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The ERTA case marks the constitutional inception of EU external relations. It laid the foundations for the legal framework governing the exercise of the EU's external competences and is often associated with the development of the doctrine of implied powers. The main tenets of the Court's pronouncement continue to define the fabric of the EU's external action. As the first Commission v Council litigation, ERTA encapsulates a still perceivable tension between two visions of Europe. One emphasises the autonomy of the EU institutional framework, the other regards the EU institutions as common organs in the hands of the Member States. ERTA's dossier de procédure constitutes a unique laboratory to assess the development of the EU as a legal order and an international actor. Its precious documents offer new sources to appreciate the abovementioned tension and unravel the shifting constitutional equilibria emerging from the interplay between EU and Member States treaty-making powers. Building on the archival research, this Article reflects on the inner working of the Court's judicial strategy. It seeks to shed novel light on the genealogy of the fascinating debate on the constitutional underpinnings of EU external relations.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 145-152 | European Forum Insight of 25 June 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The signature of international agreements into EU law and the emergence of a practice. - III. Breaking a taboo. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The European Union has always concluded international agreements with third countries and international organisations as an integral component of its external action. In contrast to its predecessors, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a uniform procedural framework for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in art. 218 TFEU with the aim of simplification and coherence between all EU external policies, including the CFSP. However, the act of signing international agreements has remained a grey area, shared between the Commission and the Council as a result of a well-established practice within EU institutional governance. On 9 April 2024, the European Court of Justice brought the Council back to a literal interpretation of the EU Treaties, removing any doubt about the role of the Commission in representing the EU externally and crystallising the legal authority of the sole Commission to sign agreements on behalf of the EU.

This Article presents two arguments and explores the relationship between them. First, the principles governing coordination between the EU and its Member States in multilateral fora (mainly, sincere co-operation and unity in the EU's representation) serve to increase the Member States' influence in inter-national law-making. Thus, there is a trade-off between the autonomy of Member States to determine their own positions in multilateral fora, and their capacity to influence such fora: the lesser the former, the greater the latter. Second, such an influence can be used by the EU and its Member States to pro-mote human rights laws abroad, “uploading” high standards into multilateral treaties, which are subse-quently “downloaded” by third states through ratification and implementation. Therefore, there is a link between the mentioned EU external relations law principles (which are a “condition” for a success-ful promotion) and the obligation to promote values set in arts 3(5) and 21 TEU (which provides the “direction” of the promotion). Consequently, when Member States complain about excessive EU intru-sion into their autonomy through common positions in multilateral fora, they should bear in mind that they are not only bound by the above-mentioned legal principles, but that their obligation to promote certain values abroad is also at stake. The case of the EU's influence on the Maritime Labour Conven-tion and its impact on Chinese law and policy is used to illustrate the arguments.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1077-1103 | European Forum Insight of 8 January 2024 | (Series Information) European Papers (News of dd month yyyy) | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction - II. From German Competition Decision to EU Judgement - II.1. Bundeskartellamt Decision B6-22/16 of 6 February 2019 - II.2. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 July 2023 - III. Comment - III.1. Something new: relations between competition law and data protection - III.2. Something borrowed: Meta v Bundeskartellamt and the European Commission - III.3. Something old: arts 6 and 9 GDPR - IV. Concluding remark. | (Abstract) Meta v Bundeskartellamt is the culmination of an issue years in the making: the relation between data protection and competition. In contention is the Bka’s finding that Meta’s practice of combining personal data across its many services, in addition to data collected through the integration of its services into third-party websites and apps, constitutes a violation of competition law. In this case, the ECJ holds that a competition authority is at liberty to consider GDPR violations as a “vital clue” to a finding of abuse of dominance, provided it first requested the cooperation of the competent data protection authorities. Furthermore, it finds that, apart from consent, no legal bases from the GDPR justify Facebook’s data processing. Through the principle of sincere cooperation, the Court opens the door to further integration of data protection and competition, acknowledging that data collection is at the core of digital market companies’ business models. Although the case is based on German national law, there is reason to believe that the same line of reasoning could also apply to the European Commission, thus expanding its options in digital market oversight. In contrast, the Court’s analysis of the GDPR is not quite as innovative, but still helpfully lists and reaffirms existing law.

Cooperation with third countries on readmission has occupied an increasingly prominent place in the EU's migration management strategy. The EU and its Member States have progressively concluded an extensive set of bilateral and multilateral, binding and non-binding, cooperation instruments on readmission. This proliferation questions the field's coherence with the principle of sincere cooperation, governing the interplay between the Union's and Member States’ action. By taking this principle as a benchmark, the article highlights the ineffective nature of the current ‘unprincipled’ pursuit of readmission goals. It also demonstrates that sincere cooperation—if read together with subsidiarity—does not necessarily favour the Union's international action, to the detriment of the Member States’. Rather, it requires a good faith effort to identify, and stand by, the most effective level of action.

After many years spent tackling multiple crises, the EU institutions now rely extensively on the concept of ‘resilience’ to help inform policymaking across a wide range of activities. This paper examines resilience as it applies to the Internal Market, where important legislative measures have recently been adopted (for example) in relation to critical entities, critical raw materials and semiconductors. First, that ‘resilience agenda’ is located within the longer-term evolution of the Internal Market – which helps explain the focus on taming Member State conduct that may well be perfectly lawful under the Treaties, but is nevertheless considered disruptive to the collective Union interest. Secondly, the Covid-19 pandemic serves as a case study to demonstrate the CJEU’s distinctive contribution to the Union concept of ‘resilience’ – reinforcing the need for Member States to respect their ordinary Treaty obligations even under extraordinary circumstances, yet with untapped potential for the Court to reinforce the Union’s wider focus on ‘lawful yet disruptive’ national measures, e.g., using the duty of sincere cooperation. However, the ‘resilience agenda’ should not be accepted simply at face value as an obvious public good offered by the Union to enhance the longterm security and well-being of its citizens. Important questions arise about the tensions between resilience and protectionism or securitization, as well as issues of transparency, accountability and legitimacy.

This Article argues that the cooperation obligations of the Member States under EU law are best understood as forming part of an overall duty of EU loyalty and elaborates on the consequences of framing it in this way. EU loyalty legally requires Member States to make the common EU interest their own. The Article further demonstrates that EU loyalty is more relevant and more stringently applied in EU external relations than within the EU legal order. Loyalty obligations of the Member States reach into the future, extend to hypothetical situations, and are at a comparatively high level of abstraction aimed to protect the Union's ability to act effectively on the international plane. This limits Member States’ margin of manoeuvre, including when they take unilateral external action within the realm of their retained national competences. The Article explains that this may be functionally justified by the high stakes of non-concerted external action. However, and in particular with the EU's increased external powers and the ever-growing relevance of international cooperation, the stringent application of cooperation requirements should be (better) explicated and justified.

The constitutional courts play a paramount role within the European judicial area and form a specific branch of the judicial network, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights. Within the European Union (EU) with its specific compound structure, in which national legal orders and Union law reciprocally influence, complement, determine and affect each other, national constitutional courts and the CJEU are not only assigned with the common task to enforce EU law, but also to preserve its limits, first and foremost the principle of conferral and the constitutional identities of the Member States. The respect for these limits is an essential prerequisite for the Member State’s participation in the EU and repeatedly enshrined in the Treaties. In order to be able to fulfil this common tasks all sides need to engage in sincere cooperation and a dialectic process, the potential of which must not be curtailed by hierarchical perceptions.Whereas the national (constitutional) courts are obliged to respect the CJEU’s authority to ultimately decide on the interpretation of EU law in principle, it is the CJEU’s obligation to take their referrals seriously and thoroughly adress concerns brought forward. The constitutional courts of the Member States are assigned with the constitutional responsibility to accompany the process of European integration in order to ensure that sovereign rights are only transferred in line with the respective provisions as well as that the excercise of competences respects the limits laid down in the Treaties and does not interfere with the constitutional identities of theMember States. It is of course again for the CJEU to review whether EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies act within their mandate in the first place including a quite large tolerance for different interpretations. To the extend the CJEU, however, fails to assume this responsibility, it is for the constitutional courts of the Member States to step in. The desirable success of the European integration largely depends on an orderly, sustainable and generally accepted process in the long run to which the network of constitutional courts can make a decisive contribution, provided it is designed and lived as a true cooperation among equals. In this regard it is not only necessary to intensify the joint efforts, but also to evaluate possibilities to enhance the involvement of the national courts, in particular the establishment of a reverse preliminary ruling procedure. duty to give reasons, administrative measure, participation, administrative procedure

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 81-99 | European Forum Insight of 22 April 2021 | (Table of Contents) I. La Carta, le sue origini. - II. Un \"catalogo\" di diritti fondamentali: le ragioni di una sua necessità. - III. La tutela di tali diritti, la giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia e l'ambito di applicabilità. - IV. La distinzione fra diritti (da rispettare) e principi (da osservare): profili critici. - V. L'applicabilità della Carta nei rapporti orizzontali: la diretta applicabilità. - VI. I rapporti fra le Corti e il ruolo del giudice comune. - VII. La Carta, il rinvio alla Corte costituzionale e la questione pregiudiziale: la non applicazione della norma nazionale contrastante con la Carta. - VIII. Le recenti questioni pregiudiziali poste dalla Corte Costituzionale e dalle Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione: la necessità di una costruttiva e leale cooperazione. | (Abstract) The year 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It was drawn up at the end of a long process, to which the Court of Justice has contributed substantially, affirming since the seventies the obligation to protect fundamental rights in the Community. The drafting of a catalogue of fundamental rights was then driven by the European Council, which under-lined the need for fundamental rights to be collected in a Charter and thus made more explicit. Over time, the Court of Justice has provided elements for a better understanding of certain essential aspects, such as the scope, the distinction between rights and principles, direct applicability, and the relationship with the Euro-pean Convention on Human Rights. The dialectic established more recently with the Constitutional Court has re-proposed the theme of the relationship between national law and EU law, between national Courts (Constitutional Court and \"common\" Court) and European Union Court.

This article explores the importance of geographical indications within the new trade policy of the European Union, using the example of the CETA and the dispute over Cypriot halloumi cheese. The authors point out that geographical indications occupy an important place within the European Commission’s negotiating strategy primarily because of their significance for the EU economy. In negotiations with third countries, such as Canada, a crucial problem is the different approaches to the protection of typical regional products. Therefore, the Union is trying to transfer its internal solutions to the international level. The detail of regulations, combined with the mixed nature of new trade agreements, makes trade policy vulnerable to blackmail by individual EU Member States. According to the authors, a reasonable solution to this problem – which was highlighted by Cyprus’s veto of the CETA – is to rely on the treaty provisions and the judgements of the Court of Justice of the EU. These indicate the exclusive competence of the EU in this area and impose an obligation on EU Member States to cooperate sincerely.