Journal Article

Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to “Rule of Law” in China

Green, Eric, Tanner, Murray Scot

2007

Overview

This article extends the enduring debate over the balance of central versus local government control to China's cornerstone of state coercive control: the public security (civilian police) system. A recent series of studies argues that during the 1990s central authorities made terrific progress in regaining influence over local officials across a wide variety of issue-areas. This study, by contrast, argues that each policy sector in China has developed its own historical and institutional set of “lessons” that help structure power in that sector. Likewise, the particular issues in each policy sector create unique challenges for “principals” trying to monitor their “agents.” Regarding internal security, the historical lessons the Party has derived from past security crises combine with the uniquely difficult challenges of monitoring police activities to create a system in which local Party and government officials have tremendous power over policing. The many institutions intended to help central authorities control, oversee and monitor local policing actually provide weak control and oversight. These obstacles to central leadership create tremendous additional challenges to building rule by law in China.

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Subject: Balance of power / Central Government / Coercion / Economic reform / Government securities / Hiring / Internal audits / Law / Law enforcement / Leadership / Local Government / National security / Oversight / Peoples Republic of China / Police / Police services / Policing / Political parties / Politics / Power / Power structure / Principals / Public administration / Public officials / Rule of law / Security / State Power