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Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
by
Bardhi, Arjada
, Guo, Yingni
in
collective decision-making
/ D71
/ D82
/ D83
/ Economic theory
/ Experiments
/ G28
/ Influence
/ Information design
/ information guard
/ K20
/ O32
/ Persuasion
/ Rubber
/ Suffrage
/ Thresholds
/ unanimity rule
/ Voter behavior
/ Voters
2018
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Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
by
Bardhi, Arjada
, Guo, Yingni
in
collective decision-making
/ D71
/ D82
/ D83
/ Economic theory
/ Experiments
/ G28
/ Influence
/ Information design
/ information guard
/ K20
/ O32
/ Persuasion
/ Rubber
/ Suffrage
/ Thresholds
/ unanimity rule
/ Voter behavior
/ Voters
2018
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Do you wish to request the book?
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
by
Bardhi, Arjada
, Guo, Yingni
in
collective decision-making
/ D71
/ D82
/ D83
/ Economic theory
/ Experiments
/ G28
/ Influence
/ Information design
/ information guard
/ K20
/ O32
/ Persuasion
/ Rubber
/ Suffrage
/ Thresholds
/ unanimity rule
/ Voter behavior
/ Voters
2018
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Journal Article
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
2018
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Overview
A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Under individual persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends only on her state. The sender designates a subgroup of rubber-stampers, another of fully informed voters, and a third of partially informed voters. The most demanding voters are strategically accorded high-quality information.
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