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This study develops a model of emergent strategy formation at a large telecommunications firm. It integrates prominent traditions in strategy process research—strategy as patterned action, as iterated resource allocation and as practice—to show how emergent strategy originates as a project through autonomous strategic behavior, then subsequently becomes realized as a consequence of mobilizing wider support to provide impetus, manipulating strategic context to legitimate the project by constructing it as consonant with the prevailing concept of strategy, and altering structural context to embed it within organizational units, routines, and objectives. The study theorizes the role of \"practices of strategy articulation\" in emergent strategy formation, and explains why some autonomous strategic behavior becomes \"ephemeral\" and disappears rather than enduring to become emergent strategy.

Although scholars increasingly acknowledge a contemporaneous relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions, debate continues as to why this relationship exists. Does public opinion directly influence decisions or do justices simply respond to the same social forces that simultaneously shape the public mood? To answer this question, we first develop a strategy to control for the justices' attitudinal change that stems from the social forces that influence public opinion. We then propose a theoretical argument that predicts strategic justices should be mindful of public opinion even in cases when the public is unlikely to be aware of the Court's activities. The results suggest that the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions is real, substantively important, and most pronounced in nonsalient cases.

A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product design capabilities to both design \"hot\" products that capture the latest consumer trends and exploit minimal production lead times to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop a model of such a system and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick-response-only systems, enhanced-design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of each of the four systems on \"strategic\" or forward-looking consumer purchasing behavior, i.e., the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-season clearance. We find that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by offering consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance sale and possibly experiencing a stockout. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through a different mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance sale. Most importantly, we find that although it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity effect tends to dominate. Hence, when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the firm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in profit than the sum of the increases resulting from employing either system in isolation. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic. We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of significant value, particularly when consumers exhibit strategic behavior. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.

Although some evidence indicates that even very young children engage in rudimentary forms of strategic behavior, the underlying mechanisms remain largely unknown. This study tested the hypothesis that uncertainty monitoring underlies such behaviors. Three-, four-, and five-year-old children (N = 88) completed a perceptual discrimination task. Results indicated that children are more likely to withhold (vs. volunteer) responses on trials for which, when forced to provide an answer, they report subjective uncertainty (vs. subjective certainty). Furthermore, uncertainty monitoring positively predicted the strategic regulation of accuracy via withholding of incorrect responses, even when controlling for individual differences in inhibitory control. Overall, results suggest that children's awareness of their own knowledge states contributes to early strategic behavior.

The microfoundations of dynamic capabilities have assumed greater importance in the search for factors that facilitate strategic change. Here, we focus on microfoundations at the level of the individual manager. We introduce the concept of \"managerial cognitive capability,\" which highlights the fact that capabilities involve the capacity to perform not only physical but also mental activities. We identify specific types of cognitive capabilities that are likely to underpin dynamic managerial capabilities for sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring, and explain their potential impact on strategic change of organizations. In addition, we discuss how heterogeneity of these cognitive capabilities may produce heterogeneity of dynamic managerial capabilities among top executives, which may contribute to differential performance of organizations under conditions of change. Finally, we propose possible directions for future research.

This paper empirically studies firm's strategic exit decisions in an environment where demand is declining. Specifically, I quantify the extent to which the exit process generated by firms' strategic interactions deviates from the outcome that maximizes industry profits. I develop and estimate a dynamic exit game using data from the US movie theater industry in the 1950s, when the industry faced demand declines. Using the estimated model, I quantify the magnitude of strategic delays and find that strategic interactions cause an average delay of exit of 2.7 years. I calculate the relative importance of several components of these strategic delays.

We present a dynamic pricing model for oligopolistic firms selling differentiated perishable goods to multiple finite segments of strategic consumers who are aware that pricing is dynamic and may time their purchases accordingly. This model encompasses strategic behavior by both firms and consumers in a unified stochastic dynamic game in which each firm's objective is to maximize its total expected revenues, and each consumer responds according to a shopping-intensity-allocation consumer choice model. We prove the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, provide equilibrium optimality conditions, and prove monotonicity results for special cases. The model provides insights about equilibrium price dynamics under different levels of competition, asymmetry between firms, and multiple market segments with varying properties. We demonstrate that strategic behavior by consumers can have serious impacts on revenues if firms ignore that behavior in their dynamic pricing policies. Moreover, ideal equilibrium responses to consumer strategic behavior can recover only a portion of the lost revenues. A key conclusion is that firms may benefit more from limiting the information available to consumers than from allowing full information and responding to the resulting strategic behavior in an optimal fashion.

This paper investigates the incentives market participants have in the German electricity balancing mechanism. Strategic over and undersupply positions are the result of existing stochastic arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism. Clear indications for strategic behavior can be observed in aggregate market data. These structural imbalances increase the need for reserve capacity, raise system security concerns, and therefore place significant costs on consumers. The underlying problem is the disconnect between spot market, reserve capacity market and balancing mechanism. Alternative market design options discussed in this paper suggest better alignment between these markets/mechanisms.

We address the value of quick response production practices when selling to a forward-looking consumer population with uncertain, heterogeneous valuations for a product. Consumers have the option of purchasing the product early, before its value has been learned, or delaying the purchase decision until a time at which valuation uncertainty has been resolved. Whereas individual consumer valuations are uncertain ex ante, the market size is uncertain to the firm. The firm may either commit to a single production run at a low unit cost prior to learning demand, or commit to a quick response strategy that allows additional production after learning additional demand information. We find that the value of quick response is generally lower with strategic (forward-looking) customers than with nonstrategic (myopic) customers in this setting. Indeed, it is possible for a quick response strategy to decrease the profit of the firm, though whether this occurs depends on various characteristics of the market; specifically, we identify conditions under which quick response increases profit (when prices are increasing, when dissatisfied consumers can return the product at a cost to the firm) and conditions under which quick response may decrease profit (when prices are constant or when consumer returns are not allowed). This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations and supply chain management.

The aim of this paper is to extend recent reflection on the evolution of strategic management by analyzing the field's object of study: strategy. We show how the concept of strategy has formed the backbone of the development of strategic management as an academic field and how consensus regarding it has evolved in the academic community during the stages of its historical development. We also address changes in the structure of the definition as it evolved through the growth of internal consistency, the centrality degree of the key terms that have shaped it, and how this evolution fostered the emergence of new research topics during the development of the discipline.