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Many analysts argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken out. Evidence suggests, however, that Chinese leaders may prefer having more flexibility rather than less in a crisis. Using original data generated by a survey experiment conducted in China in 2015, this article examines several strategies that Chinese leaders could use to reduce public pressure so as to make concessions in a crisis easier. These strategies include pledging to use economic sanctions instead of force; invoking China’s “peaceful identity”; citing the costs of conflict to China’s development; accepting United Nations mediation; and backing down in the face of U.S. military threats. In all cases except one, approval for the leader increases over a baseline level of support for making concessions. The exception is if the leader backs down in the face of U.S. military threats. Here, approval drops below the baseline level of support, especially for nationalists and hawks. The findings suggest that if one assumes that Chinese leaders are constrained by public opinion, a U.S. cost-imposition strategy to compel China to back down in crises may have the opposite effect—tying Chinese leaders’ hands even tighter.

The paper analyzes the excerpt ex libro Balbi, in the ms. Arcerianus A, on a boundary stone and others recently found in the area of the Alban Hills. It thus reconstructs the boundary dispute between Ardea, Boville and Aricia. It was settled on behalf of the emperor Antoninus Pius by a iudex, the knight Tuscenius Felix, who availed himself of the technical knowledge of the surveyor Blaesius Taurinus.

Chinese leaders are increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history. China’s monumental history as an ancient civilization is used to revise the communist party’s ideology and to buttress foreign policy ambitions and infrastructural investments—including the ‘belt and road initiative’ and territorial claims in the South China Sea. This more assertive approach to China’s immediate neighbourhood resonates with the official reiteration of imperial tropes and concepts of Confucian philosophy, yet assertions that Beijing wants to reanimate the tribute system remain contested. While using historical narratives to legitimize foreign policy is not new, we are witnessing an unprecedented ‘return of history’ as a global social force. By revisiting Fukuyama’s claims, I develop the notion of ‘historical statecraft’ and apply it to China’s ‘belt and road initiative’. The Chinese case is exemplary for the importance of ideational factors in understanding the recent structural changes often described as the weakening of the West. This article examines in what ways China’s historical statecraft is challenging western narratives, what controversies emerge as China articulates its identity as a re-emerging ancient Great Power—one which expects global audiences to acknowledge the value of its cultural norms—and whether the Chinese approach to the use of the past for construing alternative political imaginaries contributes to a peaceful reconstruction of global order.

How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda impact Chinese citizens’ approval of their government’s performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster—vague and ultimately empty threats—suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.

Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China’s use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—”killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states’ coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.

Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical ownership by at least one side of a dispute. Why does historical ownership lead to more hardened bargaining stances than in other territorial disputes? Do such uncompromising positions lead to more military conflict? We investigate these questions in this study. After developing a theoretical argument for how historical ownership may lead to a perception of territorial indivisibility, we test the hypotheses derived from the theory with a survey experiment implemented in China.We find that a historical ownership treatment increases the number of respondents who view the indivisible outcome of a hypothetical dispute as the only acceptable outcome. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military solutions to the dispute and are much less likely to support bilateral negotiation or arbitration by an international organization.

Territorial notions of place and region are being challenged by the relational viewpoint. Yet relational thinking often neglects to address questions of territory and territorial politics. This progress report examines some commonalities and differences between relational and territorial approaches to regions and regionalism. It considers the treatment of the state and territorial politics in the various literatures developing around the New Regionalism. The received distinction drawn between territorial and relational approaches could be rendered obsolete if critical attention were to be paid to matters of territory and territorial politics.

Territorial debates complicate the politics of the affected regions, as parties decide whether to compete on a territorial dimension alongside other longstanding important issues. Yet, empirical evidence is scarce regarding how much voters politically weigh territorial issues against others. We theorize that in contexts when such issues are salient, they have a greater weight relative to others due to their identity-oriented nature. We present evidence from conjoint experiments from three European regions with active territorial debates: Catalonia, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. We find that territorial preferences matter more than others for candidate choice, as the reward (punishment) of congruent (incongruent) candidates is greater, and individuals are less willing to trade off on this issue. Our results have comparative implications for political competition in multidimensional spaces.

This article explains why autocrats love constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity. Though these concepts were developed by scholars and jurists with the best of intentions in mind, we explain why they are also attractive to and inherently prone to abuse by autocrats. We then describe how the regimes in Hungary and Poland have made use of these concepts in their drive to consolidate autocracy. We conclude that given the dangers inherent in constitutional pluralism and its susceptibility to abuse, it should be replaced with a more traditional understanding of the primacy of EU law.