Explore the vast range of titles available.

A compendium of opinion on issues surrounding biological weapons, bioterrorism, and chemical warfare.

Holding Their Breath uncovers just how close Britain, the United States, and Canada came to crossing the red line that restrained chemical weapon use during World War II. Unlike in World War I, belligerents did not release poison gas regularly during the Second World War. Yet, the looming threat of chemical warfare significantly affected the actions and attitudes of these three nations as they prepared their populations for war, mediated their diplomatic and military alliances, and attempted to defend their national identities and sovereignty. The story of chemical weapons and World War II begins in the interwar period as politicians and citizens alike advocated to ban, to resist, and eventually to prepare for gas use in the next war. M. Girard Dorsey reveals, through extensive research in multinational archives and historical literature, that although poison gas was rarely released on the battlefield in World War II, experts as well as lay people dedicated significant time and energy to the weapon's potential use; they did not view chemical warfare as obsolete or taboo. Poison gas was an influential weapon in World War II, even if not deployed in a traditional way, and arms control, for various reasons, worked. Thus, what did not happen is just as important as what did. Holding Their Breath provides insight into these potentialities by untangling World War II diplomacy and chemical weapons use in a new way.

\"A riveting, chilling tale of how a group of ragtag activists infiltrated one of the most secure nuclear weapons sites in the United States, told alongside a broader history of America's nuclear stewardship, from the early stages of the Manhattan Project to our country's never-ending investment in nuclear weaponry. On Saturday, July 28, 2012, three senior citizens broke into one of the most secure nuclear weapons facilities in the world. An eighty-two-year-old Catholic nun, a Vietnam veteran, and a house painter infiltrated the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, complex in the dead of night, smearing the walls with human blood and spray-painting quotes from the Bible. Then they waited to be arrested. What was a simple plan--one far more successful than even its perpetrators expected -- spawned a complex discussion. Among the questions that the infiltration raised: How did three unarmed civilians manage to penetrate one of the most heavily guarded locations in the world, nicknamed the 'Fort Knox of Uranium'? Why does the United States continue to possess more nuclear weaponry than is needed to destroy global civilization many times over? And what does this mean for the day-to-day safety of Americans? In Almighty, Washington Post writer Dan Zak begins with the present-day axis of a seventy-year-old story, exploring how events of the twentieth century -- including the prophecies of a farmer-turned-ascetic named John Hendrix and the early stages of the Manhattan Project in Morningside Heights -- led to one of the most successful and high-profile demonstrations of anti-nuclear activism\"--Amazon.com.

The state-of-the-art centre will help to enforce a near-universal ban on certain chemicals and train analysts from around the world. The state-of-the-art centre will help to enforce a near-universal ban on certain chemicals and train analysts from around the world. Credit: OPCW/Flickr (CC BY-ND 2.0) OPCW inspector training on using a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

Continued efforts to maintain the ban on chemical weapons depend on nations sharing information to further build trust and global safety. Continued efforts to maintain the ban on chemical weapons depend on nations sharing information to further build trust and global safety. Peter Hotchkiss.

[ Barriers to Bioweapons ] is a must-read for nonproliferation experts and should be a standard text for understanding biological weapons development for some time to come. ―David W. Kearn, Perspectives on Politics In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons , Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs. Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production. In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons , Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international disarmament treaty that prohibits the development, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. This treaty has 193 States Parties (nations for which the treaty is binding) and entered into force in 1997. The CWC contains schedules of chemicals that have been associated with chemical warfare programmes. These scheduled chemicals must be declared by the States that possess them and are subject to verification by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW, the implementing body of the CWC). Isotopically labelled and stereoisomeric variants of the scheduled chemicals have presented ambiguities for interpretation of the requirements of treaty implementation, and advice was sought from the OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in 2016. The SAB recommended that isotopically labelled compounds or stereoisomers related to the parent compound specified in a schedule should be interpreted as belonging to the same schedule. This advice should benefit scientists and diplomats from the CWC’s State Parties to help ensure a consistent approach to their declarations of scheduled chemicals (which in turn supports both the correctness and completeness of declarations under the CWC). Herein, isotopically labelled and stereoisomeric variants of CWC-scheduled chemicals are reviewed, and the impact of the SAB advice in influencing a change to national licensing in one of the State Parties is discussed. This outcome, an update to national licensing governing compliance to an international treaty, serves as an example of the effectiveness of science diplomacy within an international disarmament treaty.

Recent advances in disciplines such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and neuropharmacology entail a \"dual-use dilemma\" because they promise benefits for human health and welfare yet pose the risk of misuse for hostile purposes. The emerging field of synthetic genomics, for example, can produce custom DNA molecules for life-saving drugs but also makes possible the creation of deadly viral agents for biological warfare or terrorism. The challenge for policymakers is to prevent the misuse of these new technologies without forgoing their benefits . Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a systematic approach for managing the dual-use dilemma. The book presents a \"decision framework\" for assessing the security risks of emerging technologies and fashioning governance strategies to manage those risks. This framework is applied to fourteen contemporary case studies, including synthetic genomics, DNA shuffling and directed evolution, combinatorial chemistry, protein engineering, immunological modulation, and aerosol vaccines. The book also draws useful lessons from two historical cases: the development of the V-series nerve agents in Britain and the use and misuse of LSD by the U.S. Army and the CIA. Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a comprehensive, multifaceted introduction to the challenges of governing dual-use technologies in an era of rapid innovation. The book will be of interest to government officials and other practitioners as well as to students and scholars in security studies, science and technology studies, biology, and chemistry.

Tear gas and pepper spray put lives at risk. Examine their effects and regulate their deployment, urges Dan Kaszeta. Tear gas and pepper spray put lives at risk. Examine their effects and regulate their deployment, urges Dan Kaszeta. Police fire tear gas to clear pro-Democracy protesters in Hong Kong

Recent years have seen a growing role for private military contractors in national and international security. To understand the reasons for this, Elke Krahmann examines changing models of the state, the citizen and the soldier in the UK, the US and Germany. She focuses on both the national differences with regard to the outsourcing of military services to private companies and their specific consequences for the democratic control over the legitimate use of armed force. Tracing developments and debates from the late eighteenth century to the present, she explains the transition from the centralized warfare state of the Cold War era to the privatized and fragmented security governance, and the different national attitudes to the privatization of force.