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Conflict is a ubiquitous, but potentially destructive, feature of social life. In the current research, we argue that intellectual humility—the awareness of one’s intellectual fallibility—plays an important role in promoting constructive responses and decreasing destructive responses to conflict in different contexts. In Study 1, we examine the role of intellectual humility in interpersonal conflicts with friends and family members. In Study 2, we extend this finding to workplace conflicts. In both studies we find that intellectual humility predicts more constructive and less destructive responses to conflict. This work extends the burgeoning literature on the benefits of intellectual humility by demonstrating its association with responses that help defuse conflictual encounters.

The aim of this study is to respond to Cass Sunstein's question: ‘Why are some nudges ineffective, or at least less effective than choice architects hope and expect?’—particularly in view not only of the rational basis in decision-making but also of the direct influence of emotions on the behavior of those who must choose. In this study, I used findings from psychology surveys, specifically considering the influence of emotions on the fallibility of nudges in social interactions when wealth is compared. Special attention is dedicated to vanity, a combined emotion that leads to emotional choices, which arises in self-presentation and self-comparison when external signs of wealth are displayed. Imagination plays an important role in simulation to the extent that it causes failure in further nudges. In conclusion, I argue that vanity impels people to act differently, as expected of choice architects.

The paper explores the concept of epistemic theodicy and strengthens an argument that reconciles human fallibility with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. This argument is grounded in epistemic responsibility, emphasizing our epistemic autonomy. The paper supports two aspects of this argument: the role of epistemic agency in shaping beliefs and belief formation based on experiential rationality. The paper begins by introducing the concept of epistemic theodicy and its relation to the problem of epistemic evil. Next, it presents a succinct version of the argument based on epistemic responsibility. The paper then focuses on epistemic agency, proposing a notion rooted in reasons-responsiveness and highlighting the agentive nature of belief formation. It provides an outline a of view of epistemic rationality grounded in experiential rationality, showing its compatibility with the responsibility-based response to the problem of epistemic evil. The conclusion reflects on the significance of these accounts of agency and rationality in the context of epistemic theodicy.

The article argues for the epistemic rationale of triangulation, namely, the use of multiple and independent sources of evidence. It claims that triangulation is to be understood as causal reasoning from data to phenomenon, and it rationalizes its epistemic value in terms of controlling for likely errors and biases of particular data-generating procedures. This perspective is employed to address objections against triangulation concerning the fallibility and scope of the inference, as well as problems of independence, incomparability, and discordance of evidence. The debate on the existence of social preferences is used as an illustrative case.

This paper embarks on a comprehensive exploration of the intricate and multifaceted dynamics underlying global policies aimed at mitigating climate change, particularly within the evolving landscape of emerging biofuel markets. While the imperative to combat climate change is undeniable, it is equally essential to recognize and address the potential unintended consequences that may arise. In an age characterized by disinformation and conspiracy theories, public resistance to policies deemed malicious or inhumane is particularly prevalent, especially in cases where outcomes entail land grabbing, deforestation, and human rights violations, notably within developing countries marked by heightened vulnerabilities. Leveraging established theoretical frameworks proposed by prominent scholars such as Bastiat, Popper, Taleb, Hayek, and Soros, this study aims to explore the practical ramifications of green policies, which often exceed their intended scope and result in unforeseen negative consequences. Concurrently, we endeavor to challenge potential conspiracy narratives surrounding the purported malevolent intentions of elites and allegations of neo-colonialism in the formulation of green policies, emphasizing the enduring relevance of the principles of selfawareness and radical fallibility within the realm of critical rationalism.

Large language models (LLMs), one application of artificial intelligence, experienced a surge in users between 2022–2023. During this time, we were conducting online focus groups in which participants insisted on responding using the chat box feature. Based on several chat box responses, we became concerned they were LLM generated. Out of the 42 participants who typed a chat box response during a focus group, we identify 9 as potentially providing LLM generated answers and present their responses with the highest similarity score to an LLM answer. Given the growth and improvement in LLMs, we believe that this issue is likely to increase in frequency. In response to this, in this article we reflect on (1) strategies to prevent participants from using LLMs, (2) indicators LLMs may be being used, (3) the fallibility of identifying LLM generated responses, (4) philosophical frameworks that may permit LLM responses to be incorporated into analyses, and (5) procedures researchers may follow to evaluate the influence of LLM responses on their results.

ABSTRACT Objective: errors are inevitable in the scholarly pursuit of truth, yet they are often seen as flaws rather than growth opportunities. This paper examines the tension between scholars’ inherent fallibility and rigorous academic research standards, particularly concerning quantitative methods such as exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). The focus is on whether the academic community effectively balances the acceptance of errors as part of the learning process, with the relentless pursuit of truth and how this balance influences the advancement of knowledge within the context of evolving statistical tools needed to improve our understanding of complex global relationships. Provocations: if errors are fundamental to scientific progress, why does the academic community approach them with apprehension? This fear of mistakes may inhibit innovation, especially in fields such as quantitative methods research, where the stakes are high. Another question is whether the accessibility of user-friendly statistical software has led to a superficial understanding of complex methodologies, prioritizing convenience over depth. Conclusions: we advocate for a shift in how the academic community perceives errors toward viewing them as essential to the research process rather than as fatal flaws. Embracing a humble approach to pointing out mistakes and limitations, particularly with quantitative methods such as EFA and SEM, can create a more innovative and progressive research environment. We call for a cultural shift where constructive critiques are balanced with understanding our collective fallibility, with the ultimate goal of producing more impactful scholarship. RESUMO Objetivo: erros são inevitáveis na busca acadêmica pela verdade, mas muitas vezes são vistos como falhas e não como oportunidades de crescimento. Este artigo examina a tensão entre a falibilidade inerente dos estudiosos e os rigorosos padrões de pesquisa acadêmica, particularmente no que diz respeito a métodos quantitativos, como análise fatorial exploratória (EFA) e modelagem de equações estruturais de mínimos quadrados parciais (PLS-SEM). O foco está em saber se a comunidade acadêmica equilibra efetivamente a aceitação de erros como parte do processo de aprendizagem, com a busca incessante da verdade e como esse equilíbrio influencia o avanço do conhecimento no contexto da evolução das ferramentas estatísticas necessárias para melhorar a nossa compreensão de questões complexas. relacionamentos globais. Provocações: se os erros são fundamentais para o progresso científico, por que a comunidade acadêmica os aborda com apreensão? Este medo de erros pode inibir a inovação, especialmente em domínios como a investigação de métodos quantitativos, onde os riscos são elevados. Outra questão é se a acessibilidade de software estatístico de fácil utilização levou a uma compreensão superficial de metodologias complexas, priorizando a conveniência em detrimento da profundidade. Conclusões: defendemos uma mudança na forma como a comunidade acadêmica percebe os erros, no sentido de os ver como essenciais ao processo de investigação e não como falhas fatais. Adotar uma abordagem humilde para apontar erros e limitações, particularmente com métodos quantitativos como EFA e SEM, pode criar um ambiente de investigação mais inovador e progressivo. Apelamos a uma mudança cultural onde as críticas construtivas sejam equilibradas com a compreensão da nossa falibilidade colectiva, com o objetivo final de produzir estudos mais impactantes.