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The gender difference in competitiveness has been cited as an important factor driving the gender gap in labor market outcomes. Using a field experiment with more than 35,000 university students, I explore the impact of compensation scheme on willingness to apply for a job. I find that competitive compensation schemes that depend on relative performance disproportionately deter women from applying. I do not find the same deterrence effect under a compensation scheme in which students face uncertain payoffs independent of performance. I also test the impact of describing the job as helping a charity, and this increases the willingness to apply but does not affect the gender gap. My findings are important for managers, who need to understand the impact of different compensation schemes on the share of women recruited for a job posting. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3107 . This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

We conduct field experiments to investigate dynamic inconsistency and commitment demand in food choice. In two home grocery delivery programs, we document substantial dynamic inconsistency between advance and immediate choices. When given the option to commit to their advance choices, around half of subjects take it up. Commitment demand is negatively correlated with dynamic inconsistency, suggesting those with larger self-control problems are less likely to be aware thereof. We evaluate the welfare consequences of dynamic inconsistency and commitment policies with utility measures based on advance, immediate, and unambiguous choices. Simply offering commitment has limited welfare (and behavioural) consequences under all measures.

In experimental economics there is a norm against using deception. But precisely what constitutes deception is unclear. While there is a consensus view that providing false information is not permitted, there are also “gray areas” with respect to practices that omit information or are misleading without an explicit lie being told. In this paper, we report the results of a large survey among experimental economists and students concerning various specific gray areas. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity across respondent choices. The data indicate a perception that costs and benefits matter, so that such practices might in fact be appropriate when the topic is important and there is no other way to gather data. Compared to researchers, students have different attitudes about some of the methods in the specific scenarios that we ask about. Few students express awareness of the no-deception policy at their schools. We also briefly discuss some potential alternatives to “gray-area” deception, primarily based on suggestions offered by respondents.

There is growing interest in the use of loss contracts that offer performance incentives as up-front payments that employees can lose. Standard behavioral models predict a trade-off in the use of loss contracts: employees will work harder under loss contracts than under gain contracts, but, anticipating loss aversion, they will prefer gain contracts to loss contracts. In a series of experiments, we test these predictions by measuring performance and preferences for payoff-equivalent gain and loss contracts. We find that people indeed work harder under loss than gain contracts, as the theory predicts. Surprisingly, rather than a preference for the gain contract, we find that people actually prefer loss contracts. In exploring mechanisms for our results, we find suggestive evidence that people do anticipate loss aversion but select into loss contracts as a commitment device to improve performance, using one bias, loss aversion, to address another, dynamic inconsistency. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2402 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics .

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.

We developed and experimentally evaluated four novel educational programs delivered online: an informational brochure, a visual interactive tool, a written narrative, and a video narrative. The programs were designed to inform people about risk diversification, an essential concept for financial decision-making. The effectiveness of these programs was evaluated using the American Life Panel. Participants were exposed to one of the programs, and then asked to answer questions measuring financial literacy – in particular, risk literacy – and self-efficacy. All of the programs were found to be effective at increasing self-efficacy, and several improved financial literacy, providing new evidence for the value of programs designed to improve financial decision-making.

Evidence shows that people have difficulty understanding complex aspects of retirement planning, which leads them to under-utilize annuities and claim Social Security benefits earlier than is optimal. To target this problem, we developed vignettes about the consequences of different annuitization and claiming decisions. We evaluated our vignettes using an experiment with a representative online panel of nearly 2,000 Americans. In our experiment, respondents were either assigned to a control group with no vignette, to a written vignette, or to a video vignette. They were then asked to give advice to hypothetical persons on annuitization or Social Security claiming, and were asked factual questions about these concepts. We found evidence that being exposed to vignettes led respondents to give better advice. For example, the gap between advised claim age for a relatively healthy person versus a relatively sick person was larger by nearly a year in the vignette treatments than in the control group. Furthermore, the vignettes increased financial literacy related to these concepts by 10–15 percentage points. Interestingly, the mode of communication did not have a significant impact – the video and written vignettes were equally effective.

Young children have long been known to act selfishly and gradually appear to become more generous across middle childhood. While this apparent change has been well documented, the underlying mechanisms supporting this remain unclear. The current study examined the role of early theory of mind and executive functioning in facilitating sharing in a large sample (N = 98) of preschoolers. Results reveal a curious relation between early false-belief understanding and sharing behavior. Contrary to many commonsense notions and predominant theories, competence in this ability is actually related to less sharing. Thus, the relation between developing theory of mind and sharing may not be as straightforward as it seems in preschool age children. It is precisely the children who can engage in theory of mind that decide to share less with others.

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from quality to quantity to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform managers of appropriate ways to structure contracts, and suggest benefits to personalizing contracts based on individual behavioral characteristics.

Product bundling is a common retail marketing strategy. The bundling of food items has the potential to increase profits in the grocery sector, particularly for fresh produce, which often has lower profit margins. Although prior work suggests consumers prefer bundles because they require less cognitive effort to select, no study has yet experimentally manipulated cognitive load when food bundles are included in the choice set. To test whether bundle preference differs when cognitive resources are constrained, a grocery shopping experiment was conducted with 250 consumers in the midwestern U.S., in a laboratory that featured a grocery store display. Consumers who grocery shopped under cognitive load had a higher odds of selecting a food bundle even when the bundle did not offer a price discount. Results suggest food bundles may be preferred because they require less cognitive effort to process, which could benefit consumers by simplifying the grocery shopping experience. Additional factors found to influence food bundle selection included whether the bundled items were perceived as being complementary and hunger levels. Food bundles could help lessen cognitive effort associated with grocery shopping and may especially appeal to those who do not enjoy food shopping.