Journal Article

Cooperation on Interdependent Networks by Means of Migration and Stochastic Imitation

Nag Chowdhury, Sayantan, Kundu, Srilena, Duh, Maja, Perc, Matjaž, Ghosh, Dibakar

2020

Overview

Evolutionary game theory in the realm of network science appeals to a lot of research communities, as it constitutes a popular theoretical framework for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent research has shown that cooperation is markedly more resistant in interdependent networks, where traditional network reciprocity can be further enhanced due to various forms of interdependence between different network layers. However, the role of mobility in interdependent networks is yet to gain its well-deserved attention. Here we consider an interdependent network model, where individuals in each layer follow different evolutionary games, and where each player is considered as a mobile agent that can move locally inside its own layer to improve its fitness. Probabilistically, we also consider an imitation possibility from a neighbor on the other layer. We show that, by considering migration and stochastic imitation, further fascinating gateways to cooperation on interdependent networks can be observed. Notably, cooperation can be promoted on both layers, even if cooperation without interdependence would be improbable on one of the layers due to adverse conditions. Our results provide a rationale for engineering better social systems at the interface of networks and human decision making under testing dilemmas.

• Publisher: MDPI AG,MDPI
• Subject: Agents (artificial intelligence) / Algorithms / Computer networks / Cooperation / Decision making / Evolution / Game theory / Gateways / interdependent networks / Investigations / mobile agents / Political asylum / prisoner’s dilemma / Reciprocity / snowdrift game