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Hiding in Plain Sight tells the story of the global effort to apprehend the world’s most wanted fugitives. Beginning with the flight of tens of thousands of Nazi war criminals and their collaborators after World War II, then moving on to the question of justice following the recent Balkan wars and the Rwandan genocide, and ending with the establishment of the International Criminal Court and America’s pursuit of suspected terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11, the book explores the range of diplomatic and military strategies—both successful and unsuccessful—that states and international courts have adopted to pursue and capture war crimes suspects. It is a story fraught with broken promises, backroom politics, ethical dilemmas, and daring escapades—all in the name of international justice and human rights.

Purpose This paper aims to contend that when tackling financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist financing, international regulators are seeking to hold offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands to higher standards and that this detracts from the pursuit of detecting and prosecuting money launders. Design/methodology/approach This paper will deal with the following perceived issues: firstly, to offshore jurisdictions as a concept; secondly, to outline the efforts made by the Cayman Islands to combat money laundering and to rate these changes against Financial Action Task Forces’ (FATAF’s) technical criteria; thirdly, to demonstrate that the Cayman Islands is among some of the world’s top jurisdictions for compliance with FATAF’s standards; and finally, to examine whether greylisting was necessary and to comment upon whether efforts by international regulators to hold offshore jurisdictions to higher standards detracts from the actual prosecution of money laundering within the jurisdiction. Findings Greylisting the Cayman Islands in these authors’ view was something that should have never happened; the Cayman Islands is being held to standards far beyond what is expected in an onshore jurisdiction. There is a need for harmonisation in respect of international anti money laundering rules and regulations to shift the tone to prosecution and investigation of offences rather than on rating jurisdictions technical compliance with procedural rules where states have a workable anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Research limitations/implications The implications of this research are to show that offshore jurisdictions are being held by FATAF and other international regulators to higher AML standards than their onshore counterparties. Practical implications The author hopes that this paper will begin the debate as to whether FATAF needs to give reasons as to why offshore jurisdictions are held to higher standards and whether it needs to begin to contemplate higher onshore standards. Originality/value This is an original piece of research evaluating the effect of FATAF's reporting on offshore jurisdictions with a case study involving primary and secondary data in relation to the Cayman Islands.

Contemporary international criminal law is largely concerned with holding individual defendants responsible for mass atrocities. Because the crimes usually involve the concerted efforts of many individuals, allocating responsibility among them is of critical importance. This Article examines two liability doctrines-joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility-that play a central role in that allocation of guilt in international criminal tribunals. The Article posits a general framework for understanding the development of international criminal law as an outgrowth of three legal traditions: domestic criminal law, international human rights law, and transitional justice. We explore the application of that framework to joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines and argue that viewing joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility through the lens of our framework shows the need for certain doctrinal reforms. Finally, we discuss the application of liability doctrines developed in the context of international criminal tribunals to prosecutions for international or transnational crimes in other forums, such as domestic military tribunal prosecutions of terrorists, that do not share the same roots as international criminal law.

This article gives a prosecutor's perspective on the practical application of UK terrorism legislation. It gives an overview of the working relationship between the Counter Terrorism Division's specialist prosecutors, police officers and the intelligence services, in order to outline some of the challenges in investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases, and to inform on prosecutorial decision-making. It summarizes the main additions and changes to the criminal terrorism legislation over the last decade and gives examples of how some of the key powers and offences have been approached and used by prosecutors. The article deliberately concentrates on the criminal aspects of terrorism legislation and the importance of using due process to prosecute alleged terrorists fairly and proportionately. It describes how prosecutors use a mixture of the ordinary criminal and specialist terrorism laws depending on what is deemed appropriate in any given case. It is not intended to be a critique of the legislation itself or an analysis of what may or may not need to be changed. That is a matter for Parliament; the prosecutor's role is to apply the law not to make it. The article concludes that the criminal justice system is the correct place for terrorism prosecutions to take place and that the UK can continue to retain due process and respect for human rights while seeking properly to protect national security.

In January 2002, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national of Moroccan descent, pleaded not guilty in Virginia federal court to six counts of conspiring to commit acts of international terrorism in connection with the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. In other times, it would have seemed unremarkable for someone charged with conspiring to murder American citizens and destroy American property on American soil to be tried in a U.S. civilian court. More than two centuries ago, Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution granted Congress the power to \"define and punish Piracies, Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,\" a power that Congress immediately exercised by criminalizing piracy, the eighteenth-century version of modern terrorism. Since then, Congress has criminalized numerous other international offenses. In recent decades, United States courts have decided criminal cases convicting international hijackers, terrorists, and drug smugglers, as well as a string of well-publicized civil lawsuits adjudicating gross human rights violations. Most pertinent, federal prosecutors have successfully tried and convicted in U.S. courts numerous members of Al Qaeda, the very terrorist group charged with planning the September 11 attacks, for earlier attacks on the World Trade Center and the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Have U.S. government lawyers, including military attorneys, designed policies with the \"goal of separating... lawyers from their clients\" at Guantanamo? Have these government lawyers \"worked... hard to take out the adversary lawyers at Guantanamo?\" Are government policies unethically interfering with the responsibilities of defense counsel for the detainees? Are there special difficulties for 'military' defense attorneys? These are some of the ethics questions panelist Professor David Luban of the Georgetown University Law Center sought to address at a conference on the American legal profession sponsored by Stanford University in March of 2008. The Stanford Law Review published his expanded views under the title 'Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guant namo, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, Vol. 60, No. 6, April 2008: 1981-2026. The purpose of this Response is to assess critically Professor Luban's effort and, in key areas, dispute his inferences and conclusions.

Sicily's experiments in civility and legality in dealing with the mafia are helpful in thinking about the \"war on terrorism\" following the Sep 11 terrorist attacks. Prosecutions in Sicily have depended upon several innovations, most of which derive from a national law defining active membership in the mafia as itself a crime.