Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Green subsidies as strategic trade policy tools
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Green subsidies as strategic trade policy tools
Do you wish to request the book?
Green subsidies as strategic trade policy tools
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Green subsidies as strategic trade policy tools
2024
Overview
In a third-country market model in which two export countries adopt environmental policies (taxes and subsidies), this article analyses how an abatement (“green”) subsidy can become a potential strategic trade policy tool. When governments set the optimal policy considering their local environmental damages, a rich set of equilibria arises. In contrast to the standard result, it is shown that subsidising pollution abatement can 1) emerge as the unique Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium of the policy game, 2) be the only feasible environmental policy when environmental awareness is low, irrespective of the efficiency of the cleaning technology, and 3) emerge as the unique Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium of the policy game at the end of the ecological transition. The article also tackles some dynamic issues that the policy game implies.
