In 1964, the Netherlands experienced an average gross wage increase of 17 percent. In the economic literature, this wage explosion is mostly explained by the contrast between labour market developments and the restrictive wage policies by the Dutch government, which until that year adhered to central, state led wage determination. Overfull employment pressured employers to circumvent and ignore government regulations, and induced trade unions to increase wage demands, which, under labour market pressure, in 1963/64 were easily and willingly met by both employers and the government. In this article, it is argued that this explanation is too one sided, as it only takes marketplace bargaining power of workers into account (the power that results directly from tight labour markets), and ignores associational power (the power that results from the formation of collective organizations of workers). Focussing on unofficial strikes in the metal industries between 1959 and 1963, it is shown that in the run up to the wage explosion, tensions between rank and file and union leadership increased, which eventually forced the leaders to change their attitude. Remnants of the post-war, but now dissolved, communist trade union “Eenheidsvakcentrale” in the Amsterdam shipbuilding industry played a pivotal role in the mobilisation for these wildcat strikes.

In 1964, the Netherlands experienced an average gross wage increase of 17 percent. In the economic literature, this wage explosion is mostly explained by the contrast between labour market developments and the restrictive wage policies by the Dutch government, which until that year adhered to central, state led wage determination. Overfull employment pressured employers to circumvent and ignore government regulations, and induced trade unions to increase wage demands, which, under labour market pressure, in 1963/64 were easily and willingly met by both employers and the government. In this article, it is argued that this explanation is too one sided, as it only takes marketplace bargaining power of workers into account (the power that results directly from tight labour markets), and ignores associational power (the power that results from the formation of collective organizations of workers). Focussing on unofficial strikes in the metal industries between 1959 and 1963, it is shown that in the run up to the wage explosion, tensions between rank and file and union leadership increased, which eventually forced the leaders to change their attitude. Remnants of the post-war, but now dissolved, communist trade union “Eenheidsvakcentrale” in the Amsterdam shipbuilding industry played a pivotal role in the mobilisation for these wildcat strikes.

Canonical LST (sTEZ) is an enshrined, protocol-native mechanism designed to mitigate the centralization risks associated with liquid staking intermediaries. Intended to complement direct staking rather than replace it, Canonical LST provides a neutral, public alternative managed directly by the Tezos protocol. It allows any tez holder to participate in aggregated staking without reliance on third-party operators. sTEZ follows an accrual-based design: all slashing events and rewards are reflected in the token's exchange rate to tez, keeping balances fungible while exposing holders to the precise economics of staking. This approach ensures that liquid staking functions as fundamental network infrastructure--with deterministic lifecycle rules, transparent on-chain data, and governance anchored in the amendment process--rather than as a discretionary commercial product. This white paper summarises the motivation for enshrining liquid staking, the core mechanics, exchange-rate model, regulatory touchpoints, risk posture, and forward-looking roadmap for Canonical LST.

Consensus protocols used today in blockchains often rely on computational power or financial stakes - scarce resources. We propose a novel protocol using social capital - trust and influence from social interactions - as a non-transferable staking mechanism to ensure fairness and decentralization. The methodology integrates zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable credentials, a Whisk-like leader election, and an incentive scheme to prevent Sybil attacks and encourage engagement. The theoretical framework would enhance privacy and equity, though unresolved issues like off-chain bribery require further research. This work offers a new model aligned with modern social media behavior and lifestyle, with applications in finance, providing a practical insight for decentralized system development.

We introduce a micro-velocity framework for analysing the on-chain circulation of Lidos liquid-staking tokens, stETH, and its wrapped ERC-20 form, wstETH. By reconstructing full transfer and share-based accounting histories, we compute address-level velocities and decompose them into behavioural components. Despite their growing importance, the micro-level monetary dynamics of LSTs remain largely unexplored. Our data reveal persistently high velocity for both tokens, reflecting intensive reuse within DeFi. Yet activity is highly concentrated: a small cohort of large addresses, likely institutional accounts, are responsible for most turnover, while the rest of the users remain largely passive. We also observe a gradual transition in user behavior, characterized by a shift toward wstETH, the non-rebasing variant of stETH. This shift appears to align with DeFi composability trends, as wstETH is more frequently deployed across protocols such as AAVE, Spark, Balancer, and SkyMoney. To make the study fully reproducible, we release (i) an open-source pipeline that indexes event logs and historical contract state, and (ii) two public datasets containing every Transfer and TransferShares record for stETH and wstETH through 2024-11-08. This is the first large-scale empirical characterisation of liquid-staking token circulation. Our approach offers a scalable template for monitoring staking asset flows and provides new, open-access resources to the research community.

In the Proof of Stake (PoS) Ethereum ecosystem, users can stake ETH on Lido to receive stETH, a Liquid Staking Derivative (LSD) that represents staked ETH and accrues staking rewards. LSDs improve the liquidity of staked assets by facilitating their use in secondary markets, such as for collateralized borrowing on Aave or asset exchanges on Curve. The composability of Lido, Aave, and Curve enables an emerging strategy known as leverage staking, an iterative process that enhances financial returns while introducing potential risks. This paper establishes a formal framework for leverage staking with stETH and identifies 442 such positions on Ethereum over 963 days. These positions represent a total volume of 537,123 ETH (877m USD). Our data reveal that 81.7% of leverage staking positions achieved an Annual Percentage Rate (APR) higher than conventional staking on Lido. Despite the high returns, we also recognize the potential risks. For example, the Terra crash incident demonstrated that token devaluation can impact the market. Therefore, we conduct stress tests under extreme conditions of significant stETH devaluation to evaluate the associated risks. Our simulations reveal that leverage staking amplifies the risk of cascading liquidations by triggering intensified selling pressure through liquidation and deleveraging processes. Furthermore, this dynamic not only accelerates the decline of stETH prices but also propagates a contagion effect, endangering the stability of both leveraged and ordinary positions.

Staking has emerged as a crucial concept following Ethereum's transition to Proof-of-Stake consensus. The introduction of Liquid Staking Derivatives (LSDs) has effectively addressed the illiquidity issue associated with solo staking, gaining significant market attention. This paper analyzes the LSD market dynamics from the perspectives of both liquidity takers (LTs) and liquidity providers (LPs). We first quantify the price discrepancy between the LSD primary and secondary markets. Then we investigate and empirically measure how LTs can leverage such discrepancy to exploit arbitrage opportunities, unveiling the potential barriers to LSD arbitrages. In addition, we evaluate the financial profit and losses experienced by LPs who supply LSDs for liquidity provision. Our results show that 66% of LSD liquidity positions generate returns lower than those from simply holding the corresponding LSDs.

Layer-2 (L2) blockchains offer security guarantees for Ethereum while reducing transaction (gas) fees, and consequentially are gaining popularity among traders at Automated Market Makers (AMMs). However, Liquidity Providers (LPs) are lagging behind. Our empirical results show that AMM liquidity pools on Ethereum are oversubscribed compared to their counterparties on L2s and often deliver lower returns than staking ETH. LPs would receive higher rewards by reallocating part of the liquidity to AMMs on L2s, or staking. By employing Lagrangian optimization, we find the optimal liquidity allocation strategy that maximizes LPs rewards. Moreover, we show that the returns from liquidity provisions converge to the staking rate, and in a perfect equilibrium, liquidity provisions to any AMM should provide returns equal to staking rewards.

As the XDC network celebrates five years of stable mainnet operation and prepares for the highly anticipated launch of XDC 2.0, this research proposes a comprehensive improvement plan for the network's staking and tokenomics mechanisms. Our analysis reveals opportunities to optimize the current model, ensuring a more sustainable, decentralized, and resilient ecosystem. We introduce novel concepts, including validator NFTs, decentralized governance, and utility-based tokenomics, to increase validator node liquidity and promote staking participation. Our proposal aims to establish a robust foundation for XDC 2.0, fostering a thriving ecosystem that rewards validators, stakeholders, and users alike. By addressing the intricacies of staking and tokenomics, this research paves the way for XDC to solidify its position as a leading decentralized network, poised for long-term success and growth.