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Playing in the Forest While the Wolf Is Not Around: Vote Switching and Positive Agenda Power in Federal Multiparty Systems
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Playing in the Forest While the Wolf Is Not Around: Vote Switching and Positive Agenda Power in Federal Multiparty Systems
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Playing in the Forest While the Wolf Is Not Around: Vote Switching and Positive Agenda Power in Federal Multiparty Systems
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Journal Article
Playing in the Forest While the Wolf Is Not Around: Vote Switching and Positive Agenda Power in Federal Multiparty Systems
2025
Overview
Party-based theories of agenda power contend that when majority/plurality cartels exist, they control the outcomes in both the plenary and the committees. However, this conclusion is typically based on the use of dependent variables (roll-call votes and approval rates) that do not convey information about legislator behavior during the lawmaking process, so the mechanisms and the extent to which party leaders exercise their positive agenda power remain unclear. We propose to use vote switching by legislators between committee and floor voting as a measure of positive agenda power, and, to maximize potential variation in this power due to principal-agent conflict, we analyze evidence from a legislature in a federal multiparty system: the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our findings show that party leaders exercise their power over cartel-sponsored bills by eliciting favorable and demobilizing switches in order to build floor coalitions, but otherwise allow legislators with conflicting incentives to play around freely with their own agenda.
