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In response to the call of the New Urban Agenda—Habitat III for a reinvigoration of long-term and integrated planning towards sustainable urban development, this paper presents an empirical comparative study of planning practices based on the “satellite city” and “new town” concepts in Tokyo and Shanghai to examine from a long-term perspective how well they have guided polycentric urban development at a time of massive population growth. We aim to deliver evidence-based contributions to boost the knowledge transfer between the Global North and the Global South. The paper adopts a multi-dimensional framework for the comparative analysis, including a review of long-term urban development policies and an inspection of the population distribution and extent of built-up areas using time-specific categorizations to map the spatiotemporal changes based on GHSL data. The comparative analysis shows that urban plans in Tokyo and Shanghai based on satellite cities and new towns as steering instruments for polycentric urban growth management have not lived up to the original aspirations. In fact, the intended steering of population distribution has essentially failed, despite the practical steps undertaken.

Human activities, such as research, innovation and industry, concentrate disproportionately in large cities. The ten most innovative cities in the United States account for 23% of the national population, but for 48% of its patents and 33% of its gross domestic product. But why has human activity become increasingly concentrated? Here we use data on scientific papers, patents, employment and gross domestic product, for 353 metropolitan areas in the United States, to show that the spatial concentration of productive activities increases with their complexity. Complex economic activities, such as biotechnology, neurobiology and semiconductors, concentrate disproportionately in a few large cities compared to less--complex activities, such as apparel or paper manufacturing. We use multiple proxies to measure the complexity of activities, finding that complexity explains from 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration of occupations, industries, scientific fields and technologies. Using historical patent data, we show that the spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization. These findings suggest that the growth of spatial inequality may be connected to the increasing complexity of the economy. Balland et al. use data on scientific papers, patents, employment and GDP for 353 metropolitan areas in the United States to show that economic complexity drives the spatial concentration of productive activities in large cities.

The increasing prominence of urban scaling laws highlights the importance of a systematic understanding of the variational scaling rates for different economic activities. In this article, we utilize several datasets to provide the first systematic investigation of the urban scaling of manufacturing industries in China. Most existing literature assumes that the divergence in urban scaling can be explained by returns to agglomeration, with a few exceptions instead highlighting the role of knowledge complexity or a mixture of both. Our main purpose in this paper is to explain the inter-sector variation of urban scaling rates. In doing this, we provide a clearer approach to demonstrating the relations between urban scaling, returns to agglomeration, and knowledge complexity. Our findings are twofold. First, after uncovering the scaling rates (denoted as urban concentration ) and returns to agglomeration (denoted as urban productivity ) for each sub-manufacturing sector, we prove that, rather than being a positive predictor, returns to agglomeration is slightly negatively associated with urban scaling rates. This finding reveals that urban concentration of manufacturing may not simply be a natural consequence driven by the maximization of performance. We also show that this result of the manufacturing system contrasts with what would be found in other pure knowledge systems such as patents. Secondly, we measure the complexity for each sector and demonstrate that the variation of urban concentration can be largely explained by their complexity, consistent with the knowledge complexity perspective. Specifically, complex manufacturing sectors are found to concentrate more in large cities than less complex sectors in China. This result provides support for the view that the growth of complex activities hinges more on diversity than on efficiency. The findings above can greatly reduce the current level of ambiguity associated with urban scaling, returns to agglomeration and complexity, and have important policy implications for urban planners, highlighting the significance of a more balanced and diversified configuration of urban productive activities for the growth of innovation economy.

Most current scientific policies incorporate debates on cities and the geographic organisation of scientific activity. Research on 'world cities' develops the idea that interconnected agglomerations can better take advantage of international competition. Thus, the increasing concentration of activities in these cities at the expense of others could be observed by certain scholars using measures based on scientific publications. Others, however, show that an opposite trend is emerging: the largest cities are undergoing a relative decline in a country's scientific activities. To go beyond this seeming contradiction, this paper provides a global analysis of all countries with papers in the Web of Science over the period 1987–2007. The author's addresses were geocoded and grouped into agglomerations. Registering of papers was based on the fractional counting of multi-authored publications, and the results are unambiguous: deconcentration is the dominant trend both globally and within countries, with some exceptions for which explanations are suggested.

Latin American nations are highly urbanised around a small number of megacities that account for the majority of these nations' productivity and population. Scholars of urban planning and economics argue these cities may be overly large, leading to environmental, transportation and housing issues that depress growth and increase economic inequality. We use fine-grained satellite data from 1992-2018 to document urban concentration in Latin America. We argue political decentralisation creates incentives to distribute urban populations more evenly throughout the territory. Our results demonstrate a strong empirical relationship between political decentralisation and lower urban concentration. We link our findings to literature on economic geography, political institutions and urbanisation, with broader implications for the politics of economic growth.

How does redistributive policy affect the survival of authoritarian regimes? I argue that redistributive policy in favor of cities, while temporarily reducing urban grievances, in the long-run undermines regime survival by inducing urban concentration. I test the argument using cross-national city population, urban bias, and nondemocratic regime survival data in the post-WWII period. The results show that urban concentration is dangerous for dictators principally by promoting collective action, that urban bias induces urban concentration, and that urban bias represents a Faustian bargain with short-term benefits overwhelmed by long-term costs.

Research on shrinking cities shows continuous links between this phenomenon and the process of urban decline, which has been analyzed in many works, especially in Greece. The impact on urban development can be positive, while population growth over time is characterized by the degree of its convergence. The aim of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of the challenge of urbanization in large cities. The sample used in this effort consists of 117 Greek cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1994, using econometric tools to identify settlements using Markov chain theory with data from 1994 to 2020 from the Hellenic Statistical Authority. Using Urban Hierarchy Research (UHR), a significant decline in Greek Urban Concentration (GUC) and a continuous increase in the population of small- and medium-sized cities were found. The Greek urban system is moving toward a distribution characterized by the seeding of relatively large cities. The study aims to open a broader research discussion in the field of spatial econometric applications.

The explosion of cities and megacities has increased scholars’ and policy markers’ attention to the effects such changes might have on conflict: increasingly, urban environments may alter the nature of warfare but not necessarily the incidence of intrastate war. We argue that high levels of urban concentration—the concentration of populations in one or relatively few urban centers—increases both the likelihood of civil wars and their intensity. Urban concentration limits the ability of the state to project power across space, exacerbating grievances in rural areas, easing rebel control of territory, and enhancing their military strength. At the same time, cities become high-value loci of contestation even as urban warfare constrains conventional state military strength. The result is more symmetrical fighting producing more battle deaths. Cross-national regressions show that urban concentration exerts a crucial effect on the likelihood, nature, and intensity of intrastate warfare.

City size and growth are the subject of a substantial literature in economic geography and urban economics, but consensus remains elusive on the extent to which key regularities such as Zipf’s Law or Gibrat’s Law holds across space and time. We contribute to this literature by examining city size, rank and growth in Britain 1801–2011, the first country in the world to urbanize. Across Zipf, Gibrat and Gini analyses, we find that urban concentration in Britain peaked in the mid-nineteenth century before falling 1861–1911 and again 1951–1991. The evolving relationship between city size, rank and growth in Britain since 1801 strongly suggests that drivers mentioned in the literature, such as random growth, increasing returns to scale and the importance of location fundamentals, are not constant over time. There is some evidence of increasing returns to scale 1801–1861, then offset by factors favouring smaller cities, possibly related to new transport technologies. Further, we show that conclusions about both Zipf’s and Gibrat’s Law would change if weaker city definitions, sample cutoffs and regression methods were used, a likely factor in understanding the often contradictory results in the literature on city dynamics.

The text emphasizes the growing global need to integrate ecological and sustainable urban planning with contemporary demands for circulation and transportation. The importance of university education based on serious research for architects and urban planners is highlighted, promoting collaboration among all societal stakeholders. The increasing urban concentration poses challenges in mobility, sustainability, and commerce, making it essential to address these issues in education and professional practice. The \"door-to-door\" trend in consumer-oriented societies underscores the need to reconcile mobility with sustainable designs. ESTOA's editorial reflects on these aspects, advocating for academic forums discussing sustainable projects tailored to user needs. The issue features theoretical and practical articles exploring architecture from various angles, ranging from heritage studies to evaluations of post-COVID-19 public policies. The text underscores the importance of education and teaching in developing synergies in eco-urbanism, emphasizing the need for innovation in architectural and urban education.