Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Stroud's Carnap
by
Alspector-Kelly, Marc
in
Abstract entities
/ Cartesianism
/ Empiricism
/ Existence
/ Metaphysics
/ Nominalism
/ Ontology
/ Philosophical object
/ Skepticism
/ Verificationism
2002
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Stroud's Carnap
by
Alspector-Kelly, Marc
in
Abstract entities
/ Cartesianism
/ Empiricism
/ Existence
/ Metaphysics
/ Nominalism
/ Ontology
/ Philosophical object
/ Skepticism
/ Verificationism
2002
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Stroud's Carnap
2002
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
In \"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology\" Carnap drew his famous distinction between 'internal' and 'external' questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Carnap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his commitment to empiricism. He rejected that criticism as presupposing a super-scientific standpoint from which constraints on the admissible domain of entities of science could be delivered. Carnap wanted to insulate science from the imposition of first-philosophical metaphysical prejudice, not to defuse scepticism by appeal to verificationism.
Publisher
International Phenomenological Society
Subject
MBRLCatalogueRelatedBooks
Related Items
Related Items
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.