Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Monopsony Exploitation in Professional Sport
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Monopsony Exploitation in Professional Sport
Do you wish to request the book?
Monopsony Exploitation in Professional Sport
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Monopsony Exploitation in Professional Sport
2017
Overview
Some professional athletes still face monopsony power in labor markets, underscoring the importance of estimating players’ marginal revenue product to assess its effects. We introduce two new empirical approaches, spline revenue functions and fixed-effects stochastic production functions, into the standard Scully (1974) approach to marginal revenue product estimation and calculate Monopsony Exploitation Ratios (MERs) for position players in Major League Baseball over the 2001–2011 seasons. Estimates indicate that MERs are about 0.89 for rookie players, 0.75 for arbitration eligible players, and 0.21 for free agents. Recent collective bargaining agreements have reduced MERs for free agents, but had no effect on MERs for other players.
Publisher
Wiley (Variant),Wiley,Wiley Periodicals Inc
Subject
