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Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
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Journal Article
Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
2017
Overview
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.
Publisher
The Econometric Society,Blackwell Publishing Ltd,John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Subject
/ Auctions
/ D44
/ D47
/ D82
/ Deficits
/ ex post incentive compatibility
/ multi-unit demand and supply
/ Property
