Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Upcoding
by
Geruso, Michael
, Layton, Timothy
in
Consumer behavior
/ Economic theory
/ Government spending
/ Health care industry
/ Health insurance
/ Incentives
/ Markets
/ Medical diagnosis
/ Medicare
/ Payments
/ Political economy
/ Risk
/ Risk adjustment
/ Vertical integration
2020
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Upcoding
by
Geruso, Michael
, Layton, Timothy
in
Consumer behavior
/ Economic theory
/ Government spending
/ Health care industry
/ Health insurance
/ Incentives
/ Markets
/ Medical diagnosis
/ Medicare
/ Payments
/ Political economy
/ Risk
/ Risk adjustment
/ Vertical integration
2020
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Upcoding
2020
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
In most US health insurance markets, plans face strong incentives to upcode the patient diagnoses they report to the regulator, as these affect the risk-adjusted payments that plans receive. We show that enrollees in private Medicare plans generate 6%–16% higher diagnosisbased risk scores than they would under fee-for-service Medicare, where diagnoses do not affect most provider payments. Our estimates imply that upcoding generates billions in excess public spending and significant distortions to firm and consumer behavior. We show that coding intensity increases with vertical integration, suggesting a principal-agent problem faced by insurers, who desire more intense coding from the providers with whom they contract.
Publisher
University of Chicago Press,The University of Chicago Press,University of Chicago, acting through its Press
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.