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The Impact of Audit Oversight Quality on the Financial Performance of U.S. Firms: A Subjective Assessment
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The Impact of Audit Oversight Quality on the Financial Performance of U.S. Firms: A Subjective Assessment
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The Impact of Audit Oversight Quality on the Financial Performance of U.S. Firms: A Subjective Assessment
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Journal Article
The Impact of Audit Oversight Quality on the Financial Performance of U.S. Firms: A Subjective Assessment
2024
Overview
Audit committees are appointed by the board of directors of corporations to oversee the financial reporting process, monitor financial control processes, hire and assess independent auditors, and communicate findings with management and auditors. We propose two new measures of audit oversight quality. The first measure is purely subjective, in that it scores audit committees on a scale based on their ability to fulfill one or more of their responsibilities, as mentioned in annual reports, Form 10-K and DEF 13A. The second measure concerns audit committee activity, as it measures the number of times the term ‘audit committee’ is mentioned in these documents. Both measures were obtained for U.S. pharmaceutical companies and energy companies from 2010 to 2022. The audit oversight quality measures were regressed in regard to profitability (measured by return on assets and return on equity), debt capacity (measured by equity multiplier), and firm value (measured by Tobin’s q and economic value added). Audit oversight quality, using both measures, reduces the return on equity. Audit oversight quality, using both measures, had a disciplining effect on debt. Increases in the oversight of increasing debt discourage the propensity to increase borrowing using collateral (debt capacity), and reduce investor returns through investment in debt-financed projects (return on equity). Audit oversight quality, using both measures, exhibited a size effect on the firm’s value, in that an increase in the firm size with high audit oversight quality increases the firm’s value. However, it is possible that only the first measure of audit oversight quality significantly increased the firm’s value, as only the first measure exhibited robustness to the endogeneity effect of size.
