Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India's ecological fiscal transfers
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India's ecological fiscal transfers
Do you wish to request the book?
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India's ecological fiscal transfers
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India's ecological fiscal transfers
2018
Overview
Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid).
Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India's new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover.
Discussion: India's EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states' stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India's EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection.
Conclusion: These features make India's EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.
Publisher
Taylor & Francis,The American Association for the Advancement of Science,American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Subject
