Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Strong State, Weak Managers: How Firms Cope with Autocracy in Hungary
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Strong State, Weak Managers: How Firms Cope with Autocracy in Hungary
Do you wish to request the book?
Strong State, Weak Managers: How Firms Cope with Autocracy in Hungary
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Paper
Strong State, Weak Managers: How Firms Cope with Autocracy in Hungary
2015
Overview
This paper investigates how companies manage risk associated with political ties in the context of the 'return of state capitalism'. We show that findings from previous studies of firms' copying strategies under autocratic regimes are of limited relevance in the context of Hungary, because they lack a sophisticated, theoretically underpinned conceptualisation of 'the state'. We develop a more fine-grained analysis of the role of the state in emerging markets. We then show that the type of 'state capitalism' that is emerging in Hungary poses unique challenges to companies with implications for existing theories of companies' political 'buffering strategies'. Based on interviews with business leaders in Hungary, we identify two coping strategies: responsiveness -whereby firms accommodate state pressures by giving in to them - and a non-responsive strategy of 'dormancy', which consists in firms putting forward-looking activities on hold and focussing on survival. We discuss implications for theories of corporate political risk management.
Publisher
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Subject
