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Regulatory enforcement with competitive endogenous audit mechanisms
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Journal Article
Regulatory enforcement with competitive endogenous audit mechanisms
2011
Overview
This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanism that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and provides an alternative explanation for the stylized fact, in many settings, that most agents are compliant most of the time even though audit rates and expected penalties are low.
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing Inc,Wiley Periodicals, Inc,Wiley,RAND Corporation,Rand Corporation
Subject
