Explore the vast range of titles available.

Managers of emerging platforms must decide what level of platform performance to invest in at each product development cycle in markets that exhibit two-sided network externalities. High performance is a selling point for consumers, but in many cases it requires developers to make large investments to participate. Abstracting from an example drawn from the video game industry, we build a strategic model to investigate the trade-off between investing in high platform performance versus reducing investment in order to facilitate third party content development. We carry out a full analysis of three distinct settings: monopoly, price-setting duopoly, and price-taking duopoly. We provide insights on the optimum investment in platform performance and demonstrate how conventional wisdom about product development may be misleading in the presence of strong cross-network externalities. In particular, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom about \"winner-take-all\" markets, heavily investing in the core performance of a platform does not always yield a competitive edge. We characterize the conditions under which offering a platform with lower performance but greater availability of content can be a winning strategy.

We explain why dominant firms give away good-quality products for free when network externalities are present. Despite its immense popularity, the freemium business model remains a complex strategy to master and often a topic of heated debate. Adopting a generalized version of the screening framework, we ask when and why a firm should endogenously offer a zero price on its low-end product when users’ product usages generate network externalities on each other. In the standard screening framework without network effects, freemium never emerges as optimal, and the firm always chooses the efficient price point for its low-end product. We show that even with network effects, freemium is typically not optimal. When network effects are identical across products (“symmetric”), the firm has greater incentive to expand its network size and may find it profitable to sell to the low-end customers. However, this does not lead to freemium as an equilibrium strategy. Instead, the firm should offer a low-end product to attract customers, while keeping its price positive. Freemium can only emerge if the high- and low-end products provide different levels of (“asymmetric”) marginal network effects. In other words, the firm would set a zero price for its low-end product only if the high-end product provided larger utility gain from an expansion of the firm’s user base. In contrast to conventional beliefs, a firm pursuing the freemium strategy might increase the baseline quality on its low-end product above the “efficient” level, which seemingly reduces differentiation. The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1109 .

Many two-sided platforms, such as eBay, iOS, Android, and Twitter, invest in developer integration tools, such as modular interfaces, interactive development environments, application programming interfaces, and help desks, in order to reduce the cost and improve the functionality of third-party content developed for the platform. Although these integration tools are crucial to platform success, they are costly to create, and therefore, managers need to understand where and when to deploy them. In particular, when the necessary integration investment is high, the advice to subsidize one side of a two-sided market while charging the other may not hold. This means that integration investment should be carefully coordinated with market pricing decisions. In general, higher levels of investment by hardware/software platforms into integration become desirable when the platform (1) has access to a large pool of content providers and consumers, (2) is able to develop integration tools that are highly effective in reducing third-party development costs, and (3) operates in high-consumer value markets. However, there are nuances. For example, business to business platforms can make investments in integration to facilitate participation by both sides of the market. We find that such investments are complements, not—as one might expect—substitutes. Many two-sided platforms (for example, eBay, Google, iOS, Android, Twitter, and Amazon) provide integration tools, such as modular interfaces, interactive development environments, application programming interfaces, and help desks, to reduce the costs and improve the functionality of third-party content developed for the platform. The need for such investment is increasing with the rise of major new markets as the result of technologies, such as the “Internet of Things.” Although crucial to platform success, platform integration tools are costly to create. We develop an analytic model to explore the key tradeoffs behind investment in integration tools and how that investment interacts with pricing decisions in a two-sided market. We model these decisions for hardware/software platforms as well as hybrid retail platforms and analyze them under various scenarios, including monopoly and competition. Our results suggest that considering integration investment can create market regimes in which the standard pricing results from the extant platform literature no longer hold. For example, the tendency to reduce prices to one side of a market in response to increasing the benefit of the network to the other side may be suboptimal in the presence of integration investment. Therefore, integration investments must be well coordinated with pricing decisions made for both sides of the market. In general, higher levels of investment by hardware/software platforms into integration become desirable when the platform (1) has access to a large pool of content providers and consumers, (2) is able to develop integration tools that are highly effective in reducing third-party development costs, and (3) operates in a market in which content providers earn a high-enough profit margin creating content that is highly valued by the consumer market. Hybrid retail platforms often show similar behavior. However, there are some nuances. For example, business to business platforms can make investments in integration to facilitate participation by both sides of the market. We find that these investments are complements, not—as one might expect—substitutes. We conclude by discussing this work’s implications for theory and practice.

Network externality arises when the utility of a product depends not only on its attributes but also on the number of consumers who purchase the same product. In this paper, we study consumer choice models that endogenize such network externality. We first characterize the choice probabilities under such models and conduct studies on comparative statics. Then we investigate the assortment optimization problem under such choice models. Although the problem is generally NP-hard, we show that a new class of assortments, called quasi-revenue-ordered assortments , which consist of a revenue-ordered assortment plus at most one additional item, are optimal under mild conditions. We also propose an iterative estimation method to calibrate such choice models, for both uncensored and censored data cases. An empirical study on a mobile game data set shows that our proposed model can provide better fits for the data, increase the prediction accuracy for consumer choices, and potentially increase revenue. This paper was accepted by Noah Gans, stochastic models and simulation .

As a digital financial innovation, equity crowdfunding (ECF) allows investors to exploit the complementarity of information provision and network effects in a reduced transaction cost environment. We build on the underlying distinction between soft and hard information and show that ECF platforms create an environment of greater information pooling that benefits from network externalities. We test our hypotheses using a unique proprietary dataset and find that soft information has a greater impact than hard on the likelihood that a financing pitch will be successful. Moreover, the effects of soft information are amplified by the size of the investor network on the platform and network size also positively moderates the effect of information on the amount invested during each pitch. We conclude that ECF platforms can successfully exploit low transaction costs of the digital environment and bring network externalities to bear on investor decisions. Taken together that these increase the supply of funds to entrepreneurs.

PurposeBased on the cognition–affect–conation pattern, this study explores the factors that affect the intention to use facial recognition services (FRS). The study adopts the driving factor perspective to examine how network externalities influence FRS use intention through the mediating role of satisfaction and the barrier factor perspective to analyze how perceived privacy risk affects FRS use intention through the mediating role of privacy cynicism.Design/methodology/approachThe data collected from 478 Chinese FRS users are analyzed via partial least squares-based structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM).FindingsThe study produces the following results. (1) FRS use intention is motivated directly by the positive affective factor of satisfaction and the negative affective factor of privacy cynicism. (2) Satisfaction is affected by cognitive factors related to network externalities. Perceived complementarity and perceived compatibility, two indirect network externalities, positively affect satisfaction, whereas perceived critical mass, a direct network externality, does not significantly affect satisfaction. In addition, perceived privacy risk generates privacy cynicism. (3) Resistance to change positively moderates the relationship between privacy cynicism and intention to use FRS.Originality/valueThis study extends knowledge on people's use of FRS by exploring affect- and cognitive-based factors and finding that the affect-based factors (satisfaction and privacy cynicism) play fully mediating roles in the relationship between the cognitive-based factors and use intention. This study also expands the cognitive boundaries of FRS use by exploring the functional condition between affect-based factors and use intention, that is, the moderating role of resistance to use.

Mobile payment is an attractive option that has recently boomed because of the advent of smart phones and their applications. Despite the great potential of such technology in simplifying our lives, its uptake remains limited. As the technology acceptance fails to meet expectations, this study aims at providing a better understanding of the factors influencing mobile payment acceptance. Through an empirical investigation that couples the traditional technology acceptance factors with “network externalities” effect. This study hypothesized that performance expectancy, effort expectancy; social influence, trust, and network externality are major factors that influence the intention to use mobile payment. Results indicated that while the traditional acceptance drivers still impact customers’ willingness to adopt mobile payment, network externalities was the most influential driver of mobile payment acceptance. Results also failed to support the influence of effort expectancy. Conclusions and future work propositions are stated at the end.

Platform-based capacity sharing is a new business format of sharing economy to reallocate spare production resources via industrial internet, generating collaborative manufacturing related platform operations issues. This paper examines the impact of cross-network externality and supply risk of the two-sided market on the pricing and blockchain adopting decisions of capacity sharing platforms. The mean–variance model is employed to depict the impact of purchasers’ or suppliers’ risk-sensitive types on platform pricing, where purchasers’ or suppliers’ risk-sensitive types can be identified by blockchain technology and be intertwined by the cross-network externality. The obtained platform’s optimal pricing under two scenarios with risk-sensitive capacity purchasers (D) and risk-sensitive suppliers (S) shows that the platform charges risk-seeking, risk-neutral and risk-averse users in descending order for the platform side containing risk-sensitive users, regardless of the comparison of bilateral cross-network externalities. However, for risk-neutral side users, the price ranking under three risk-sensitive types depends on the relative size of bilateral cross-network externalities. In addition, blockchain technology always decreases the surplus of risk-sensitive side users, whereas it increases the surplus of risk-insensitive side users. Further, we find that platform prefers to introduce blockchain technology when the fixed cost of introducing it is less than the profit increment it brings. In addition, by comparing platform profits and blockchain value in the two scenarios, we argue that platforms need to comprehensively balance the comparison of fixed costs of introducing blockchain on both sides and the importance of risk-preferring and risk-averse users to improve their profitability. Introducing blockchain technology to the side where the cost of blockchain technology is higher may result in higher blockchain value for the platform. Finally, we examine the platform with two-sided risk-sensitive users and the results are robust. This study proposes theoretical explanation for platform pricing considering the cross-network externality and risk-sensitive users, as well as some management insights for the application of blockchain technology in platform operations.

For a period starting in 2015, Apple, Google, and Microsoft became the most valuable companies in the world. Each was marked by an external developer ecosystem. Anecdotally, at least, developers matter. Using a formal model of code spillovers, we show how a rising number of developers can invert the firm. That is, firms will choose to innovate using open external contracts in preference to closed vertical integration. The locus of value creation moves from inside the firm to outside. Distinct from physical goods, digital goods afford firms the chance to optimize spillovers. Further, firms that pursue high risk innovations with more developers can be more profitable than firms that pursue low risk innovations with fewer developers. More developers give platform firms more chances at success. Our contribution is to show why developers might cause a shift in organizational form and to provide a theory of how platform firms optimize their own intellectual property regimes in order to maximize growth. We use stylized facts from multiple platform firms to illustrate our theory and results.