Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Do you wish to request the book?
Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
2009
Overview
Drawing on recent critiques and advances in theories of the rentier state, this paper uses an in-depth case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to posit a new “supply and demand” approach to the study of external rents and authoritarian durability. The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly foreign aid, but also of the demands of a coalition encompassing groups with highly disparate economic policy preferences. The breadth of the Hashemite coalition requires that the regime dispense rent-fueled side payments to coalition members through constructing distributive institutions. Yet neither rent supply nor coalition demands are static. Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality.
Publisher
Springer-Verlag,Springer Nature B.V
Subject
