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The study aims to explore the impact of renewable, nonrenewable, and nuclear energy consumption on global gross domestic product (GDP) growth through machine learning algorithms. The findings reveal that renewable energy consumption is the most influential variable, contributing to a predicted 67.5% global GDP growth. In contrast, nuclear energy consumption contributes 17.8%, and non-renewable energy consumption contributes 14.6%. Notably, the relationship between nuclear energy consumption and global economic growth is positive; there is a negative relation in conjunction with renewable energy consumption. However, the association with non-renewable energy is consistently fixed. These results suggest that an increased reliance on renewable energy may necessitate a trade-off, potentially leading to a reduction in global GDP growth despite the positive contributions from renewable sources.

The Kyrgyz Republic has made major strides in the past decade in its transition to a market-based economy. Its trade and investment policies are arguably the most liberal among the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Despite the generally progressive stance on structural policies and a sound record of macroeconomic management in recent years, economic growth has been modest, living standards are low, a large burden of external debt has accumulated, and integration into global production and trade remains limited. The growth agenda must address more carefully the constraints to greater supply-side response to ongoing reforms—an agenda that can facilitate a broad-based growth of economic activity and exports. Risks to sustainability of current growth rates and continued poverty reduction will otherwise remain high as will the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. This report is aimed at assisting authorities fashioning this agenda by focusing on three key challenges:Identifying strategic options to strengthen prospects for medium- and long-term growth and poverty reduction; Assessing ways of leveraging domestic trade policy reforms and existing regional and multilateral trade agreements for further regional and global integration; and Identifying key areas where greater efforts are necessary to facilitate improvements in enterprise capability and productivity.

The vast majority of the world's poorest households depend on farming for their livelihoods. During the 1960s and 1970s, most developing countries imposed pro-urban and anti-agricultural policies, while many high-income countries restricted agricultural imports and subsidized their farmers. Both sets of policies inhibited economic growth and poverty alleviation in developing countries. Although progress has been made over the past two decades to reduce those policy biases, many trade- and welfare-reducing price distortions remain between agriculture and other sectors and within the agricultural sector of both rich and poor countries. Comprehensive empirical studies of the disarray in world agricultural markets appeared approximately 20 years ago. Since then, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has provided estimates each year of market distortions in high-income countries, but there have been no comparable estimates for the world's developing countries. This volume is the third in a series (other volumes cover Asia, Europe's transition economies, and Latin America and the Caribbean) that not only fills that void for recent years but extends the estimates in a consistent and comparable way back in time—and provides analytical narratives for scores of countries that shed light on the evolving nature and extent of policy interventions over the past half-century. 'Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa' provides an overview of the evolution of distortions to agricultural incentives caused by price and trade policies in the Arab Republic of Egypt plus 20 countries that account for about of 90 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's population, farm households, agricultural output, and overall GDP. Sectoral, trade, and exchange rate policies in the region have changed greatly since the 1950s, and there have been substantial reforms since the 1980s. Nonetheless, numerous price distortions in this region remain, others have been added in recent years, and there has also been some backsliding, such as in Zimbabwe. The new empirical indicators in these country studies provide a strong evidence-based foundation for assessing the successes and failures of the past and for evaluating policy options for the years ahead.

Thirty years ago, half the developing world lived in extreme poverty today, a quarter. Now, a much smaller share of children are malnourished and at risk of early death. And access to modern infrastructure is much more widespread. Critical to the progress: rapid economic growth driven by technological innovation and institutional reform, particularly in today's middle- income countries, where per capita incomes have doubled. Yet the needs remain enormous, with the number of hungry people having passed the billion marks this year for the first time in history. With so many still in poverty and hunger, growth and poverty alleviation remain the overarching priority for developing countries. Climate change only makes the challenge more complicated. First, the impacts of a changing climate are already being felt, with more droughts, more floods, more strong storms, and more heat waves-taxing individuals, firms, and governments, drawing resources away from development. Second, continuing climate change, at current rates, will pose increasingly severe challenges to development. By century's end, it could lead to warming of 5°C or more compared with preindustrial times and to a vastly different world from today, with more extreme weather events, most ecosystems stressed and changing, many species doomed to extinction, and whole island nations threatened by inundation. Even our best efforts are unlikely to stabilize temperatures at anything less than 2°C above preindustrial temperatures, warming that will require substantial adaptation. High income countries can and must reduce their carbon footprints. They cannot continue to fill up an unfair and unsustainable share of the atmospheric commons. But developing countries whose average per capita emissions are a third those of high income countries need massive expansions in energy, transport, urban systems, and agricultural production. If pursued using traditional technologies and carbon intensities, these much-needed expansions will produce more greenhouse gases and, hence, more climate change. The question, then, is not just how to make development more resilient to climate change. It is how to pursue growth and prosperity without causing \"dangerous\" climate change.

One out of every three dollars invested abroad in 2012 was originated in multinationals from developing countries. This study sheds light on the characteristics, motivations, strategies, and needs of emerging market investors. By including information on investors, potential investors, and non-investors, the study identifies differentiating factors among them that are associated with investment decisions. Results show that emerging market investors are active players in international trade markets; they operate predominantly in manufacturing, and are publicly listed and larger than non-investors. They exhibit a strong regional bias: they invest more heavily in neighbors and in other countries in their own regions. Outward FDI from emerging markets is primarily market-seeking. Expanding regional and host markets emerged as the most important factor influencing the location of investments. However, emerging markets' firms face binding costs of investing in distant, culturally dissimilar markets, resulting, in practice in a trade-off between market size and market familiarity. Transaction costs associated with geographical and cultural differences have a greater impact on services sector firms that exhibit a stronger regional bias. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) partly offset these costs associated with investing in faraway and/or unfamiliar markets. In addition, international trade agreements increase the perceived attractiveness of a host country to potential investors. Political factors constitute binding constraints that deter emerging markets' firms from investing in developing markets. Yet, investors value political stability and transparency more than corruption control, fair and regular elections, and risk of expropriation in the host country. IPAs play only a marginal role in raising awareness of investment opportunities in developing countries, and may be particularly ineffective in many African countries. Nevertheless, IPAs appear to be a widely used and useful resource for investors once they have made the decision to enter a specific market. IPA services tend to be more valuable for smaller and less productive firms. Overall, the new TNCs from emerging economies do not appear to differ dramatically from their predecessors from developed and developing countries in previous waves of OFDI. Results suggest that to attract FDI from emerging economies, countries need to maintain market-friendly, liberal trade and investment policies. In addition, joining international trade and investment agreements can be benefitial to reduce transaction costs associated with cross border investment. Countries also need to provide a stable and predictable political and institutional environment. Last and not least, it is important to revamp IPAs and increase their effectiveness in raising awareness of investment opportunities and meeting investors' needs.

The 2011 World development report looks across disciplines and experiences drawn from around the world to offer some ideas and practical recommendations on how to move beyond conflict and fragility and secure development. The key messages are important for all countries-low, middle, and high income-as well as for regional and global institutions: first, institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion-the likelihood of violent conflict increases. Second, investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential to reducing violence. But there are major structural gaps in our collective capabilities to support these areas. Third, confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change. International agencies and partners from other countries must adapt procedures so they can respond with agility and speed, a longer-term perspective, and greater staying power. Fourth, need to adopt a layered approach. Some problems can be addressed at the country level, but others need to be addressed at a regional level, such as developing markets that integrate insecure areas and pooling resources for building capacity Fifth, in adopting these approaches, need to be aware that the global landscape is changing. Regional institutions and middle income countries are playing a larger role. This means should pay more attention to south-south and south-north exchanges, and to the recent transition experiences of middle income countries. L’édition 2011 du Rapport sur le développement dans le monde examine l’évolution de la violence en ce début de XXIe siècle où plus de 1,5 milliard d’êtres humains vivent dans des pays touchés par un conflit. Au siècle dernier, les conflits violents avaient pris avant tout la forme de guerres interétatiques et de guerres civiles ; aujourd’hui, la violence liée aux conflits locaux, à la répression politique et à la criminalité organisée est plus prononcée. Le Rapport souligne les répercussions négatives des conflits prolongés sur les perspectives de développement des pays et des régions et relève qu’aucun État à faible revenu touché par un conflit n’a encore atteint un seul des objectifs de développement pour le Millénaire. Le Rapport sur le développement dans le monde 2011 s’inspire de l’expérience des pays qui sont parvenus à donner la priorité à des mesures permettant de créer un climat de confiance entre l’État et les citoyens et à mettre en place des institutions capables d’assurer la sécurité, la justice et l’emploi. Les capacités des pouvoirs publics sont un élément essentiel de cette problématique, mais les compétences techniques ne suffisent pas : pour être légitimes, les institutions et les responsables des programmes doivent rendre des comptes aux citoyens. L’impunité, la corruption et les atteintes aux droits de l’homme empêchent l’instauration de rapports de confiance entre l’État et les citoyens et accroissent les risques de violence. Le message fondamental du Rapport est le suivant : il est crucial de renforcer la gouvernance et les institutions légitimes pour assurer la sécurité des citoyens, la justice et l’emploi et rompre ainsi l’enchaînement des cycles de violence.

Understanding the causes of economic inequality is critical for achieving equitable economic development. To investigate whether global warming has affected the recent evolution of inequality, we combine counterfactual historical temperature trajectories froma suite of global climate models with extensively replicated empirical evidence of the relationship between historical temperature fluctuations and economic growth. Together, these allow us to generate probabilistic country-level estimates of the influence of anthropogenic climate forcing on historical economic output. We find very high likelihood that anthropogenic climate forcing has increased economic inequality between countries. For example, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has been reduced 17–31% at the poorest four deciles of the population-weighted country-level per capita GDP distribution, yielding a ratio between the top and bottom deciles that is 25% larger than in a world without global warming. As a result, although between-country inequality has decreased over the past half century, there is ∼90% likelihood that global warming has slowed that decrease. The primary driver is the parabolic relationship between temperature and economic growth, with warming increasing growth in cool countries and decreasing growth in warm countries. Although there is uncertainty in whether historicalwarming has benefited some temperate, rich countries, for most poor countries there is >90% likelihood that per capita GDP is lower today than if global warming had not occurred. Thus, our results show that, in addition to not sharing equally in the direct benefits of fossil fuel use, many poor countries have been significantly harmed by the warming arising from wealthy countries’ energy consumption.

Overweight and obesity is a global epidemic. Forecasting future trajectories of the epidemic is crucial for providing an evidence base for policy change. In this study, we examine the historical trends of the global, regional, and national prevalence of adult overweight and obesity from 1990 to 2021 and forecast the future trajectories to 2050. Leveraging established methodology from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study, we estimated the prevalence of overweight and obesity among individuals aged 25 years and older by age and sex for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2050. Retrospective and current prevalence trends were derived based on both self-reported and measured anthropometric data extracted from 1350 unique sources, which include survey microdata and reports, as well as published literature. Specific adjustment was applied to correct for self-report bias. Spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression models were used to synthesise data, leveraging both spatial and temporal correlation in epidemiological trends, to optimise the comparability of results across time and geographies. To generate forecast estimates, we used forecasts of the Socio-demographic Index and temporal correlation patterns presented as annualised rate of change to inform future trajectories. We considered a reference scenario assuming the continuation of historical trends. Rates of overweight and obesity increased at the global and regional levels, and in all nations, between 1990 and 2021. In 2021, an estimated 1·00 billion (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 0·989–1·01) adult males and 1·11 billion (1·10–1·12) adult females had overweight and obesity. China had the largest population of adults with overweight and obesity (402 million [397–407] individuals), followed by India (180 million [167–194]) and the USA (172 million [169–174]). The highest age-standardised prevalence of overweight and obesity was observed in countries in Oceania and north Africa and the Middle East, with many of these countries reporting prevalence of more than 80% in adults. Compared with 1990, the global prevalence of obesity had increased by 155·1% (149·8–160·3) in males and 104·9% (95% UI 100·9–108·8) in females. The most rapid rise in obesity prevalence was observed in the north Africa and the Middle East super-region, where age-standardised prevalence rates in males more than tripled and in females more than doubled. Assuming the continuation of historical trends, by 2050, we forecast that the total number of adults living with overweight and obesity will reach 3·80 billion (95% UI 3·39–4·04), over half of the likely global adult population at that time. While China, India, and the USA will continue to constitute a large proportion of the global population with overweight and obesity, the number in the sub-Saharan Africa super-region is forecasted to increase by 254·8% (234·4–269·5). In Nigeria specifically, the number of adults with overweight and obesity is forecasted to rise to 141 million (121–162) by 2050, making it the country with the fourth-largest population with overweight and obesity. No country to date has successfully curbed the rising rates of adult overweight and obesity. Without immediate and effective intervention, overweight and obesity will continue to increase globally. Particularly in Asia and Africa, driven by growing populations, the number of individuals with overweight and obesity is forecast to rise substantially. These regions will face a considerable increase in obesity-related disease burden. Merely acknowledging obesity as a global health issue would be negligent on the part of global health and public health practitioners; more aggressive and targeted measures are required to address this crisis, as obesity is one of the foremost avertible risks to health now and in the future and poses an unparalleled threat of premature disease and death at local, national, and global levels. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Cost-effectiveness analysis is used to compare the costs and outcomes of alternative policy options. Each resulting cost-effectiveness ratio represents the magnitude of additional health gained per additional unit of resources spent. Cost-effectiveness thresholds allow cost-effectiveness ratios that represent good or very good value for money to be identified. In 2001, the World Health Organization's Commission on Macroeconomics in Health suggested cost-effectiveness thresholds based on multiples of a country's per-capita gross domestic product (GDP). In some contexts, in choosing which health interventions to fund and which not to fund, these thresholds have been used as decision rules. However, experience with the use of such GDP-based thresholds in decision-making processes at country level shows them to lack country specificity and this - in addition to uncertainty in the modelled cost-effectiveness ratios - can lead to the wrong decision on how to spend health-care resources. Cost-effectiveness information should be used alongside other considerations - e.g. budget impact and feasibility considerations - in a transparent decision-making process, rather than in isolation based on a single threshold value. Although cost-effectiveness ratios are undoubtedly informative in assessing value for money, countries should be encouraged to develop a context-specific process for decision-making that is supported by legislation, has stakeholder buy-in, for example the involvement of civil society organizations and patient groups, and is transparent, consistent and fair.

The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2019 provides a rules-based synthesis of the available evidence on levels and trends in health outcomes, a diverse set of risk factors, and health system responses. GBD 2019 covered 204 countries and territories, as well as first administrative level disaggregations for 22 countries, from 1990 to 2019. Because GBD is highly standardised and comprehensive, spanning both fatal and non-fatal outcomes, and uses a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of hierarchical disease and injury causes, the study provides a powerful basis for detailed and broad insights on global health trends and emerging challenges. GBD 2019 incorporates data from 281 586 sources and provides more than 3·5 billion estimates of health outcome and health system measures of interest for global, national, and subnational policy dialogue. All GBD estimates are publicly available and adhere to the Guidelines on Accurate and Transparent Health Estimate Reporting. From this vast amount of information, five key insights that are important for health, social, and economic development strategies have been distilled. These insights are subject to the many limitations outlined in each of the component GBD capstone papers.