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PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether loan officers' risk taking in credit decisions are associated with their personal financial risk preference and personality traits or solely with bank-contextual and loan-relevant factors.Design/methodology/approachAn online survey administered in six large Swedish banks to 163 loan officers responsible for assessing credit risk and approval of loan applications. The loan officers rated their likelihood of approving fictitious loan applications from business companies.FindingsThe loan officers' credit risk taking is associated with bank-contextual factors, directly with perceived organizational credit risk norms and indirectly with self-confidence in assessing credit risks through attitude to credit risk taking. A direct association is also found with personal financial risk preference but not with personality traits.Research limitations/implicationsIncreased awareness of that loan officers' personal financial risk preference is associated with their credit risk taking in loan decisions but that the banks' risk policy has a stronger association. Banks' managements and boards should therefore assure that their credit risk policy is implemented, followed and being aligned with their performance incentives.Practical implicationsIncreased awareness of that loan officers' credit risk taking is associated with personal financial risk preference but more strongly with the banks' risk policy that motivate banks' managements and boards to assure that their credit risk policy is implemented, followed and being aligned with their performance incentives.Originality/valueThe first study which directly compare the associations of loan officers' risk taking in credit approvals with personal risk preference and personality traits versus bank-contextual factors and loan-relevant information.

VAR analysis on a measure of bank lending standards collected by the Federal Reserve reveals that shocks to lending standards are significantly correlated with innovations in commercial loans at banks and in real output. Credit standards strongly dominate loan rates in explaining variation in business loans and output. Standards remain significant when we include various proxies for loan demand, suggesting that part of the standards fluctuations can be identified with changes in loan supply. Standards are also significant in structural equations of some categories of inventory investment, a GDP component closely associated with bank lending. The estimated impact of a moderate tightening of standards on inventory investment is of the same order of magnitude as the decline in inventory investment over the typical recession.

This paper estimates the impact of loan officer subjectivity on microcredit granting by exploiting an exceptionally detailed database from a Brazilian microfinance institution. The loan officers collect field data, meet with applicants, and make recommendations to the credit committee, which has the final say on both loan approval and loan size (LS). The loan officer's subjectivity is captured through gender bias. Our estimations indeed show subjective gender gap in LS. This gap is almost exclusively attributable to loan officers. We interpret this finding as evidence that, despite monitoring and wage incentivization, microcredit officers let their subjective preferences interfere with loan granting. We conclude by suggesting alternative means to curb subjectivity in credit allocation to micro-entrepreneurs.

Purpose - The aim of the paper is to analyse female and male loan officers' (LOs) risk aversion as they assess different types of small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) loan applications. Design/methodology/approach - The data were gathered from a sample of 75 Swedish LOs, using the repertory grid technique and related questions. The data were analysed statistically. Findings - The findings demonstrate that female LOs focus more on collateral (used as a proxy for risk aversion) in their evaluations of first-time loan applications than male LOs. However, the findings also suggest that there are no significant differences between the two groups as far as risk aversion when they evaluate additional loan applications. The other variables controlled for (age, tenure, insight, education, and location) did not significantly affect the LOs' risk aversion. Research limitations/implications - The study might have benefited from the use of complementary data collection approaches. Access to actual assessment and decision-making procedures could have increased the understanding of female and male LOs' attitudes toward risk. Practical implications - The findings suggest that by the use of female-male LO teams, banks may achieve more balanced assessments of SMEs' loan applications. Originality/value - To the authors' knowledge, the literature has not explicitly addressed risk aversion among female and male LOs with respect to different types of bank loans. Moreover, the authors investigated risk aversion in the context of standardised assessments procedures used to reduce exposure to credit risk.

This report brings together the results of an eight-part series of presentations by leading experts in issues directly related to microfinance institutional sustainability. It is intended for microfinance institution (MFI) board members, managers, and staff members as well as for government regulators, supervisors, and donor staff members. The first four chapters include topics in risk management: (1) risk management systems, (2) good governance, (3) interest rates, and (4) micro-insurance. The last four chapters include four topics in new product development and efficient delivery methodologies: (5) housing microfinance, (6) micro-leasing, (7) disaster preparedness products and systems, and (8) new technologies. The objectives of the series were as follows: i) to strengthen MFIs by disseminating innovative approaches in risk management, cost control, governance, and new technologies; ii) to promote a South-South exchange of experiences and lessons learned; iii) to promote greater ties among the MFIs in the region and between MFIs and government supervisors and regulators; and iv) to highlight the Bank's ability to mobilize international technical expertise in microfinance.

We show that the cost of employee turnover in firms that rely on decentralized knowledge and personal relationships depends on the firms' planning horizons and the departing employees' incentives to transfer information. Using exogenous shocks to the relationship between borrowers and loan officers, we document that borrowers whose loan officers are on leave are less likely to receive new loans from the bank, are more likely to apply for credit from other banks, and are more likely to miss payments or go into default. These costs are smaller when turnover is expected, as in the case of maternity leave, or when loan officers have incentives to transfer information, as in the case of voluntary resignations. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance .

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self-reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk-aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.