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Democratic erosion in the United States, and the global decline of support for democratic values and institutions, obliges us to reflect on how we introduce politics to undergraduate students in this challenging era. Recent attacks on democratic rights and academic freedoms on college campuses, as well as the undermining of rule of law and democratic norms in the United States and abroad, compels us to reconsider and reflect on how we introduce politics and civic engagement in the classroom to our students. In this essay, we reflect on how current global and national trends in populism and authoritarianism require us to teach politics courses differently than in the past. We then identify the content, skills, and values we need to emphasize and continue to train students under the stressors of anti-democratic norms and legislation in the United States and around the world. We also identify our responsibilities as educators, as we promote civic and political engagement which may expose students to risks of political repression and even violence. Lastly, we propose ways to help students identify and understand their support for and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and critically evaluate the alternatives.

This article compares the dynamics of polarization in the eleven case studies analyzed in this special issue to draw conclusions about antecedents of severe political and societal polarization, the characteristics and mechanisms of such polarization, and consequences of severe polarization for democracy. We find that the emergence of pernicious polarization (when a society is split into mutually distrustful “Us vs. Them” camps) is not attributable to any specific underlying social or political cleavage nor any particular institutional make-up. Instead, pernicious polarization arises when political entrepreneurs pursue their political objectives by using polarizing strategies, such as mobilizing voters with divisive, demonizing discourse and exploiting existing grievances, and opposing political elites then reciprocate with similarly polarizing tactics or fail to develop effective nonpolarizing responses. We explain how the political construction of polarization around “formative rifts” (social or political rifts that arise during the fundamental formation/reformation of a nation-state), the relative capacity of opposing political blocs to mobilize voters versus relying on mechanisms such as courts or the military to constrain the executive, and the strategic and ideological aims of the polarizing actors contribute to the emergence of its pernicious form. We analyze the consequences for democracy and conclude with reflections on how to combat pernicious polarization.

This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The empirical section presents data about executive illiberalism and the balance of power in the national legislature for thirteen Latin American presidents. We test our argument in four negative cases (episodes) in Argentina since 1983. We use primary sources including 125 original interviews to explain how two presidents who attempted to centralize power fell short of eroding democracy

This article investigates the internal tensions of Liberal Democracy through the lens of discourse and political language, with particular attention to the rise of populist narratives. Far from being an external threat, populism emerges as a product of democracy itself, appropriating its symbolic repertoire – such as freedom, sovereignty, representation, and transparency – to construct a rhetoric of rupture. This dynamic generates what can be termed the ‘liberal trap’: populism legitimizes itself within democratic frameworks while simultaneously fostering illiberal practices that erode pluralism, checks and balances, and the substantive rule of law. By analyzing the semantic reconfigurations of key democratic concepts, the article highlights how language functions as both a vehicle of legitimacy and a mechanism of democratic corrosion. The study argues that populism should not be reduced to pathology or deviation but understood as a discursive transformation that reveals unresolved contradictions at the core of liberal democracy. In this way, populist discourse operates as both a symptom of systemic fragility and a catalyst of political change, illustrating how democratic ideals can be reappropriated and instrumentalized to undermine their very foundations.

Under the Justice and Development Party AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has become one of the most polarized countries in the world, and has undergone a significant democratic breakdown. This article explains how polarization and democratic breakdown happened, arguing that it was based on the built-in, perverse dynamics of an “authoritarian spiral of polarizing-cum-transformative politics.” Furthermore, I identify ten causal mechanisms that have produced pernicious polarization and democratic erosion. Turkey’s transformation since 2002 is an example of the broader phenomenon of democratic erosion under new elites and dominant groups. The causes and consequences of pernicious polarization are analyzed in terms of four subperiods: 2002–2006, 2007, 2008–2013, and 2014–present. In the end, what began as a potentially reformist politics of polarization-cum-transformation morphed into an autocratic-revolutionary one. During this process, polarization and AKP policies; the politicization of formative rifts that had been a divisive undercurrent since nation-state formation; structural transformations; and the opposition’s organizational, programmatic, and personal shortcomings fed and reinforced each other.

Poland represents a surprising case of democratic back-sliding since the return to power of the PiS party in 2015, given that positive conditions associated with democracy are present—consistent strong per capita economic growth since 1989, moderate inequality, rising wages, strong preference for democracy, high levels of happiness, and a parliamentary system with proportional representation. The lack of strong underlying cleavages indicates the polarization was not bottom up. Instead, this article argues that polarization was driven from the top down by a segment of the political class that donned the cloak of radical populist anti-establishmentarianism to gain popular support, win an election, and rewrite the constitutional rules of the game to its own benefit. The Polish case points to the importance of elite cues, and especially the pernicious consequences of system-delegitimizing rhetoric, creating distrust in the media and institutions.

This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The empirical section presents data about executive illiberalism and the balance of power in the national legislature for thirteen Latin American presidents. We test our argument in four negative cases (episodes) in Argentina since 1983. We use primary sources including 125 original interviews to explain how two presidents who attempted to centralize power fell short of eroding democracy.

Polarization in Hungary is one of the most severe cases in Europe. It is predominantly elite-driven, and determined mostly by the antagonistic confrontation between the parties. Left and Right blocs oppose each other in a struggle where the loser is completely denied any influence on policymaking. The two blocs endorse opposing views on socio-cultural policies, but this division emerged as a consequence of the rhetoric and coalitional choices of parties, more than from the societal divisions that they ostensibly represent. Moreover, while the perceived ideological distance between party blocs is wide, the actual programmatic differences in the parties’ economic and social policy stances are modest. This article draws on a broad range of sources to describe the process of polarization in Hungary after the fall of communism. I discuss how a polarizing style of political competition can lead to a politically divided society and, over the long run, to democratic erosion.

Incumbents often seek to wield power in ways that are formally legal but informally proscribed. Why do voters endorse these power grabs? Prior literature focuses on polarization. We propose instead that many voters are majoritarian, in that they view popularly elected leaders’ actions as inherently democratic – even when those actions undermine liberal democracy. We find support for this claim in two original survey experiments, arguing that majoritarians’ desire to give wide latitude to elected officials is an important but understudied threat to liberal democracy in the United States.

In the last year Israel has been going through its most severe constitutional crisis in its history. The newly elected right-wing government has initiated a judicial overhaul that would limit the authority of the judiciary and grant the executive almost absolute powers. In response, the country has witnessed unprecedented civil protestations and opposition from nearly all segments of civil society, academia and economic sectors. In this article we argue that the judicial overhaul must be analysed as a populist constitutional project. We also explain that compared with other systems, Israeli democracy is especially vulnerable to populism, because of its unique institutional design factors coupled with social factors. Only with understanding these factors can one grasp the risks that the judicial overhaul poses to Israeli democracy.