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6,823 result(s) for "post‐ World War II period"
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The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana
In this article, I show that far from consenting to be bound by institutions and rules of the Pax Americana, China is already working to recast the international order in ways that favour its interests, not those of the United States. The US foreign policy establishment does not grasp this, and, instead, has invested the idea of a ‘rules-based, institutionalized’ international order with a talismanic quality. It claims that rules and institutions are politically neutral, and, ipso facto, beneficial for all. However, in international politics, who rules makes the rules. Rules and institutions reflect the distribution of power in the international system. A power transition is taking place in the early twenty-first century: US power is in relative decline and China is rising quickly. No international order—not even the Pax Americana—lasts forever. The liberal world order cannot survive the erosion of US hegemonic power. It is this structural change, not Donald Trump, that threatens the post-Second Word War international order’s survival. It requires a huge leap of faith to believe that a risen China will continue to subordinate itself to the Pax Americana.
Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism
The 1990s saw a systemic shift from the liberal post–World War II international order of liberal multilateralism (LIO I) to a post–Cold War international order of postnational liberalism (LIO II). LIO II has not been only rule-based but has openly pursued a liberal social purpose with a significant amount of authority beyond the nation-state. While postnational liberal institutions helped increase overall well-being globally, they were criticized for using double standards and institutionalizing state inequality. We argue that these institutional features of the postnational LIO II led to legitimation problems, which explain both the current wave of contestations and the strategies chosen by different contestants. We develop our argument first by mapping the growing liberal intrusiveness of international institutions. Second, we demonstrate the increased level and variety of contestations in international security and international refugee law. We show that increased liberal intrusiveness has led to a variety of contestation strategies, the choice of which is affected by the preference of a contestant regarding postnational liberalism and its power within the contested institution.
China in search of a liberal partnership international order
The existing liberal hegemonic order is essentially an American-led and western-centred one. Its desirability and sustainability have been called into questions due to a wide array of challenges and developments. The rise of China is both one of the drivers of change as well as a key determinant shaping the emerging order. This article discusses what China’s vision for a future international order looks like, what kind of impact China is likely to have on this order and how this will happen. By examining the ideas, concepts and practices which inform China’s vision for the future, it argues that China will search for a liberal partnership order composed of an open economic order, a relatively more equal political order and a cooperative security order. To advance this goal, China will aim to preserve or even expand the liberal features of the prevailing order while curtailing its hegemonic nature. Instead of attempting to overturn the current order, China would pursue selective and incremental adjustments that overtime will lead to an order transition. Given current constraints, China cannot shape the emerging order in the same way as the United States did in the post-Second World War period, and the form and tempo of the order transition will depend largely on the outcome of Sino-US bargaining.
Education in East Asian Societies: Postwar Expansion and the Evolution of Inequality
This article reviews research on the coevolution of educational expansion and educational inequality within China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the post-World War II period. These societies are often lauded for their spectacular economic growth, widespread commitment to investing in education, and intense competition for academic success. This review first considers organizational sorting and horizontal stratification within the educational system, followed by returns to education in the labor market and then the inequality of educational opportunity, with special attention to the nominal versus positional approaches to measuring education. This combination of regional focus and substantive diversity offers the leverage of an approximately matched comparison. The findings demonstrate that there are significant heterogeneities in the coevolution of educational expansion and inequality among these societies with strong cultural and political ties. The findings also suggest complex causal and contingent relationships among educational expansion, educational stratification, returns to education, and inequality of opportunity.
The German statistical category “migration background”
The term “migration background” is commonly used in Germany today, but this neologism is only 20 years old. As an official category, it is even much younger. There has been only little research concerning the new population category, which emerged around the turn of the millennium. Thus, the question how the “migration background” could become the central category describing migration related diversity in Germany is not answered yet. This article fills this gap by exploring the context of the emergence of the “migration background” including the history of ethnic categories in German official statistics. It describes the actual definition of a “migration background” which became an official category in 2007 when the German Federal Statistical Office started publishing data regarding “the population with a migration background” based on the microcensus, a 1% household survey with mandatory participation. The central questions are: how national membership is imagined, how is it inscribed in definitions, and what adaptions had to be made over time? To answer these questions, different sources as questionnaires, publications of results of the microcensus and national reports on children and youth are analysed. Using interpretative methods, it is shown how a new taxonomy of the population in Germany was created, how it was influenced by international and national educational research, and to which extent it reshaped the perspectives on newcomers and natives. It is shown that the new category is tightly bound to citizenship and summarizes a number of older ethnic categories, but excludes also immigrated Germans who immigrated shortly after Second World War and from the former German Democratic Republic. Therefore, the label “migration background” is misleading because inherited citizenship and ancestry is in the centre of the definition rather than migration experience.
Why general artificial intelligence will not be realized
The modern project of creating human-like artificial intelligence (AI) started after World War II, when it was discovered that electronic computers are not just number-crunching machines, but can also manipulate symbols. It is possible to pursue this goal without assuming that machine intelligence is identical to human intelligence. This is known as weak AI. However, many AI researcher have pursued the aim of developing artificial intelligence that is in principle identical to human intelligence, called strong AI. Weak AI is less ambitious than strong AI, and therefore less controversial. However, there are important controversies related to weak AI as well. This paper focuses on the distinction between artificial general intelligence (AGI) and artificial narrow intelligence (ANI). Although AGI may be classified as weak AI, it is close to strong AI because one chief characteristics of human intelligence is its generality. Although AGI is less ambitious than strong AI, there were critics almost from the very beginning. One of the leading critics was the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, who argued that computers, who have no body, no childhood and no cultural practice, could not acquire intelligence at all. One of Dreyfus’ main arguments was that human knowledge is partly tacit, and therefore cannot be articulated and incorporated in a computer program. However, today one might argue that new approaches to artificial intelligence research have made his arguments obsolete. Deep learning and Big Data are among the latest approaches, and advocates argue that they will be able to realize AGI. A closer look reveals that although development of artificial intelligence for specific purposes (ANI) has been impressive, we have not come much closer to developing artificial general intelligence (AGI). The article further argues that this is in principle impossible, and it revives Hubert Dreyfus’ argument that computers are not in the world.
Interrupting the Coloniality of Knowledge Production in Comparative Education
The article explores the coloniality of knowledge production in comparative education in and about (post)socialist spaces of southeast/central Europe and the former Soviet Union after the Cold War. We engage in a particular form of decoloniality, or what Walter Mignolo terms “delinking,” to fracture the hegemony of Western-centric knowledge and enable comparative education to gain a global viewpoint that is more inclusive of different voices. Our critique is threefold. First, we engage in rethinking and rewriting socialist past(s) through new and multiple frames to reveal possibilities for imagining postsocialist future(s). Second, we show the relations and the intertwined histories of the spatially partitioned world. Third, we examine how coloniality has shaped our own identities as scholars and discuss ways to reclaim our positions as epistemic subjects who have both the legitimacy and capacity to look at and interpret the world from our own origins and lived realities. El artículo explora la colonialidad de la producción del conocimiento en la educación comparativa dentro y fuera de los espacios (post)socialistas del sudeste/centro de Europa y la antigua Unión Soviética después de la Guerra Fría. Participamos en una forma especial de decolonialidad, o lo que Walter Mignolo designa “desvincular” (“delinking”), para fracturar la hegemonía del conocimiento céntrico occidental y permitir la educación comparativa para ganar una perspectiva global que es más inclusiva de las diferentes voces. Nuestra crítica es triple. En primer lugar nos dedicamos a reflexionar y volver a escribir el pasado socialista a través de marcos nuevos y múltiples para revelar las posibilidades de imaginar un futuro postsocialista. En segundo lugar mostramos las relaciones y las historias entrelazadas del mundo particionado desde el punto de vista espacial. En tercer lugar examinamos de qué forma la colonialidad ha moldeado nuestras propias identidades como académicos y hablamos sobre las formas de recuperar nuestras posiciones como sujetos epistémicos que tienen legitimidad y capacidad para observar e interpretar el mundo desde nuestros propios orígenes y realidades vividas. Cet article explore la colonialité de la production des connaissances dans l’éducation comparée dans et à propos des régions (post)communistes en Europe de l’Est et dans l’ancienne Union soviétique après la Guerre Froide. Nous nous engageons dans une forme particulière de décolonialité, ou ce que Walter Mignolo appellerait “dissociation,” pour casser l’hégémonie des connaissances centrée sur l’Occident et permettre une éducation comparée, afin d’obtenir un point de vue global qui tienne mieux compte des différentes voix. Notre critique est triple. D’abord, nous entreprenons de repenser et de réécrire le(s) passé(s) communiste(s) à travers des cadres nouveaux et multiples, afin de révéler des possibilités d’imaginer un/des futur(s) postcommuniste( s). Deuxièmement, nous montrons les relations et les historiques entrelacés d’un monde aux espaces séparés. Troisièmement, nous examinons comment la colonialité a modelé nos propres identités en tant qu’universitaires et nous débattons pour savoir comment retrouver nos positions de sujets épistémiques légitimes et capables d’étudier et d’interpréter le monde à partir de nos propres origines et des réalités que nous vivons. 本文探讨了 冷战后在欧洲东南/中部和前 苏联时期(后)社会主义空间内部和周围在比较教育中的殖民性知识产生。我们进行了特 殊形式的非殖民化,或者如 Walter Mignolo 所称的“脱钩”以打破以西方为中心的知识霸权, 使比较教育能够获得对 不同声音更加包容的全球性观点。我们的批判具有三重性。第一,我们 通过新型多重框架对社会主义过往进行反思和重写,以揭示对 后社会主义未来进行想象的可能性。第二,我们展现了 世界经过空间划分之后的内部关系与错综复杂的历史。第三,我们审视了殖民性是如何将 我们自己的身份塑造成 学者的,并讨论了将我们的地位改造成知识主体的方式, 从而让我们既有正当性又有能力 从我们自己的起源和所处的现实来看待和解读世界。 يستكشف هذا المقال الطبيعة الاستعمارية للإنتاج المعرفي في التعليم المقار ن أ و روبا وسحداشرق جنوب ف ي ا لا شت را ك ي ة المناطق ف ي .البا ردة الحرب ب ع د ال سا ب ق ا ل س و ف ي ت ي والاتحادونحن نشارك في شكل معين من أشكال إنهاء الاستعمار أو م ا ا ل غ ر ب ي ة ال و س طي ة ال م ع رف ة هيمنة ل ك س ر وذلك \"ا لا رتبا ط ف ك\" م ي غ ن ول و و ال ت ر عل ي ه ي طل ق ش م ولي ة ا لأ ك ث ر ال عال م ي ة الن ظ ر وجهة ا ك ت سا ب من المقا ر ن ا ل ت ع ل ي م و ت م ك ي ن . ا ل م خ ت ل ف ة ل لأ صوات وال و ١ي أن نقدنا هو نقد ثلاثي. أولأ، نحن نشارك في إعادة التفكير وفي إعادة كتاب ة ت صو ر إمكانات عن ل ل ك ش ف وال مت ع د د ة ال جدي دة الإطارات.خلال من ا لا شت را ك ي ضي١ل م ا .ا لا شت را كي ة ا ل ف ت ر ة ب ع د ما ا ل م س ت ق ب د ث ا ن ي ا، نحن نعرض العلاقات والتاريخ المتشابك .مكانيا ا ل م ش م للع-المثالذبا وأخيرا، نحن ندرس كيف أن الاستعمار قد شكل هويتنا الخاصة ت ت م ت ع م ع ر ف ي ة ك كا ئ نا ت م و ا ق ف ن ا ا ست عا د ة س ب ل و ننا ق ش ك عل ما ء وأ صولنا ال ع ال م إل ى الن ظ ر من ت م ك ن ن ا ا ل ت ي والق د رة ب ال ش ر ع ي ة . ت ف س ي ر ه إعادة ومن ن ع ي ش ه الذي وال واق В этой статье анализируется колониальность производства знаний в сравнительном образовании в различных (пост)социалистических странах Юго-Восточной и Центральной Европы и бывшего СССР после Холодной войны. Авторы рассматривают определенную форму деколониальности (или того, что Уолтер Миньоло называет «разрывом»), призванную сломить гегемонию западно-центристских знаний и предоставить сравнительному образованию возможность получить глобальное видение, позволяющее уделить больше внимания различным точкам зрения. Представленный критический обзор состоит из трех частей. Во-первых, авторы переосмысливают и переписывают социалистическое прошлое, используя новые, многочисленные структуры и раскрывая возможности для формирования постсоциалистического будущего. Во-вторых, они демонстрируют связи и переплетения в истории пространственно разделенного мира. В-третьих, авторы рассматривают, каким образом колониальность сформировала нас как ученых, и обсуждают, как нам восстановить свои позиции эпистемологических субъектов, обладающих и законным правом, и способностью воспринимать мир с учетом своих корней и жизненного опыта.
The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump
A century ago, Woodrow Wilson changed America’s place in the world when he sent two million men to fight in Europe, but America withdrew into isolationism in the 1930s. After the Second World War, Harry Truman and others created a framework of permanent alliances and multilateral institutions that became known as the ‘liberal international order’ or ‘Pax Americana’. Those terms have become obsolete as descriptions of the US place in the world, but the need for the largest countries to provide public goods remains. An open international order covers political–military affairs; economic relations; ecological relations; and human rights. It remains to be seen to what degree these depend on each other and what will remain as the 1945 package is unpacked. Wilson’s legacy of developing international institutions continues to make sense. Leadership is not the same as domination, and it will need to be shared. There have always been degrees of leadership and degrees of influence during the seven decades of American pre-eminence after 1945. Now with less preponderance and a more complex world, American exceptionalism in terms of its economic and military power should focus on sharing the provision of global public goods, particularly those that require ‘power with’ others. Wilson’s century old insights about international institutions and a rules-based order will remain crucial, but America’s place in that world may be threatened more by the rise of populist politics at home than the rise of other powers abroad.
POLITICO-ECONOMIC REGIMES AND ATTITUDES
This paper investigates whether attitudes are affected by politico-economic regimes. We exploit the efforts of state socialist regimes to promote women’s economic inclusion. Using the German partition afterWorld War II, we show that women from East-Germany are more likely to place importance on career success compared to women from West-Germany. Further, the population at large in East Germany is less likely to hold traditional gender role attitudes. Examining possible mechanisms, we find that the change in attitudes under the East German regime was larger in areas where the growth in female employment was larger. A comparison of Eastern versus Western Europe confirms these results.
RUDERAL ECOLOGIES
Engaging with a series of human–plant encounters in Berlin, this article explores possibilities for rethinking the heterogeneity of urban life in the ruins of European nationalism and capitalism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and revisiting Berlin’s postwar history of botanical research, I develop the concept of the ruderal and expand it for an anthropological inquiry of urban life. The term ruderal was originally used by Berlin ecologists after the Second World War to refer to ecologies that spontaneously inhabit disturbed environments: the spaces alongside train tracks or roads, wastelands, or rubble. Exploring Berlin as a ruderal city, I direct attention to the often unnoticed, cosmopolitan, and unruly ways of remaking the urban fabric at a time of increased nationalism and ecological destruction. Tracing human–plant socialities in encounters between scientists and rubble plants, in public culture, and among immigrants and their makeshift urban gardens, the lens of the ruderal directs ethnographic analysis toward the city’s unintended ecologies as these are produced in the context of nation-making, war, xenophobia, migration, environmental change, and contemporary austerity policies. Attending to ruderal worlds, I argue, requires telling stories that do not easily add up but that combine environmental perspectives with the study of migration, race, and social inequality—in the interest of mapping out possibilities for change. This framework thus expands a recent anthropological focus on ruins, infrastructure, and urban landscapes by highlighting questions of social justice that are at stake in emerging urban ecologies and an era of inhospitable environments.