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We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division's current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country's TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.

Tempo effects in period fertility indicators are widely regarded as a source of bias or distortion. But is this always the case? Whether tempo change results in bias depends, in the view advanced here, on the measure used, the meaning of bias/distortion, and the objective of analysis. Two ways of construing bias in period measures are suggested, and their relevance is discussed in the context of five broad purposes for measuring period fertility: describing and explaining fertility time trends, anticipating future prospects, providing input parameters for formal models, and communicating with nonspecialist audiences. Genuine timing effects are not biasing when period fertility is the explanandum but are distorting when the aim is to estimate cohort fertility. Alternatives to tempo adjustment are available that are a more defensible solution to the issue of timing change. Tempo adjustment could be more fruitfully considered a form of modeling rather than empirical measurement. The measurement of period fertility could be improved by relying more on a statistical approach and less on indicators based on stable assumptions. Future progress will depend on integrating research on measurement with substantive investigation.

The study examined the adult sex ratio and fertility rate at Birhan Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Globally, the sex ratio at birth and total population remains stable, with approximately 105.6 boys born for every 100 girls and 101 males born for every 100 females, respectively. Ethiopia’s average population sex ratio is 101 males to 100 females. Fertility rates have declined globally since 1950, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia’s fertility rate decreased from 6.4 in 1990 to 4.6 in 2016. The HDSS monitors health and demographic conditions in both rural and urban areas, providing an updated sampling frame for nested studies. We used both the HDSS and the open cohort data to calculate key indicators, including Crude Birth Rate (CBR), General Fertility Rate (GFR), Total Fertility Rate (TFR), and Adult Sex Ratio (ASR). The study’s strength lies in its comprehensive approach to pregnancy screening and birth outcome registration, yielding valuable data beyond traditional surveys. The mid-year population was 72,776, with a higher number of males (38,454) than females (34,322). Among individuals aged 15–24, women comprised 37.4% of the group, resulting in a sex ratio of 167.4 males per 100 females. For the broader reproductive age range (15–50 years), the sex ratio was 125 males per 100 females. In 2022, the TFR was 3.44 children per woman, reflecting a 25.22% decline compared to Ethiopia’s national TFR of 4.6 in 2016. Other key fertility indicators also demonstrated notable reductions: the CBR was 19.98 per 1000 population, and the GFR was 104.78 per 1000 women of reproductive age, marking decreases of 37.24% and 32.83%, respectively, from the 2016 national averages. The findings indicate a youthful population with a higher male-to-female ratio, particularly among younger age groups. Fertility rates are notably lower compared to national figures. The decline may be attributed to gendered migration patterns and reduced conception risk among migrants, influenced by improved living conditions in urban areas and temporary separation from partners.

The neo-Confucian tradition in South Korea had influenced the number of female Koreans that were born due to the patrilineality-caused aversion to daughters and pre- and post-natal sex selection. The introduction of ultrasonographic devices even deepened the sex ratio at birth (SRB), resulting in the state forbidding their use for prenatal sex determination. Since the 2000s, a preference for daughters has been visible, and SRB is considered natural. The paper aims to show changes in South Korean culture and approach towards the sex of the offspring. It also aims to prove that a stronger cultural aversion to daughters in the past in South Korea has changed as an result of cultural and societal transformations, but also surprisingly of the traditional approach to gender roles – it is not generally emphasized and it can accelerate the drop in an already low total fertility rate (TFR) in this country.

In this study, we contrast period and cohort approaches to answering the question: Is US fertility now below replacement? The answer would appear to be an unambiguous “yes” based on period trends in the total fertility rate (TFR). Since 2007, TFR has declined from 2.12, just above the replacement level set by demographic tradition at 2.10 births per woman, to 1.67 in 2022, leading many to speculate that the United States has now entered a sustained period of below-replacement fertility. A quite different picture emerges from cohort trends in the cumulative fertility rate (CFR), a cohort measure that is not subject to biases that can distort period TFRs. For older birth cohorts of US women—those born between 1959 and 1987 and who were thus age 33 or older in 2020—observed or projected CFRs at age 45 vary between 2.00 and 2.24 births per woman. For younger cohorts—those born between 1988 and 2010 and who were 10 to 32 as of 2020—we project CFRs at age 45 that are below 2.00, with these declines attributable to falling fertility at younger ages. We thus conclude that from a cohort perspective, the question “Is US fertility now below replacement” should be replaced by the question “Will lifetime fertility fall below replacement for the youngest cohorts of US women?”, with the answer to this latter question depending on the extent to which decreases observed at early ages in these cohorts will or will not be offset by future increases at later ages.

The total fertility rate (TFR) is a fundamental demographic measure widely used for assessing fertility trends in populations. However, the TFR is susceptible to distortion due to timing effects, which can confound the understanding of true fertility patterns. This study investigates the impact of changes in the distribution of fertility rates on the period total fertility rate (PTFR) from a cohort perspective. We adopt a model representation that separates the quantum (the fertility that would occur without timing changes) from the tempo (timing changes) components. Using a skewed normal distribution to fit cohort fertility schedules, we explore the impact of variations in cohort mean age at childbearing, variance, and skewness on the PTFR. Simulation studies are also conducted to investigate the transient behavior of the TFR. We demonstrate that the tempo distortion in PTFR depends on the speed and magnitude of shifts in scale and shape parameters. Adjusting PTFR for these variations yields different results compared to adjustments based solely on mean shifts, highlighting the importance of considering all tempo parameters. Analyzing tempo fluctuations from a cohort perspective reveals their significant impact on PTFR estimates. Additionally, it becomes evident that the changes observed at the cohort level are predominantly reflected in the period shift of the mean age at childbearing.

BACKGROUND The cross-sectional association between female employment and fertility across developed countries turned from negative to positive during the mid-1980s. The conventional view is that the observed positive association is spurious owing to country-specific heterogeneity. OBJECTIVE We revisit the validity of this view using recent data up to 2017 from 24 countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). METHODS Based on the data downloaded from the OECD database, we estimate the time-series association between the female labor force participation rate (FLFP) and total fertility rate (TFR) by fixed-effects regression models, which can control for country-specific heterogeneity. RESULTS The more recent the data set used, the more likely it is that the time-series correlation will be positive between FLFP and TFR, even after controlling for country-specific heterogeneity. We also observe that public spending on families, especially in the form of benefits in kind, starts increasing once FLFP becomes sufficiently high. CONCLUSIONS A positive correlation between female employment and fertility in developed countries is no longer attributable to country-specific heterogeneity. The results are supportive of the view that higher female employment can make socioinstitutional contexts more favorable for childbearing, leading to a positive association between FLFP and TFR. CONTRIBUTIONS This study underscored the need for further investigation of the association between female employment and fertility, which is likely to have changed in recent decades.

The typical contraceptive--fertility relationship has not held in some countries witnessing rapid increases in contraceptive uptake. With increasingly more diverse population age structures among developing countries, one explanation may be the different measurement approaches of total fertility rate (TFR), an age-adjusted measure, and contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR), an unadjusted measure. To examine whether the association between contraception and fertility has changed over time in less developed settings and whether the relationship is better explained with an age-adjusted measure of contraceptive use. Using data from 259 Demographic and Health Surveys, we examine associations between CPR and TFR in two 15-year periods. We then develop age-adjusted CPR and explore the relationship between TFR and unadjusted versus age-adjusted CPR, using linear regression analyses with country-level fixed effects. A TFR decrease of 1 was associated with a CPR increase of 15.4 percentage points during 1985-2000 and of 17.2 percentage points during 2001-2016. On average, across 259 surveys, age-adjusted CPR was higher than unadjusted CPR by about 3% with significant regional variation. Regression model fit reveals that age-adjusted CPR better explains the CPR--TFR relationship.

In 1979, China introduced its unprecedented one-child policy, under which households exceeding the birth quota were penalized. However, estimating the effect of this policy on family outcomes turns out to be complicated. China had already enacted an aggressive family planning policy in the early 1970s, and its fertility rates had already dropped sharply before the enactment of the one-child policy. The one-child policy was also enacted at almost the same time as China's market-oriented economic reforms, which triggered several decades of rapid growth, which would also tend to reduce fertility rates. During the same period, a number of other developing countries in East Asia and around the world have also experienced sharp declines in fertility. Overall, finding defensible ways to identify the effect of China's one-child policy on family outcomes is a tremendous challenge. I expound the main empirical approaches to the identification of the effects of the one-child policy, with an emphasis on their underlying assumptions and limitations. I then turn to empirical results in the literature. I discuss the evidence concerning the effects of the one-child policy on fertility and how it might affect human capital investment in children. Finally I offer some new exploratory and preliminary estimates of the effects of the one-child policy on divorce, labor supply, and rural-to-urban migration.

South Korea and other developed regions in East Asia have become forerunners of prolonged lowest-low fertility. South Korea's total fertility rate has been below 1.3 for two decades, the longest duration among OECD countries. Using vital statistics and census data, I study recent trends in the country's cohort fertility covering women born before the 1960s to those born in the 1980s. Analyzing outcomes at both the intensive margin of fertility (i.e., timing and number of children) and the extensive margin of family formation (i.e., marriage and childlessness), I document three novel patterns. First, the driver of low fertility has evolved across birth cohorts, from married women having later and fewer childbirths, to fewer women getting married, and finally to fewer women having children even if married. Second, a decomposition analysis of marriage and fertility changes indicates that the marriage and fertility decline was driven by changes within educational groups rather than by changes in women's educational composition. Third, the relationship between women's educational attainment and marriage or fertility was negative for the 1960s cohort, but an inverted U-shaped education gradient emerged beginning with the 1970s cohort.