Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence
by
Dreher, Axel
in
Borrowing
/ Compliance
/ Creditors
/ Data analysis
/ Developing countries
/ Economic theory
/ Economics
/ Economics and Finance
/ Empirical evidence
/ Government
/ Government corruption
/ Government crises
/ Government reform
/ IMF
/ International financial institutions
/ International lending
/ LDCs
/ Literature Survey
/ Loans
/ Moral hazard
/ Policy
/ Policy analysis
/ Political Science
/ Program Implementation
/ Public Finance
/ Regulation
/ Studies
/ World Bank
2009
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence
by
Dreher, Axel
in
Borrowing
/ Compliance
/ Creditors
/ Data analysis
/ Developing countries
/ Economic theory
/ Economics
/ Economics and Finance
/ Empirical evidence
/ Government
/ Government corruption
/ Government crises
/ Government reform
/ IMF
/ International financial institutions
/ International lending
/ LDCs
/ Literature Survey
/ Loans
/ Moral hazard
/ Policy
/ Policy analysis
/ Political Science
/ Program Implementation
/ Public Finance
/ Regulation
/ Studies
/ World Bank
2009
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence
by
Dreher, Axel
in
Borrowing
/ Compliance
/ Creditors
/ Data analysis
/ Developing countries
/ Economic theory
/ Economics
/ Economics and Finance
/ Empirical evidence
/ Government
/ Government corruption
/ Government crises
/ Government reform
/ IMF
/ International financial institutions
/ International lending
/ LDCs
/ Literature Survey
/ Loans
/ Moral hazard
/ Policy
/ Policy analysis
/ Political Science
/ Program Implementation
/ Public Finance
/ Regulation
/ Studies
/ World Bank
2009
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence
2009
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.