Journal Article

Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy

Wright, Joseph, Escribà-Folch, Abel

2012

Overview

This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization.

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Subject: Accounting / Authoritarian regimes / Authoritarianism / Authoritarianism (Political Ideology) / Autocracy / Credibility / Democracy / Democratization / Dictators / Dictatorship / Distribution / Economic transitions / Elites / Guarantees / Hypotheses / Income inequality / Incumbents / Legislative Bodies / Legislature / Legislatures / Military dictatorship / National security / Personalism / Political Change / Political Parties / Political science / Political systems / Power / Regime transition / Stability / Taxation