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Contracts as Reference Points
by
Hart, Oliver
, Moore, John
in
Composers
/ Contract law
/ Contracts
/ Economic models
/ Employers
/ Employment
/ Employment contracts
/ Entitlement
/ Market prices
/ Studies
/ Surplus
/ Total surplus
/ Trade
/ Uncertainty
/ Weddings
2008
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Contracts as Reference Points
by
Hart, Oliver
, Moore, John
in
Composers
/ Contract law
/ Contracts
/ Economic models
/ Employers
/ Employment
/ Employment contracts
/ Entitlement
/ Market prices
/ Studies
/ Surplus
/ Total surplus
/ Trade
/ Uncertainty
/ Weddings
2008
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Journal Article
Contracts as Reference Points
2008
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Overview
We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcomes to uncertainty but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments and elucidates why \"employment\" contracts, which fix wages in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.
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