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Šiame straipsnyje atkreipiame dėmesi i problemą, susijusią su J. Stanley'io ir T. Williamsono Ryleb regreso argumento rekonstrukcija, kad paneigtume ju kritiką Ryleb argumento atžvilgiu. Ryleb kritikos objektą nustatome analizuodami kai kuriuos intelektualizmus, kurie bando išspręsti regreso argumentą. Norėdami suderinti intelektualizmo ir antiintelektualizmo prieštarą, siūlome nuosaikią intelektualizmo versiją - intelektualinio paaiškinimo tezę, kuri nesukelia begalinio regreso ir išlaiko būtiną ryši tarp „žiniu kaip\" ir „žiniu ko\". Šia alternatyvia teze ivedamas kriterijus, pagal kuri galima spręsti, veiksmas yra intelektualus ar ne, todėl siūlomas naujas požiūris i sudėtingą intelektualinio veiksmo ir žiniu santyki.

Anti-intellectualism—a distrust of intellectuals and experts—has had a significant political presence in the U.S. and globally, especially in recent years. Anti-intellectualism drives support for phenomena such as populism, a rejection of scientific consensus, and health and science misinformation endorsement. Therefore, discovering what drives someone to be more anti-intellectual is highly important in understanding contemporary public opinion and political behavior. Here, I argue that a significant and overlooked factor contributing to anti-intellectualism is rural social identification—a psychological attachment to being from a rural area or small town—because rural identity in particular views experts and intellectuals as an out-group. Using 2019 ANES pilot data (N = 3000), original survey data (N = 811) and a separate original survey experiment, I find that rural social identification significantly predicts greater anti-intellectualism. Conversely, anti-intellectualism is not significantly associated with rural residency alone, as theoretically speaking, simply living in a rural area does not capture the affective dimension of rural psychological attachment. These findings have implications for health and science attitudes, populist support, and other relevant political matters. They also have implications for what it means to hold a rural identity beyond anti-urban sentiment, and for understanding the urban–rural divide.

Roughly speaking, intellectualists contend that practical knowledge is always a matter of having the right kind of propositional knowledge. This article argues that intellectualism faces a serious explanatory challenge when practical knowledge crucially relies on ecological information, i.e. when know-how is scaffolded. More precisely, intellectualists struggle to provide a satisfactory explanation of seeming know-how contrasts in structurally similar cases of scaffolded ability manifestation. In contrast, even if anti-intellectualism is similarly challenged, at least some varieties of anti-intellectualism seemingly hold resources to account for the relevant contrasts.

Books are often the targets of anti-intellectual censorship efforts in schools for two reasons. First, they are integral to the process and practice of reading, which is how people encounter new ideas. Second, the coercive nature of curriculum means that students must read books with controversial ideas. Emily Knox argues that the people who challenge books believe strongly in the power of books, and it is this belief that motivates their actions. To combat these efforts, educators must have in place robust policies and procedures for choosing and defending curriculum materials, directly name anti-intellectualism as a threat to education, and avoid treating any single book as presenting a complete and absolute version of the truth.

Epistemic hubris—the expression of unwarranted factual certitude—is a conspicuous yet understudied democratic hazard. Here, in two nationally representative studies, we examine its features and analyze its variance. We hypothesize, and find, that epistemic hubris is (a) prevalent, (b) bipartisan, and (c) associated with both intellectualism (an identity marked by ruminative habits and learning for its own sake) and anti-intellectualism (negative affect toward intellectuals and the intellectual establishment). Moreover, these correlates of epistemic hubris are distinctly partisan: intellectuals are disproportionately Democratic, whereas anti-intellectuals are disproportionately Republican. By implication, we suggest that both the intellectualism of Blue America and the anti-intellectualism of Red America contribute to the intemperance and intransigence that characterize civil society in the United States.

Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. This essay defends intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state reported.

In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of control for precisely the same reason: each reduce control to a passive, mechanistic, automatic process, which then prevents them from producing a substantive account of how controlled processes can be characterized by seemingly intelligent features and integrated with personal-level states. I will end by introducing three different kinds of control, which are constitutive of skilled action: strategic control, selective, top—down, automatic attention, and motor control. It will become clear that Dreyfus cannot account for any of these three kinds of control while Stanley has difficulty tackling the two latter kinds.

Richard Hofstadter's classic Anti-intellectualism in American Life (1963) dissects the anti-intellectualism that runs through American history, with anti-evolutionism perhaps the most vivid example among the cases he examines. Fifty years after Hofstadter's death in 1970, the specter of anti-evolutionism still haunts the American scene, especially in science education. Here, Branch examines the connection that Hofstadter discern between anti-intellectualism and anti-evolutionism in the past, the developments that have occurred in the half-century since Hofstadter's death, and the extent of his analysis in understanding the present situation.

These are troubled times in the United States. Trouble keeps coming fast, and not the good kind. As people of African descent, we've long known that it can be dangerous for us to trust the motives and methods of the systems that control our lives. Now, that danger looms for a new set of groups and institutions. Law firms. Newspapers. Universities. There are more sticks and fewer carrots to separate the obedient from the untamed, and the administration shows no hesitation when wielding their sticks. So we are proud that Volume 43.4 features a timely and critical special section on The Austin School Black Studies Manifesto.

Skilful expertise is grounded in practical, performative knowledge-how, not in detached, spectatorial knowledge-that, and knowledge-how is embodied by habitual dispositions, not representation of facts and rules. Consequently, as action control is a key requirement for the intelligent selection, initiation, and regulation of skilful performance, habitual action control, i.e. the kind of action control based on habitual dispositions, is the true hallmark of skill and the only veridical criterion to evaluate expertise. Not only does this imply that knowledge-that does not make your actions more skilful, but it also implies that it makes them less skilful. This thesis, that I call Radical Habitualism, finds a precursor in Hubert Dreyfus. His approach is considered extreme by most philosophers of skill & expertise: an agent –says Dreyfus– does not perform like an expert when they lack the embodied dispositions necessary to control their action habitually or when they stop relying on such dispositions to control their actions. Thus, one cannot perform skilfully if their actions are guided by representations (isomorphic schemas, explicit rules, and contentful instructions), as the know-that that they convey disrupts or diminishes the agent’s habitual engagement with the task at hand. In defence of Radical Habitualism, I will argue that only the contentless know-how embedded in habitual dispositions fulfils (i) the genetic, (ii) the normative, and (iii) the epistemic requirements of skilful performance. I will examine the phenomenological premises supporting Dreyfus’ approach, clarify their significance for a satisfactory normative and explanatory account of skilful expertise, and rebut the most common objections raised by both intellectualists and conciliatory habitualists, concerning hybrid actions guided by a mix of habitual and representational forms of control. In revisiting Dreyfus anti-representationalist approach, I will particularly focus on its epistemological implications, de-emphasizing other considerations related to conscious awareness.