Journal Article

Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies

Lefebvre, Jeffrey A.

2012

Overview

During the Cold War, the Horn of Africa emerged as arguably the most highly penetrated regional subsystem in the world. Not only the two superpowers, but Middle Eastern regional powers intervened in interstate and intrastate conflicts there. Three geostrategic factors drew foreign powers to the Horn of Africa: 1) its location across the Red Sea from the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula; 2) an almost 2,500-mile coastline (stretching from Eritrea's border with Sudan in the north to Somalia's border with Kenya in the south) lying astride the Red Sea and the South African Cape maritime routes; and 3) Ethiopia's control over the headwaters of the Blue Nile, which account for 90 percent of the waters of the Nile River system. The end of the Cold War greatly diminished the strategic value of the Horn of Africa in the eyes of Washington and Moscow. Washington began to re-engage strategically in the Horn following the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but this failed to prevent the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen's harbor at Aden. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States adopted a much more aggressive counterterrorism policy in the Horn of Africa. However, Washington's handling of conflicts in the Horn in the context of the U.S. global war on terrorism (GWOT) produced an unintended result: it provided Iran with an opportunity to increase its political and military influence in the region by forming a strategic alliance with Eritrea. On the surface, an Eritrean-Iranian alliance seems an unlikely partnership - a political and ideological mismatch between the Islamic Republic and a 'devoutly' secular Eritrean regime. The pragmatic strategic alliance between Eritrea and Iran stems from three developments: 1) the linkage that emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century between the Somali irredentist threat in the Horn of Africa and the unresolved Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict; 2) Eritrea's running afoul of U.S. counterterrorism/GWOT policy in Somalia; and 3) the unintended consequence of isolating Eritrea diplomatically, which allowed Iran to open a southern/western strategic flank against Israel and Saudi Arabia. Adapted from the source document.

• Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Ltd,Middle East Policy Council
• Subject: Africa / Agreements / Alliance / Alliances / Borders / Christian Islamic relations / Cold War / Conflict / Counterterrorism / Decades / Democracy / East Africa / Eritrea / Foreign policy / Foreign relations / Horn of Africa / Human rights / Ideology / Independence / Invasions / Iran / Islam / Kenya / Muslims / Political alliances / Political parties / Politics / Regional security / Sanctions / Secularism / Somalia / Terrorism / Threat / U.S.A / War / Yemen