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Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies
by
Jain Tarun
, Chakraborty Abhishek
, Mandal Prasenjit
in
Collaboration
/ Market prices
/ Operations research
/ Pricing
2021
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Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies
by
Jain Tarun
, Chakraborty Abhishek
, Mandal Prasenjit
in
Collaboration
/ Market prices
/ Operations research
/ Pricing
2021
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Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies
Journal Article
Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies
2021
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Overview
We study how the manufacturer and the supplier collaborate under various pricing and contracting scenarios. We characterize two downstream pricing strategies: (a) where the manufacturer announces the market price before the quality is determined, and (b) where the manufacturer decides the market price after the quality is determined. We also study three different contracting structures: (a) effort levels are both contractible and verifiable, (b) revenue sharing agreement between manufacturer and supplier, and (c) effort dependent contract when effort levels are verifiable but not contractible. We determine under which conditions the manufacturer should implement each of the scenarios.
Publisher
Springer Nature B.V
Subject
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