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Drawing upon resources from philosophy, sociology, history, and anthropology, this paper explores the possibilities of attending to geographies on the other side of life. After an introductory review of work on deathscapes and extant geographical reflections on absence and loss, the paper turns to consider three horizons in which geographers might extend their interrogations of different mortal conditions: mourning, the spatial politics of the dead, and corporeality. The paper concludes by reflecting on the disciplinary possibilities of responding to these empirical concerns at a time when we are often asked to cultivate all manner of lively geographies.

When constructing the concept of ontology Tillich uses Kant's categorical analysis and critique o metaphysics. [...]Tillich's approach to Kant's epistemology is polemical ancrequires a deeper analysis. [...]in this article, we aim, focusing on a specific reading of Immanuel Kant-the occasion being the 300th anniversary of his birth-by Paul Tillich, in order to contribute to the discussion1 of the indebtedness and/or creative revitalization of Kant in the settings of the particular (ontological) philosophy of religion. [...]the subject loses its dependence on metaphysical reality; the subject itself becomes the guarantor of the stability and order of the world. (Kant 1998, Preface, A.) This is the ontological register of Kant's philosophy, because it seems to be refusing to discuss the ontological status of the object of knowledge. [...]the transcendental realm of traditional metaphysics is replaced by the Kantian transcendental horizon, the content of which is, as it were, \"between\" the subject and the object-formed by the a priori properties of the first and presented in a certain way by the second. [...]Kant seeks to answer once and for all the question of how much the mind can know apart from experience.

This paper challenges the Western philosophical and theological tradition’s subordination of finitude to the infinite, arguing instead for finitude as the positive ontological foundation of human existence and credible theological discourse. Drawing primarily on Emmanuel Falque’s critique of “the pre-emption of the infinite” and Jan Patočka’s concept of “being shaken,” the study demonstrates how finitude constitutes not a limitation to be overcome but the necessary horizon within which any authentic encounter with transcendence must occur. The argument proceeds through four stages: deconstructing the Cartesian legacy that privileges the infinite over the finite; establishing phenomenological reorientation toward “impassable immanence;” introducing “being shaken” as the existential manifestation of finitude; and addressing critiques of this approach. The paper argues that Christianity’s incarnational logic—particularly Christ’s assumption of human finitude—provides theological validation for this phenomenological insight. The central contribution lies in proposing “credible theology”—theological discourse that derives legitimacy not from abstract rationality but from fidelity to the common human condition of finitude. This approach offers a methodological alternative to traditional fundamental theology by grounding theological reflection in the shared structures of existence.

Emmanuel Falque’s interest in possibility is infused with the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, notably in his monograph titled Hors phénomène (2021). This essay engages in a close reading of Falque’s authorship and argues that his approach to the possible accounts for the animating features of what he calls the “resurrectional modality.” Indeed, by speaking of the possible, Falque addresses the dynamic circumstances—the necessities—of our existence but also fosters a Christian way of being in the world that can negotiate the complexities of finitude in the things that we do not choose, the weight of anxiety, or the calamities of trauma. The believer lives finitude according to the impossible of theology. This argument ultimately clarifies that the transformation of the believer involves two impossibles, one of philosophy and the other of theology, which was evident in Falque’s thought before Hors phénomène but not clearly laid out. The first section of this essay begins with an examination of possibility in both Kierkegaard and Falque. Then, in the second section, this essay turns to an in-depth interpretation of Hors phénomène and its use of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death.

Nato podam eksplikacijo pojma samolastnosti ter predstavim problem celosti tubiti in razgrnem, v kaksni zvezi je s temo samolastnosti. Vendar s tem bit-v-svetu se ni zajeta v celoti in glede na samolastno razumevanje, kakor kaze problem smrti tubiti. Abstract In the article I attempt to show in what way and in what sense finitude is the ground of the authentic being-in-the-world, insofar as it is thought existentially. [...]I offer, first, an explication of the concept of being-in-the-world, with regards to its constitutive moments of worldliness, understanding, and feeling. [...]I turn to the concept of authenticity and present the problem of the wholneness of Dasein, and how it is connected with authenticity. The interpretation of existential structures is guided by the idea of the correlation between understanding and being-meaning, which lies in each existential, insofar as it concerns the structure of such a relation. Uvod V pricujocem clanku je za vodilo interpretacije smiselnega sklopa biti-vsvetu, tesnobe, skrbi in koncnosti vzeta ideja korelacijskega ustroja fenomena tu-biti. Pri tern je potrebno dodati, da gre, ko govorimo o korelaciji, za formalizacijo zavoljo preglednosti oziroma da ta korelacija ni zgolj logicna forma razmerja subjekt-objekt, zavesti in dozivljajev, ampak je izpolnjena s fenomenalnim smislom, izkazanim v hermenevtiki vsakdanjega nacina biti-v-svetu. Smisel namrec sploh ne more imeti pomena, ce necesa ne zadeva in na nekaj ne napotuje - prirocnost je lahko smiselna le za neko potrebo, prisotnost je lahko smiselna le za neko opazovanje, namembnost le za neko namenjenost itd. Tu vendar ne gre za intencionalno naperjenost nekega logicno enotnega subjekta na dolocen logicno enoten objekt, h kateremu bi ta subjekt tezil kot k pogoju za izpolnitev kaksnega svojega akta. Brez ohranitve ideje korelacije namrec ni smiselne samostojnosti tubiti in sveta in tako tudi nobenega kriterija pristojnosti analize za pojasnitev razmerja razumevanja in sveta, vse se raztopi v tubiti kot enotni strukturi. Cesar se je tu treba varovati, je, da bi s tern nacin in moznost tega korelacijskega razmerja tubiti in smisla biti ze imeli za pojasnjenega ali celo za samorazvidnega.

We propose a unified mathematical framework showing that the representational universality of modern foundational models arises from a shared finite latent domain. Building on the Finite Ring Continuum (FRC) framework, we model all modalities as epistemic projections of a common latent set Z⊂Ut, where Ut is a symmetry-complete finite-field shell. Using the uniqueness of minimal adequate representations, we prove the Universal Subspace Theorem, establishing that independently trained embeddings coincide, up to bijection, as coordinate charts on the same latent structure. This result explains cross-modal alignment, transferability, and semantic coherence as consequences of finite relational geometry rather than architectural similarity. The framework links representation learning, sufficiency theory, and FRC algebra, providing a principled foundation for universal latent structure in multimodal models.

In Edith Stein’s thinking, there is a gradual transition from the discovery of Christianity in her phenomenological studies to the mystical realization of her own role as a Christian. The present paper explores the historical, cultural, and personal circumstances of Stein’s approach to Christianity and reveals how philosophical insights contributed to her Christian commitment and supported her receptivity to mysticism. My thesis is that Stein’s philosophical reflection and the deepening of her personal religiosity are mutually evolving. The thesis of this paper is based on a letter written by Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden in 1927, at a time when she had not yet entered the Carmelite Order in Cologne but was already living as a monk. In this sense, the letter represents a zigzag reflection between past and present events, describing events in the apocalyptic horizon of eternity. Through recurrent reflection on the letter, I argue for the parallel development of mystical insights and philosophical achievements in Stein’s life, and finally, I show that the two are inextricably linked and contribute to a philosophical understanding of her own holocaust.

Trying to give an overview of the burgeoning area known as animal studies is, if you'll permit me the expression, a bit like herding cats. My recourse to that analogy is meant to suggest that “the animal,” when you think about it, is everywhere (including in the metaphors, similes, proverbs, and narratives we have relied on for centuries—millennia, even). Teach a course or write an article on the subject, and well-intentioned suggestions about interesting material pour in from all quarters. In my field alone, there's not just, say, the starring role of bear, deer, and dog at the heart of William Faulkner's Go Down, Moses and the futility of trying to imagine Ernest Hemingway without his fraternity of bulls, lions, and fish or Marianne Moore without her menagerie of pangolins and jellyfish. There's also King Kong, Babe, Charlotte's Web, Seabiscuit, The Silence of the Lambs, The Horse Whisperer , and The Fly. There's the art of Damien Hirst, Joseph Beuys, Sue Coe, William Wegman, Bill Viola, Carolee Schneeman, Lynn Randolph, and Patricia Piccinini. And all those bird poems, from Percy Shelley's skylark and John Keats's nightingale to Edgar Allan Poe's raven and Wallace Stevens's blackbird. As any medievalist or early modern scholar will tell you, the question of the animal assumes, if anything, even more centrality in earlier periods; indeed, recent and emerging scholarship suggests a picture in which the idea of the animal that we have inherited from the Enlightenment and thinkers such as Descartes and Kant is better seen as marking a brief period (if the formative one for our prevailing intellectual, political, and juridical institutions) bookended by a pre- and posthumanism that think the human/animal distinction quite otherwise. So there's also William Hogarth and Hieronymus Bosch, The Faerie Queene and Beowulf. And, of course, there is the central place of the animal in non-Western literature and culture, written and oral, which would require another essay altogether.

Overwhelmingly, philosophers tend to work on the assumption that epistemic justification is a normative status that supervenes on the relation between a cognitive subject, some body of evidence, and a particular proposition (or “hypothesis”). This article will explore some motivations for moving in the direction of a rather different view. On this view, we are invited to think of the relevant epistemic norm(s) as applying more widely to the competent exercise of epistemic agency, where it is understood that cognitive subjects are simultaneously engaged in a number of different epistemic pursuits (distinct “lines of inquiry”), each placing irreconcilable demands on our limited cognitive resources. In effect, adopting this view would require shifting our normative epistemic concern away from the question of how a subject stands with respect to the evidence bearing on the hypothesis at stake in any one line of inquiry, and over onto the question of how well they cope with the inherent risks of epistemic resource management across several lines of inquiry. While this conclusion brings to light important connections between practical and epistemic rationality, it does not collapse the distinction between them. It does, however, constitute a step in the direction of a more systematically developed account of “non-ideal epistemology.”

This paper proposes a comparative model of “bidirectional transcendence” in Confucian thought by reading the concept of jing (敬) against two kinds of human finitude: “no-more” of being and “not-yet” of being. Drawing on philological analysis of classical lexemes, close readings of Song–Ming Neo-Confucian texts, and a comparison with Western accounts of religious and philosophical transcendence, I show that jing generates two complementary responses. The first is an outward, historicizing form of transcendence—embodied in “revering Heaven and following ancestors” (jingtian fazu 敬天法祖)—which secures communal meaning and a this-worldly continuity of ethical life in the face of the “no-more.” The second is an inward, realm-oriented transcendence—articulated in “being serious in order to straighten one’s inner life” (jing yi zhi nei 敬以直內)—realized through self-cultivation (gongfu 工夫) and the integration of mind and the principle of Heaven, and oriented toward the “not-yet.” This bidirectional framework reconciles readings that cast Confucianism as either purely ethical or essentially religious, clarifies recurring comparative and translational pitfalls, and offers a concise, textually grounded basis for Sino–Western dialogue about varieties of transcendence and ultimate concern.