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270 result(s) for "United States. Air Force. Air Defense Command"
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The Aerospace Defense Command in the Cuban Crisis, October - December 1962
U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command Rules of engagement during Airborne alert specified that Air attacks using Conventional weapons could be authorized; Rules of engagement during Airborne alert authorized the use of non-nuclear [Nike-Ajax Missiles; Nike-Hercules Missiles] when the safety of surrounding areas is assured; Rules of engagement during the Airborne alert authorizes the pursuit and Air attacks on any Cuban [Naval vessels; Military aircraft]; Rules of engagement state that Air attacks on Cuban Military bases can only be authorized by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to protect the lives of American citizens; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command chronology of the U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command. 26th Air Division; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command recommends that strict compliance with U.S. Air Force Safety regulations for ferrying Nuclear weapons be applied in the future; North American Air Defense Command instructs all dispersed U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft to \"return as soon as possible\" to home Military bases; Cuba states that it complies with the U.N. Charter and its prohibition of Intervention in other countries; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft equipped with Nuclear weapons were dispersed on 22 October 1962; Contingency plans for augmenting Air defense systems in Florida for protection against Cuban Air attacks were called Operation Southern Tip; Operation Southern Tip called for the Deployment of F-102 Aircraft at Key West Naval Air Station (Florida) for use as interceptors during Cuban Air attacks; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Continental Air Defense Command authorizes rotations for U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command participating in Airborne alert to exchange [Nuclear weapons; Flight crews; Aircraft]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Continental Air Defense Command instructions for tactical ferry of Nuclear weapons contradict U.S. Air Force Safety regulations; Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was damaged by high Winds and required that U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft augment the coverage during repairs of Electronic equipment; U.S. Air Force. 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron maintained its Aircraft on a 5 or 15 minutes Military alert status beginning with John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) and ending 3 November 1962; Defense readiness condition instructions and descriptions; Radar equipment used in Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was not operational when the Military alert was instituted on 22 October 1962
To Kill Nations
\"Edward Kaplan's To Kill Nations is a fascinating work that packs a thermonuclear punch of ideas and arguments... The work is suitable for anyone from advanced undergraduates to experts in the field.\" ― Strategy Bridge In To Kill Nations , Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.
Indexes: Numerical Index of Standard Publications
[U.S. Air Force. Space Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command; U.S. Aerospace Defense Command; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command; Cheyenne Mountain Complex (Colorado)] provide an index of regulations, pamphlets, directives, and visual aids related to [Management; Organizational structures; Personnel; Training; Communications; Command and control; Budgets; Intelligence; Security; Logistics]
Strategy in the Missile Age
Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The Fighter Interceptor Force: 1962-1964 Excerpts on the Cuban Crisis - Includes Selected Charts
U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command interceptors and squadrons were dispersed following John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) with Nuclear weapons for the first time in the history of the command; Deployment of U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft in Florida from 22 October - 23 November 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designate Operation Southern Tip as permanent Air defense systems for the southeastern U.S.; U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command developed Contingency plans for augmenting southern Florida Air defense systems on 5 January 1961 which became known as Operation Southern Tip; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command deployment of Air defense systems Fighter aircraft to the southeastern U.S. during the Cuban Crisis; Contingency plans for dispersal of Fighter aircraft were implemented before approval for use of [Canada; U.S. Navy] Military bases had been secured
Rhetoric and reality in air warfare
A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about \"strategic\" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.
The Air Force Response to the Cuban Crisis 14 October - 24 November 1962
U.S. Air Force estimates Military expenditures for Transportation of [Aircraft; Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants] during the Cuban Crisis; Robert S. McNamara called for continued Airborne alert for conducting [Aerial reconnaissance; Low altitude reconnaissance flights] and possible return to Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) operations or implementation of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 316] on 29 November; U.S. Air Force reports John F. Kennedy praise for critical activities of the U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command as a major source of Military deterrence against the Soviet Union; Cuban Crisis provided the U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command with the \"best and most realistic\" test of its Command and control system in its history; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command preparations of [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Communications] during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Air Force. Tactical Air Command reports that its requirements for [Military personnel; Military equipment] during the Cuban Crisis put other commands in danger; Minuteman I Missiles were put at Military alert beginning on 27 October; U.S. Air Force. Systems Command turned Intercontinental ballistic missiles launch sites to control of the U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command at the time of the Airborne alert; U.S. Air Forces in Europe redirects squadrons for Nuclear strikes away from Germany (Federal Republic) in order to focus alert for Conventional warfare; Thomas S. Power notes significant possibility of Nuclear strikes from the Soviet Union by way of Antarctica; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command involvement in the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Air Forces in Europe involvement in the Cuban Crisis was hampered by inadequate information prior to News media announcements; U.S. Air Force. Systems Command recommends that Research and development Missiles not be incorporated into the Operational readiness status; U.S. Air Force. Alaskan Air Command required improved Communications procedures with Civilians in Civil defense organizations; Communications equipment required by the U.S. Air Force for the Cuban Crisis diluted the Military strength of forces in [Europe; Pacific Region]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command directed Airborne alert of one-eighth of U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command B-52 Aircraft armed with Nuclear weapons for the first time after implementation of DEFCON 3; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command activated all its forces after DEFCON 2 announcement of 24 October; U.S. Air Force. Tactical Air Command began Low altitude reconnaissance flights on 26 October to search for targets for \"massive\" Air attacks against Missile bases; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Atlantic Command had 579 Aircraft at stage of Operational readiness and 49 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System Radar equipment on 24-hour operation during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Air Force reports that U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against planned use of tactical Nuclear weapons during U.S. military intervention in Cuba on 31 October that had been part of Operation Plan 314; U.S. Air Force reports that the U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command performed 2,511 missions armed with Nuclear weapons during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Command reports problems because it was not consulted on [U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command; U.S. Air Force. Tactical Air Command; U.S. Department of Defense] decisions during Cuban Crisis planning; U.S. Air Force granted authority for forward Deployment of GAR-11 Falcon Missiles with Nuclear Warheads during DEFCON 3; U.S. Air Force. Caribbean Air Command was tasked with provision of [Riot control equipment; Military equipment] to Latin America during the Cuban Crisis; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command began B-52 Aircraft Aerial reconnaissance with declaration of Airborne alert on 24 October; U.S. Air Force involvement in the Cuban Crisis
History of the Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS): 1 July 1973 - 30 June 1974
U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Directorate of Attach Affairs activities during 1973-1974; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service [Organization and functions; Personnel; Management; Organizational structures; Command, control and communications] during 1973-1974; Richard H. Ellis requests that the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service conduct extensive reviews of Personnel requirements for reductions and changes in Organizational structures; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service [Current intelligence; Special intelligence; Aerospace intelligence; Target intelligence; Research and development] activities during 1973-1974; George S. Brown changed requirements for Intelligence briefings on assuming command as the U.S. Air Force. Chief of Staff; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Aerospace Intelligence Division Organization and functions include Management of Intelligence operations; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Aerospace Intelligence Division involvement in the Arab-Israeli War (1973); U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Aerospace Intelligence Division involvement in Intelligence operations in [Asia; Europe; Latin America] during 1973-1974; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Target Intelligence Division responsibilities include [Target intelligence; Mapping, charting, and geodesy support; Targeting] and Training for Intelligence officers; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Aerospace Intelligence Division produced Intelligence products concerning [Signals intelligence; Aerospace intelligence; Weapons] during 1973-1974; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service. Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Intelligence Research Division is located at the U.S. National Security Agency offices in Fort Meade (Maryland); U.S. Air Force. 7602 Air Intelligence Group is responsible for preparing Contingency plans for U.S. Air Force involvement in Warfare; U.S. Air Force. 7602 Air Intelligence Group was responsible for debriefing U.S. Air Force Military personnel who were Prisoners of war in Vietnam (North); U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service is responsible for Management of Information dissemination for any [Intelligence Report; Biographical intelligence; Statistics] required by the U.S. Air Force; U.S. Air Force. 7602 Air Intelligence Group is responsible for coordination of [Collection requirements; Intelligence policy; Personnel] regarding Human intelligence; U.S. Air Force. 7602 Air Intelligence Group involvement in the [Arab-Israeli War (1973); United Nations Truce Supervision Organization]; U.S. Air Force. 7602 Air Intelligence Group involvement in the Vietnamese Conflict (1961-1975) during 1973-1974; [U.S. Air Force. Special Security Offices; U.S. Air Force. Special Activities Offices] Intelligence support for Special intelligence during 1973-1974; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service complies with a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency request for a 25 percent Personnel reduction and reorganization under the General Defense Intelligence Program; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service is responsible for [Computer security; Management] of Intelligence collection for [U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command; U.S. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Air Force. Tactical Air Command; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command; U.S. European Command. Air Forces]; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service Liaison with [U.S. Air Force Security Service; U.S. Air Force. Special Security Offices; U.S. Air Force. Special Activities Offices; U.S. Air Force. Foreign Technology Division; U.S. Congress]; U.S. Air Force. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Directorate of Security and Communications Management is responsible to the U.S. Air Force. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for Management of [Special intelligence; Special activities offices; Classified information; Information security; Document security; Security checks; Security clearances; Publications]; U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service received Military officers from [Taiwan; Japan] as visitors during 1973-1974
NORAD : in perpetuity and beyond
Wide-ranging changes have been made to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) since 2006, when the binational agreement was signed in perpetuity. NORAD traces the joint command's recent history - one marked by technological and structural innovations, but also by unprecedented threats and challenges.
Program Management Directive for Consolidated Space Operations Center
Program Management Directive defines the responsibilities of the [U.S. Department of the Air Force; U.S. Air Force. Systems Command; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command; U.S. Air Force. Logistics Command; U.S. Air Force. Electronic Security Command; U.S. Air Force. Operational Test and Evaluation Center; U.S. Air Force. Military Airlift Command] with regard to the Consolidated Space Operations Center (Colorado); Program Management Directive establishes the Consolidated Space Operations Center (Colorado) to carry out [Satellite tracking; Telemetry; Satellite control] and provide secure Military facilities from which to plan and conduct missions of the Space Transportation System