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Introduction: The noun has traditionally been defined in linguistic theory, following Dionysius and subsequent grammarians, as denoting subjects or objects. However, this definition fails to account for the multifunctionality of nouns in actual language use. This study questions the scientific validity of the traditional definition and explores its philosophical origins, arguing that ancient metaphysical assumptions continue to shape grammatical theory. Theoretical Framework: The theoretical grounding of this study builds upon the philosophical paradigms of Plato and Aristotle, whose metaphysical doctrines laid the foundation for ancient grammars. We examine how philosophical worldviews on the relationship between language, thought, and reality shaped the definition of grammatical categories. Methodology: The research adopts a diachronic approach, combining textual analysis of ancient philosophical and grammatical works with comparative observation of noun usage in modern languages. Illustrative data is drawn from Georgian, English, Russian, and Turkish. Results and Discussion: The study reveals that in many languages, nouns express not only subject meaning but also predicative, attributive, and adverbial meanings. The Dionysian definition, influenced by Platonic metaphysics, fails to accommodate this linguistic reality. Furthermore, the persistence of this narrow definition has been reinforced by logical traditions equating sentence structure with thought structure. Conclusion: The findings highlight the need for a new theoretical model of noun definition, one that recognizes its multifunctional nature and moves beyond metaphysical assumptions rooted in ancient philosophy.

Metaphysics: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the philosophical study of some of the most important and foundational aspects of the world in which we live. Concerned with questions about existence, time, identity, change, and other basic elements of our common-sense and scientific ways of thinking about the world, metaphysics has long fascinated people. But to the uninitiated, many of the issues and problems can appear bewilderingly complex and intractable. In this lively and lucid book, Michael Rea examines and explains the core questions in the study of metaphysics-questions such as:What is the relationship between an object and its properties, or between an object and its parts?What is time, and is time travel possible?Are human beings free?What is it for an object or person to persist over time?This second edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on the metaphysics of gender. With suggestions for further reading and a glossary of key terms, Metaphysics: The Basics is an ideal introduction for those coming to the subject for the first time.

Metaphysics: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the philosophical study of some of the most important and foundational aspects of the world in which we live. Concerned with questions about existence, time, identity, change, and other basic elements of our common-sense and scientific ways of thinking about the world, metaphysics has long fascinated people. But to the uninitiated, many of the issues and problems can appear bewilderingly complex and intractable. In this lively and lucid book, Michael Rea examines and explains the core questions in the study of metaphysics-questions such as:What is the relationship between an object and its properties, or between an object and its parts?What is time, and is time travel possible?Are human beings free?What is it for an object or person to persist over time?This second edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on the metaphysics of gender. With suggestions for further reading and a glossary of key terms, Metaphysics: The Basics is an ideal introduction for those coming to the subject for the first time.

Materialism is the view according to which a zombie world is metaphysically impossible. Assuming that zombies are conceivable in the sense that we cannot rule out a priori that our world is a zombie world, materialists must hold that a zombie world is metaphysically impossible despite being conceivable. There are no good reasons to think that this view (type-B materialism) is false, since there are no good reasons to think that the corresponding phenomenal and physical/functional concepts cannot be distinct concepts of the same thing. Nonetheless, we cannot understand how type-B materialism can be true. We cannot understand this, because we cannot in principle explain how a zombie world could be impossible despite being conceivable.

This second edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on the metaphysics of gender. With suggestions for further reading and a glossary of key terms it is an ideal introduction for those coming to the subject for the first time.

It is sometimes argued that, given its detachment from our current most successful science, analytic metaphysics has no epistemic value because it contributes nothing to our knowledge of reality. Relatedly, it is also argued that metaphysics properly constrained by science can avoid that problem. In this paper we argue, however, that given the current understanding of the relation between science and metaphysics, metaphysics allegedly constrained by science suffers the same fate as its unconstrained sister; that is, what is currently thought of as scientifically respectful metaphysics may end up also being without epistemic value. The core of our claim is that although much emphasis is put on the supposed difference between unconstrained analytic metaphysics, in opposition to scientifically constrained metaphysics, it is largely forgotten that no clear constraining relation of metaphysics by science is yet available.

Several advocates of the lively field of “metaphysics of science” have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between “metaphysics of science” and “traditional metaphysics”, and that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional “box”, with one axis distinguishing “descriptive metaphysics” from “revisionary metaphysics”, a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing “commonsense metaphysics”, “traditional metaphysics” and “metaphysics of science”. We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity.

This paper aims to better motivate the naturalization of metaphysics by identifying and criticizing a class of theories I call ’free range metaphysics’. I argue that free range metaphysics is epistemically inadequate because the constraints on its content—consistency, simplicity, intuitive plausibility, and explanatory power—are insufficiently robust and justificatory. However, since free range metaphysics yields clarity-conducive techniques, incubates science, and produces conceptual and formal tools useful for scientifically engaged philosophy, I do not recommend its discontinuation. I do recommend, however, ending the discipline’s bad faith. That is, I urge that free range metaphysics not be taken to have fully satisfactory epistemic credentials over and above its pragmatic ones.