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In international relations, different rationalistic theories have developed to explain negotiators’ behavior and the outcomes of negotiations. The compatibility and interaction effects between the different forms of bargaining power, however, remain unexplored. In this article, I seek to fill this gap by connecting four rationalistic concepts of bargaining power: veto power, asymmetric interdependence, reputation, and audience costs. By showing that domestic veto players are only semiveto players in international politics – because they can veto an improvement but not a deterioration of the status quo – threats based on asymmetric interdependence to disrupt a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship can be connected to veto power; the incompatibility of the factors concerned would otherwise make this impossible. The combination of veto power and asymmetric interdependence, however, raises a theoretical question: Will rational actors ever approve a deterioration of the status quo? Theories of reputation and audience costs can help answer this question. According to these approaches, threatening parties suffer costs when they back down from their own threats. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on how different forms of bargaining power interact with each other and also helps to address some of the theoretical inconsistencies of the original individual concepts. Finally, this analysis suggests some of the weaknesses of empirical studies that have neglected these interaction effects.

With Lisbon, the European Parliament formally acquired an equal standing to that of the Council of the EU in the making of policies in the AFSJ (area of freedom, security and justice). However, the growing political salience of policy issues at stake and bottom-up politicisation in the AFSJ has had the unintended effect of undermining the European Parliament’s internal unity even under consultation procedures. To show how this played out in practice during Europe’s migration and refugee crisis, this article analyses the European Parliament’s role, preferences, and bargaining position in the making of two Refugee Relocation Decisions (Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601) under consultation procedure. To do so, this article exploits Putnam’s two-level framework (level I and II politics throughout the policy-making process) to explore early agenda-setting attempts and groups’ positions on issues of refugee relocation and burden-sharing, as they were formally stated in their position papers and expressed at the LIBE Committee and at plenary. This article shows that the high domestic salience and politicization of the issues at stake left MEPs torn between competing principals at home and within their European Parliament political groups and had the effect of weakening overall unity on the issue of refugee relocation.

International relations scholars have struggled to adequately link domestic and international levels in theoretical models and causal analyses of foreign policy, despite widespread acknowledgment of the need to do so. This study elaborates on this challenge by assessing the utility of several policy process frameworks that have so far been underutilized in foreign policy analysis. The assumptions of one particularly fruitful method, the Two-Level Game, will be compared with those of three policy process frameworks: the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the Multiple Streams Framework, and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. When analyzing three specific concepts (the question of rationality, the dynamics of agenda setting, and the strategic action of relevant actors), it is apparent that the assumptions of the policy process frameworks largely clash with those of the Two-Level Game, raising the potential for their augmentation of the field of foreign policy analysis despite their relative underuse. Los académicos de las relaciones internacionales han luchado por vincular adecuadamente los niveles doméstico e internacional en modelos teóricos de análisis causales de políticas exteriores a pesar del reconocimiento general de lo necesario que es. Este estudio profundizará en este desafío al evaluar la utilidad de varios marcos de procesos de políticas que hasta el momento han sido subutilizados en el análisis de la política exterior. Los supuestos de un método particularmente exitoso, el Juego de dos niveles, se compararán con los de tres marcos de procesos de políticas: el Marco de coalición de defensa, el Marco de flujos múltiples y la Teoría del equilibrio puntuado. Al analizar tres conceptos específicos (la cuestión de la racionalidad, la dinámica del establecimiento de la agenda y la acción estratégica de los actores relevantes), es evidente que los supuestos de los marcos de los procesos de las políticas coinciden en gran medida con los del Juego de dos niveles, lo que plantea potencial para su aumento del campo de análisis de política exterior a pesar de su infrautilización relativa. 国际关系学者已努力将理论模型中的国内和国际层面与外交政策因果分析进行充分连接，尽管这一需求受到广泛肯定。本文将通过评估几个在外交政策分析中尚未进行完全利用的政策过程框架的用处，进而阐述这一挑战。双层博弈是一项特别富有成效的方法，其提出的假设将和其他三个政策过程框架假设进行比较：倡议联盟框架、多源流框架和间断平衡理论。当分析三个特定概念时（理性之疑、议程设定动态、和相关行为者的战略行动），显而易见的是，这些政策过程框架提出的假设在很大程度上与双层博弈理论假设相悖，这提高了前者关于外交政策分析领域的论点潜力，尽管其具备相对的未完全利用性。

We propose taking a two-level-game perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level One, candidates negotiate with employers. At Level Two, candidates negotiate with household members. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review research from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate-employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level One negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intrahousehold bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level Two influence labor force participation at Level One. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize the disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing \"internal\" with \"external\" negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated \"at the table.\" Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively \"selling\" the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its \"behind-the-table\" barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two-level games schema, I characterize such \"behind-the-table\" or \"Level Two\" barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind-the-table challenges, I pay special attention to the end-of-Cold-War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Deploying a two-level perspective, this article analyses the regional and domestic space that the Morales administration has in which to implement the vision of trade articulated in its Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND; National Development Plan). Regionally the Morales administration has attempted to combine the solidarity principles of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA; Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) with the market-oriented growth possibilities provided by more orthodox integration projects such as the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN; Andean Community of Nations) and the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur; Southern Common Market). Domestically the Movimiento al socialismo (MAS; Movement Toward Socialism) government must negotiate the destabilising effects of its trade strategy in a polarised national context where business and civil society actors are critiquing from their respective positions both the solidarity principles and market-oriented elements of the PND trade strategy.

This synthesis paper explores the reasons hindering water cooperation between India and Pakistan on the Indus River Basin. It argues that both domestic and international-level elements narrow the size of the ‘win-sets’ which make water cooperation between the two states highly challenging. Not only state actors but also the domestic actors in both India and Pakistan have repeatedly played ‘water games’. Further, due to long-standing geopolitical and territorial conflicts between India and Pakistan, the strategies pursued so far by these states including ‘securitization’, ‘issue-linkage’ and ‘alliance strategies’ as leverage mechanisms, have also contributed to the lack of cooperation in their water realm.

Coalitions play a central role in the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. By getting together, countries join resources in defending their interests and positions. But building coalitions may come at a cost. Coalition positions are a result of compromise between their members, and thus the increase in bargaining power may come at a price if the preferences of their members are heterogeneous. Relying on automatic text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, I analyze the extent to which coalitions represent the preferences of their members and discuss whether this contributes to disproportionate policy responses at the international level. I focus on a recently formed coalition: the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a large and heterogeneous group that brings together emerging, oil-dependent and poor developing countries.

This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level (2) this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes and (3) the effect is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. The findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research on the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations and legislative bargaining in the EU.

In the context of low-carbon energy transformation, fully utilizing the integrated demand response (IDR) resources on the load side can improve the operational flexibility and economy of the integrated energy system (IES). However, establishing a reasonable trading mechanism to enhance users’ participation in IDR has become a key issue that IES urgently needs to solve. To this end, this paper first establishes an IES model that includes electricity, heat, and gas. To reduce carbon emissions, a ladder-type carbon trading mechanism is introduced while adding low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture devices and power-to-gas conversion. Secondly, a bilateral IDR mechanism centered on the load aggregator (LA) is proposed, and a multi-agent operation model including IES, LA, and users is established. The IDR subsidy price is dynamically determined through a two-level Stackelberg game model involving IES, LA, and users. Then, through KKT conditions and the Big M method, the two-level game model is turned into an IES-LA game model, which is solved using a combination of the White Shark Optimization method and the Gurobi solver. The final simulation results show that the scheduling model can fully reflect the time value of IDR resources, and the IES cost is decreased by USD 152.22, while LA and user benefits are increased by USD 54.61 and USD 31.85. Meanwhile, the ladder-type carbon trading mechanism and low-carbon technology have effectively achieved low-carbon operation of the system.