Journal Article

Can China Back Down?

Quek, Kai, Johnston, Alastair Iain

2018

Overview

Many analysts argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken out. Evidence suggests, however, that Chinese leaders may prefer having more flexibility rather than less in a crisis. Using original data generated by a survey experiment conducted in China in 2015, this article examines several strategies that Chinese leaders could use to reduce public pressure so as to make concessions in a crisis easier. These strategies include pledging to use economic sanctions instead of force; invoking China’s “peaceful identity”; citing the costs of conflict to China’s development; accepting United Nations mediation; and backing down in the face of U.S. military threats. In all cases except one, approval for the leader increases over a baseline level of support for making concessions. The exception is if the leader backs down in the face of U.S. military threats. Here, approval drops below the baseline level of support, especially for nationalists and hawks. The findings suggest that if one assumes that Chinese leaders are constrained by public opinion, a U.S. cost-imposition strategy to compel China to back down in crises may have the opposite effect—tying Chinese leaders’ hands even tighter.

• Publisher: MIT Press,The MIT Press,MIT Press Journals, The
• Subject: Compromises / CONFLICT MANAGEMENT / Crises / De-escalation / Disputes / Domestic Sources of China's International Behavior / Flexibility / FOREIGN POLICY / FOREIGN RELATIONS / Identity / Imposition / International disputes / INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS / Mediation / Nationalism / PUBLIC OPINION / Sanctions / Territorial issues / TERRITORIAL WATERS / Threats